



**FREE CONGRESS RESEARCH & EDUCATION FOUNDATION**

# **Ethnic Voters and National Issues**

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## **Coalitions in the 1980's**

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**Stuart Rothenberg  
Eric Licht  
with  
Frank Newport**

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# Table of Contents

|                                                 |    |
|-------------------------------------------------|----|
| <b>Preface</b>                                  | v  |
| <b>Chapter 1: The Ethnic Element</b>            | 1  |
| Defining Ethnicity                              | 2  |
| Why Ethnicity?                                  | 4  |
| Issues, Ethnicity and Voting Behavior           | 7  |
| <b>Chapter 2: The Historical Context</b>        | 11 |
| The Irish Vote                                  | 11 |
| The Polish Vote                                 | 15 |
| The Italian Vote                                | 17 |
| The Jewish Vote                                 | 20 |
| The Mexican Vote                                | 24 |
| <b>Chapter 3: Methodology</b>                   | 27 |
| <b>Chapter 4: Ethnicity and Economic Policy</b> | 33 |
| "The Greatest Economic Problem"                 | 35 |
| Cutting Programs                                | 35 |
| Defense Spending and a Balanced Budget          | 38 |
| Student Loans                                   | 41 |
| Workfare                                        | 41 |
| Approaching Economic Issues                     | 43 |
| <b>Chapter 5: Ethnicity and Social Policy</b>   | 47 |
| Social Responsibility                           | 47 |
| The Equal Rights Amendment                      | 49 |
| Affirmative Action                              | 53 |
| Busing                                          | 55 |
| Abortion                                        | 57 |
| Tuition Tax Credits                             | 61 |
| Law and Order                                   | 64 |
| Environment versus Development                  | 66 |
| Approaching Social Policy                       | 68 |
| <b>Chapter 6: Ethnicity and Foreign Policy</b>  | 69 |
| Poland                                          | 84 |
| Defining Foreign Policy Issues                  | 84 |

|                                                |         |
|------------------------------------------------|---------|
| <b>Chapter 7: Ethnicity and Coalitions</b>     | 87      |
| Reviewing the Issues                           | 87      |
| Ideology and Partisanship                      | 89      |
| Jews                                           | 89      |
| Hispanics                                      | 91      |
| Italians/Poles/Irish                           | 93      |
| Women                                          | 94      |
| Organized Labor and the Blue Collar Vote       | 96      |
| The Conservative Label                         | 101     |
| Conclusion                                     | 104     |
| <br><b>Appendix I: A Multivariate Analysis</b> | <br>107 |
| <i>Frank Newport</i>                           |         |
| <br><b>Appendix II</b>                         | <br>113 |
| <br><b>Appendix III</b>                        | <br>133 |
| <br><b>Appendix IV: Supplementary Tables</b>   | <br>135 |

## Preface

The idea for this study was first advanced by Eric Licht at a foundation meeting in the summer of 1981. Given the breadth of the subject, as well as the various interests, skills, and previous commitments of those involved in the project, it seemed desirable and profitable to divide the labor. Therefore, Eric Licht wrote the historical section of the study, and he assisted in the construction of the ethnic voter questionnaire. Dr. Stuart Rothenberg, who directed the project, had prime responsibility for the creation of the questionnaire and for the analysis of the results. He also exercised final editorial discretion over the project as a whole. Dr. Frank Newport, Vice-President of V. Lance Tarrance and Associates of Houston, Texas, provided methodological advice and expertise throughout the project, and he played a crucial role in creating the survey questionnaire, in selecting the methodological approaches to draw the necessary sample, and in the writing of Chapter 3. He also wrote the appendix on multivariate analysis.

We hope this study contains data and analysis which are of interest to a wide-range of readers, including academics, journalists and campaign professionals. Some readers may choose to bypass the chi squares or the multiple regression analysis. Others may find these elements most useful. But since we hope that this work will have a wide distribution, we tried to provide the sort of information which would be interesting to readers from various backgrounds.

By conducting the survey in mid-1982 and releasing our results some two months prior to the November elections, we are able to furnish information and analysis which is both timely and, we hope, valuable for the 1982 contests. However, beyond November, we hope that the data and analysis which follow will be useful to those seeking an understanding of the attitudes of Irish, Italian, Polish, Jewish and Hispanic voters, as well as those interested in the ways particular issues can be framed so that they appeal to specific groups.

We would like to thank foundation president Paul Weyrich for encouraging us to proceed with the project and Lance Tarrance and his staff for their assistance and advice. Dr. Elaine Rusinko Rothenberg did her usual find job in helping to edit initial drafts, as did Rosanna Marshall Licht. Many others also contributed, from posing possible survey questions to assisting in the compilation of data. Particular thanks go to Congressman Newt Gingrich of Georgia who took some time during the formative stages of this study to make suggestions about the sorts of questions which should be asked.

S.R.

August, 1982

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## Chapter 1: The Ethnic Element

Over the last thirty years political scientists have spent considerable time and energy examining voting behavior. Most of their attention has been directed at party identification and voter turnout, and almost every imaginable demographic variable has been employed to discover how members of particular groups vote and why they vote the way they do. Among the various categories studied have been certain ethnic groups, but the research in this area is not as complete as it might be. In fact, one observer surveyed the major political science journals and concluded that political scientists have given relatively little attention to ethnic politics, and most of the research that has been done centered on black politics.<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that ethnic Americans, as an identifiable group, have been ignored. Michael Novak's *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* and Thomas Sowell's more recent *Ethnic America* are just two examples of panoramic descriptions of select ethnic groups.<sup>2</sup> There is also a good deal of literature which deals with ethnic consciousness and ethnic identity. Two of the more recent and extremely sophisticated voting behavior studies, *The Changing American Voter* and *Party Coalitions*, deal with ethnic groups as segments of the American electorate.<sup>3</sup>

An adequate understanding of ethnic voting behavior is all the more important today. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the defeat of many liberal Democratic senators suggest that the electorate is groping for new solutions to old problems. Moreover, the results of the 1980 elections question traditional assumptions about what attitudes particular groups hold on economic, social and defense issues and how they behave in the voting booth. Since the upheavals of the 1960's, members of a number of ethnic groups appear to be becoming more conservative and, in some areas, somewhat less Democratic.<sup>4</sup> Ronald Reagan directed an appeal to blue collar Democrats, and many of those voters, who are ethnics and who traditionally have backed Democrats, opted to support the Republican presidential nominee in 1980.<sup>5</sup> Reagan even did relatively well

<sup>1</sup>Laurence G. Flood, "Ethnic Politics and Political Science: A Survey of Leading Journals," *Ethnicity* 7 (March 1980): 99.

<sup>2</sup>Michael Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973) and Thomas Sowell, *Ethnic America* (New York: Basic Books, 1981). For a radical view of ethnicity, and one which holds that "American pluralism derives from the fact that it was built upon systematic inequalities that constituted an untenable basis for long-term ethnic preservation," see Stephen Steinberg, *The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America* (New York: Atheneum, 1981), pp. 254-255.

<sup>3</sup>Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979) and John R. Petrocik, *Party Coalitions: Realignments and the Decline of the New Deal Party System* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

<sup>4</sup>For a discussion of the attitudes and behavior of certain groups, see Petrocik, *Party Coalitions*.

<sup>5</sup>In 1980 Ronald Reagan drew 51% of the Catholic vote and 39% of the Jewish vote, both far beyond the normal Republican percentages. Reagan also won 47% of the blue collar vote to Jimmy Carter's 46%, and the Republican nominee barely lost the labor union household vote 47% to 44%. See Everett Carl Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate: Election Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Spring 1981): 1-25.

among Jewish voters. But Republican strength in blue collar ethnic areas did not stop at the top of the ticket. The heavily industrialized Youngstown, Ohio area elected Republican Lyle Williams to Congress in 1978 and reelected him in 1980, and the same scenerio was followed by Republican Don Ritter in the industrial Lehigh Valley of eastern Pennsylvania.

However, it is not yet clear whether ethnic Americans are ready to turn their backs completely on the Democratic Party, and it is equally uncertain whether the policies being advocated by the Republican Party and its standard-bearer will lead those ethnic voters to continue to support conservatives and Republicans throughout the 1980's. The present study will attempt to answer those questions. Our investigation will examine potential voters in terms of both their ethnic background and their positions on a number of specific economic, social and foreign policy questions. We will also place their responses to those questions into a historical context by briefly examining the political development of four Catholic ethnic groups—the Irish, Italians, Poles and Hispanics—and a fifth group, Jews. Finally, we will discuss the ways in which issues can be defined, framed and prioritized by ideological and issue groups so as to appeal to ethnic constituents.

### Defining Ethnicity

The terms "ethnics" and "ethnicity" have been used in many different ways by researchers and writers. One of the most narrow and purely objective definitions is employed by the United States Census Bureau. When it classifies the national origin of ethnics, it includes only those who are immigrants or whose parents are immigrants. In such a case, the test of whether one is or is not an ethnic is clear and concise. Sociologist Milton Gordon defines "ethnic group" somewhat more broadly, as any group "which is defined or set off by race, religion, or national origin, or some combination of these categories."<sup>6</sup> In this definition, there is no generational limitation, as in the Census' definition, and race and religion are considered along with national origin.<sup>7</sup>

Most writers have gone even further and have chosen to emphasize an individual's identification with a racial, religious or national group. Michael Novak, for example, defines an ethnic group as

a group with historical memory, real or imaginary. One belongs to an ethnic group in part voluntarily, in part by choice... Ethnic memory is not a set of events re-

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<sup>6</sup>Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in America: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 27. For a discussion of the conceptual and definitional problems of ethnicity, as well as for an examination of the evolution of the term, see James H. Dormon, "Ethnic Groups and 'Ethnicity': Some Theoretical Considerations," *The Journal of Ethnic Studies* 7 (Winter 1980): 23-36.

<sup>7</sup>Not everyone believes that "race" and "ethnicity" should be assimilated. For a critical view, see M. G. Smith, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups in America: The View from Harvard," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 5 (January 1982): 1-22.

membered, but rather a set of instincts, feelings, intimacies, expectations, patterns of emotions and behavior; a sense of reality.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, in *The Ethnic Factor in the Urban Polity* Richard Gabriel focuses on how the individual sees himself. As a result, he defines ethnicity as "that general attitudinal orientation by which an individual perceives himself as part of an ethnic group. This sense of identification extends to the group, its membership, its values and its traditions."<sup>9</sup>

These different definitions reflect the complexity of the concept of ethnicity. And yet, all definitions probably fit into one or more of the "approaches to ethnicity" identified by Tom W. Smith.<sup>10</sup> Smith's Natal Approach defines ethnicity in terms of the individual's place of birth or of the places of birth of his relatives. The second approach, the Subjective Approach, "simply asks the person what ethnicity he considers himself or where his ancestors came from." This approach allows the individual to use his own judgment in classifying his ethnic heritage. Finally, the Behavioral Approach defines ethnicity in terms of observable behavior such as language or group membership.

Most people, however, do not think of ethnicity in such elaborate terms. In common usage, an "ethnic" is someone who is Catholic or Jewish and who traces his origins from a country other than Great Britain. Increasingly, blacks and Hispanics are included under the ethnic umbrella, but most Americans probably associate the term "ethnics" with blue collar Catholics whose families originally came from Central, Southern or Eastern Europe, or from Ireland. In this country, that means areas like the Italian south end of Boston, the Polish east end of Buffalo and the Irish wards of Chicago.

Since this study is primarily political analysis, there is no need for us to become involved in the intricacies of the various definitions of ethnicity. This is not, after all, a study of ethnicity, but rather of political attitudes and voting behavior by ethnics. For the purposes of this study, then, a person's ethnicity is defined by asking him what part of the world his ancestors came from. Under the system of classification identified by Tom Smith, this would be classified as a Subjective Approach, and is identical to the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey question on ethnicity.

There are a number of reasons for adopting the Subjective Approach. First, as Tom Smith notes, the Natal Approach requires many respondents to identify the places of birth of great-grandparents, a difficult task and one of which many are incapable. And the Behavioral Approach relies solely on observable behavior. Since few Americans have a language other than English as their first language, and since few belong to groups which necessarily reflect a foreign nationality, this approach would produce an extremely small sample.

<sup>8</sup>Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*, p. 56.

<sup>9</sup>Richard Gabriel, *The Ethnic Factor in the Urban Polity* (New York: MSS Information Corporation, 1973), pp. 24-25.

<sup>10</sup>Tom W. Smith, "Ethnic Measurement and Identification," *Ethnicity* 7 (March 1980): 78-95.



The Subjective Approach, on the other hand, is likely to produce the largest sample, and that sample can in turn be broken down into different categories to control for intensity of identity, for first-or second-generation status, and even for observable behavior. Moreover, the Subjective Approach probably yields a sample which is closest to what most people think of when they hear the term "ethnic."

### Why Ethnicity?

There are a number of reasons for using ethnic voters as a frame of reference. First, there are a great many ethnics in America, and they play a potentially powerful role in American politics. Certain ethnic groups—whether they be Hispanics, Jews or Italians—play key roles in individual states, which means that those groups cannot be ignored in putting together a coalition to elect members of the House, members of the Senate or, since the electoral college is involved, the President.

Second, politicians running for office have structured their campaigns so as to appeal to the so-called ethnic vote, and political commenators have for years talked about ethnic blocs. The reason for this is simple. Campaigns are won by building a successful coalition of groups, and ethnic groups are frequently included as part of a winning coalition.<sup>11</sup> As John Petrocik has written,

To treat the party coalitions as aggregates of social groups—as much as or more than aggregates of issue groups...has the advantage of applying a general commonsense perspective about 'who' supports 'whom,' and about who is a Democrat and who is a Republican.<sup>12</sup>

While either of these reasons might be sufficient to justify a study of ethnic voters, there is a third and overriding rationale. If ethnicity were not related to voting behavior there would be no reason to focus on ethnic groups in a political analysis. In fact, as Andrew Greeley has written, "ethnicity is an important predictor of political behavior in American society."<sup>13</sup> Almost twenty years ago James Q. Wilson and Edward Banfield found that different ethnic groups within the same economic class had different attitudes about public expenditures.<sup>14</sup> More recently, Dale Nelson studied six ethnic groups, controlling for socioeconomic status, and found that "both ethnicity and socioeconomic status make *independent* and powerful contributions to the explanation of participant culture. Ethnicity, however, proved to be a *better* predictor of participant attitudes

<sup>11</sup>For one of the earlier discussions of this point, see Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 63.

<sup>12</sup>Petrocik, *Party Coalitions*, p. 28.

<sup>13</sup>Andrew M. Greeley, "Political Participation among Ethnic Groups in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance," *American Journal of Sociology* 80 (July 1974): 173.

<sup>14</sup>James Q. Wilson and Edward Banfield, "Public-Regardness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review* 58 (December 1964): 884.



than socioeconomic status."<sup>15</sup> The same sort of conclusions resulted from Thomas Pavlak's study of East European, Irish and Mexican ethnics in Chicago. Pavlak tested party affiliation and voting preference against a number of variables, among them ethnicity. He found that while occupation was the most important variable, ethnic identification was more important as an explanatory variable than was age, education or income.<sup>16</sup>

The findings of Patricia Ann Taylor go even further. Taylor examined the cultural beliefs of fifteen religioethnic groups, controlling for such variables as age, sex, occupation and education. What she found was that

even when controls for variation in socioeconomic status are introduced, religioethnic identification proves to be a significant predictor of differences in cultural beliefs.<sup>17</sup>

There has been a substantial amount of inquiry into the question of whether ethnicity decreases as a predictive variable the further away from the immigrant generation one goes. That is, even if Poles or Italians or Irish do exhibit group solidarity among first-generation immigrants, do second- and third-generation ethnics exhibit similar cohesiveness? If they do not, then there probably is no reason for studying them. The argument that ethnic voting behavior begins as homogeneous bloc voting but rapidly becomes heterogeneous was first put forward by Robert Dahl in *Who Governs?*<sup>18</sup> Dahl posits three stages of ethnic behavior. In the first, which would apply to first- and second-generation ethnics, "ethnic similarity is associated with similarity in political attitude, and there is a proposed tendency toward voting alike." The similarity results from the fact that all of the members of the group "are low in status, income, and influence."<sup>19</sup> In the second stage, the ethnic group becomes more heterogeneous on socioeconomic issues. Some members move into the middle class and enter higher status occupations. In the third and final stage, members of the ethnic group have become socioeconomically heterogeneous. Attitudes and loyalties change as the now assimilated ethnics "adopt a middle-class style of life." According to Dahl, "ethnic politics is often embarrassing and meaningless" to these third stage ethnic Americans.<sup>20</sup>

Dahl's hypothesis has been challenged frequently, and the overwhelming body of evidence indicates that Dahl was incorrect. In "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting" Raymond Wolfinger argued that "ethnicity is still

<sup>15</sup>Dale C. Nelson, "Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status as Sources of Participation: The Case for Ethnic Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 73 (December 1979): 1035-1036.

<sup>16</sup>Thomas J. Pavlak, *Ethnic Identification and Political Behavior* (San Francisco: R and E Research Associates, 1976), p. 51.

<sup>17</sup>Patricia Ann Taylor, "Education, Ethnicity and Cultural Assimilation in the United States," *Ethnicity* 8 (March 1981): 45. Also see Andrew M. Greeley, "A Note on Political and Social Differences Among Ethnic College Graduates," *Sociology of Education* 42 (Winter 1969): 98-103.

<sup>18</sup>Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 34-36.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 35.

an important factor in voting behavior and is not eliminated by changes in the economic characteristics of the individuals affected."<sup>21</sup> Michael Parenti agreed. While he acknowledged that "acculturation" does take place, he said it is "far from complete," and he argued that ethnic identity is "deeply internalized."<sup>22</sup>

Two empirical studies clearly suggest that increased status and assimilation do not necessarily mean the loss of ethnic identity. In a study of Hispanics, researchers found that Cuban and Mexican immigrants who became socialized (as defined by better understanding of the language and the endorsing of American values) were not necessarily integrated, but rather, developed renewed ethnic solidarity.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, in a survey of Irish and Italians, Richard Gabriel found that while intermarriage and place of residence contribute to lessen ethnic identification, "The conclusion appears unescapable that increases in occupational status do not have very much to do with breaking down ethnic identifications."<sup>24</sup>

The importance of ethnic identification is perhaps best described by Milton Gordon, who treats it as a thread which connects contemporary man with those generations which preceded him:

As though with a wily cunning of its own, as though there were some essential element in man's nature that demanded it—something that some ancestral group of fellows smaller by far than the whole human race, smaller often than the nation—the sense of ethnic belonging has survived. It has survived in various forms and with various names, but it has not perished, and twentieth-century urban man is closer to his stone-age ancestors than he knows.<sup>25</sup>

Of course it must be noted that voters who happen to be members of a particular ethnic group are also members of other voluntary and non-voluntary groups. That is, they belong to other demographic groups and to economic, religious and social organizations. Therefore, ethnic identification does not always determine an individual's behavior. For while a member of a particular ethnic group may hold certain values and look at things in a particular way, "even a person for whom ethnicity is a deep reservoir of meaning, belonging and self-esteem will not deliberately bring his/her ethnic identity to the fore in every social interaction or political engagement."<sup>26</sup> Nonetheless, there is no doubt but that ethnicity is a significant variable, and as the studies which we have cited

<sup>21</sup>Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," in Lawrence H. Fuchs, ed., *American Ethnic Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 192.

<sup>22</sup>Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," *American Political Science Review* 61 (September 1967): 724.

<sup>23</sup>Alejandro Portes, Robert Nash Parker and Jose A. Cobas, "Assimilation or Consciousness: Perceptions of U.S. Society Among Recent Latin American Immigrants to the United States," *Social Forces* 59 (September 1980): 220.

<sup>24</sup>Gabriel, *The Ethnic Factor in the Urban Polity*, p. 96.

<sup>25</sup>Milton M. Gordon, *Human Nature, Class and Ethnicity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 108.

<sup>26</sup>Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 7.

demonstrate, it is reasonable and productive to examine voting behavior within and among ethnic groups.

### Issues, Ethnicity and Voting Behavior

The underlying assumption of this study is that at least in part, people vote on the basis of issues. This does not mean that some voters, ethnics and non-ethnics alike, do not cast their ballots because of a particular candidate's party affiliation, ethnic background or personal appearance. In a race with low visibility, the voters may not know the issues or may select the candidate listed first on the ballot or the candidate who lives down the street. But on federal races or important state contests, issues are a crucial factor in determining which candidate will win.

The question of how much issue voting exists has been one of the most discussed and researched topics in American politics. In the 1950's, the authors of the seminal work *The American Voter* found a lack of political awareness and sophistication as a whole and concluded, "The major role played by candidate appeal suggests the absence of overriding public concern to judge the policies of the candidates and their parties."<sup>27</sup> But the overwhelming amount of evidence now indicates that things have changed dramatically and that issues have become an important element in the individual's voting decision. In the most exhaustive recent study of American voting behavior, *The Changing American Voter* (1979), Nie, Verba and Petrocik found that prior to 1964 candidates were evaluated primarily in terms of their party and personal attributes, but after that issues took on much greater importance:

The 1956 and 1960 presidential elections appear to have been dominated by habitual partisan loyalties. Partisanship alone accounts for almost 50 percent of the variance in the presidential vote. Positions on issues played almost no role. The year 1964 brings a decline in pure party voting. In the presidential election and the two subsequent ones, habitual party attachments play a reduced role. And from 1964 onward, political issues play a growing role in determining the direction of the vote. There is, however, a major difference between the 1964 and 1972 election. In 1964, partisan loyalty and issues appear to be reinforcing factors for a large portion of the citizenry. . . . The pattern for 1972 is very different. Beliefs now appear to be an independent force in determining the direction of the vote.<sup>28</sup>

Even those voters who express a strong attachment to a political party do not ignore the positions of that party on important issues. According to Petrocik,

The central feature of this issue basis of party support is not the particular political opinion of the voter, but the extent to which the voter is able to attach that opinion to the parties. In short, voters are Democratic or Republican because they feel that the party they prefer represents their position on the issues. Whether this percep-

<sup>27</sup>Angus Campbell et. al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), p. 550.

<sup>28</sup>Nie, Verba and Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*, p. 305.



tion is objectively correct is substantially irrelevant. Since voters behave on the basis of what they believe to be true, it is the perceived issue position of the parties and not their objective position that determines the support given to them by voters.<sup>29</sup>

If people paid little or no attention to issues and voted primarily on the basis of a candidate's appearance there would be no reason to ask voters about their attitudes toward a balanced budget, abortion or Soviet-American relations. But there is now an abundance of evidence which demonstrates the importance of issues. Even incumbent members of Congress cannot assume they will be re-elected simply because they provide good constituent services. While his critics acknowledged that Illinois Republican Tom Railsback had a staff second to none in responding to questions from his constituents, that did not prevent him from being defeated in an ideological primary in 1982.<sup>30</sup>

Of course, it is possible that rather than supporting a candidate because of his positions, some voters may adopt issue positions because those stances are being articulated by a candidate they like.<sup>31</sup> That is, the direction of causality between an individual's political attitudes and his vote for a particular candidate is not always clear and this may have particular significance in ethnic voting. For example, it is generally accepted that all things being equal, ethnics tend to vote for members of the same ethnic group. It is commonplace in some states for the major parties to insure that their state-wide ticket is regionally and ethnically balanced, in the belief that Jews prefer to vote for Jews, Italians for Italians and blacks for blacks. In 1961, for example, the New York City Republican ticket included Louis Lefkowitz for Mayor, Paul Fino for President of the New York City Council and John J. Gilhooley for Comptroller. The Jewish-Italian-Irish combination was not the result of pure chance.

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<sup>29</sup>Petrocik, *Party Coalitions*, p. 114. According to a similar view,

the electoral coalitions of the Republican and Democratic parties are composed of voters with distinctive issue preferences. Over the last two decades Republicans have attracted the electoral support of voters with conservative positions on the issues of health care, aid to education, guaranteed jobs, fair employment and school integration. Conversely, Democrats have received a disproportionate share of the votes of liberals on these issues. This evidence does not mean, of course, that voters with similar views on public policy always support the same party or that issues are the primary motivations underlying mass electoral behavior. It does indicate, however, that there is an issue base to the electoral coalition of the Republican and Democratic parties.

Edward G. Carmines and J. David Gopoian, "Issue Coalitions, Issueless Campaigns: The Paradox of Rationality in American Presidential Elections," *The Journal of Politics* 43 (November 1981): 1187.

<sup>30</sup>Other factors, most importantly redistricting, also played a role in Railsback's primary defeat. To be sure, there have been races in which public policy issues were not paramount. For example, John R. Petrocik found that in the four-way 1975 Democratic primary race for mayor of Chicago "issues did not play a large part in the voting calculus of the Richard Daley voter." John R. Petrocik, "Voting in a Machine City, Chicago, 1975," *Ethnicity* 8 (September 1981): 325.

<sup>31</sup>See Benjamin I. Page and Calvin C. Jones, "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalty and the Vote," *American Political Science Review* 73 (December 1979): 1077.

The scholarly literature gives strong evidence for the proposition that ethnics vote for one another. In an examination of ethnic voting in rural and urban areas, Lorinskas, Hawkins and Edwards studied voters with Polish surnames in Chicago and in Perry County, Illinois. The study found that "in partisan as well as nonpartisan elections, ethnicity was a factor in the voting choice of sample voters," though the researchers concluded that ethnic voting would increase in nonpartisan races.<sup>32</sup> The study also found ethnic voting more prevalent in Chicago than in rural Perry County.

New Haven, Connecticut, undoubtedly one of the most frequently studied cities in the country, provides a classic example of ethnic voting. In 1937 Democrat John W. Murphy drew 52% of the vote in New Haven's 10th ward, an Italian area.<sup>33</sup> Two years later, against an Italian Republican, the first Italian nominated by either party, Murphy drew only 22% in the 10th ward. Against the same Republican in 1945, Murphy pulled an even more meager 17%, but in 1947 the Democratic nominee, this time an Italian, drew a much more respectable 42% of the vote in the 10th.

Ethnic voting in New Haven did not end in the 1940's. In the 1975 Democratic primary for mayor, the city's Italians backed Anthony Barbieri, while the non-Italian voters supported Frank Logue. With Logue winning the nomination, the Republicans nominated John Esposito, the head of the local Italian-American Civil Rights League. According to one source, Esposito "ran the strongest mayoral race in years by a Republican" and he did well among Italian voters, even though he was beaten by Logue.<sup>34</sup> To be sure, Michael Johnston notes that Italian wards in New Haven were "over-rewarded" in CETA (Comprehensive Employment Training Act) jobs, which could account for their support of the "machine candidate" Barbieri in the primary. But even though there may have been non-ethnic reasons for Italians to back Barbieri and Esposito, there is little doubt that ethnicity was a factor in Italian voting behavior.

However, while other variables are involved, political scientists and political observers agree that issues play an increasingly important role in an individual's decision about which candidate to support. After all, Lefkowitz, Gilhooley and Fino lost. The phenomenon of ethnics voting for ethnics is an interesting one, but if issues are emphasized in the campaign and if there are significant differences in the policy positions of the candidates, the voters are more likely to react to the issue positions of the office seekers rather than to their ethnicity. For this reason, by examining the attitudes of various ethnic groups towards a number of policy questions we are able to identify those issues which are important to each ethnic group and to compare the issue orientations of the groups.

<sup>32</sup>Robert A. Lorinskas, Brett W. Hawkins and Stephen D. Edwards, "The Persistence of Ethnic Voting in Urban and Rural Areas: Results from the Controlled Election Method," *Social Science Quarterly* 49 (March 1969): 894.

<sup>33</sup>See Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," pp. 163-193.

<sup>34</sup>Michael Johnson, "Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage," *American Political Science Review* 73 (June 1979): 392.

## Chapter 2: The Historical Context

As large numbers of immigrants entered the United States in the nineteenth century and became a part of the political process, they chose partisan sides. Whether they selected the Democrats or the Republicans depended on a number of factors, including how they were received by the parties, the parties' stances on particular issues, and which other groups joined the respective parties. The Democrats' hold over the ethnic groups became stronger just before the Depression. As Kevin Phillips notes:

Thus, even before the Great Depression [Al] Smith sparked a revolt of the urban ethnic groups which forshadowed the make-up of the New Deal coalition, although the meaning of Smith's break-through was ignored because of his national defeat.<sup>1</sup>

But the Democratic monopoly appears to be fading and while most political observers doubt that Jews and Catholics are permanently deserting the Democratic Party, those same observers acknowledge increased electoral independence on the part of those ethnic voters.<sup>2</sup> The question is now whether five decades after Franklin Roosevelt's victory in 1932, ethnic voters can still be counted on as the back-bone of the Democratic coalition.

### The Irish Vote

Equipped with unique political experiences, the Irish arrived in the United States with distinct advantages over other ethnic groups in the political arena. While in Ireland, these immigrants had learned how to establish extra-legal societies and courts, enabling them to understand the mechanisms behind certain political battles and strategies.<sup>3</sup> These covert operations were set up due to tough Irish laws banning Catholics from politics and certain professions.

The Irish immigrants did not begin to practice their self-taught political expertise in the United States until the mass migration was almost a generation old.<sup>4</sup> With the downfall of Boss Tweed, John Kelly took over New York's Tammany Hall. Irish mayors appeared in New York City in 1880, Boston in 1884, and Chicago in 1893. The elected Irish mayors further promoted their fellow

<sup>1</sup>Kevin Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1970), p. 58.

<sup>2</sup>See E. J. Dionne, Jr., "Catholics and the Democrats: Estrangement But Not Desertion" and Alan M. Fisher, "Jewish Political Shift? Erosion, Yes; Conversion, No" in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Party Coalitions in the 1980's* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981), pp. 307-340. Also see Mark A. Siegel, "Ethnics: A Democratic Stronghold," *Public Opinion* 1 (September-October, 1978).

<sup>3</sup>Stephan Thernstrom, ed., *The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 807.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 807.



ethnics by appointing friends to key political positions and to protected government jobs. Irish mayors have continued to be elected in large eastern and mid-western cities throughout the twentieth century. Political office may be cited as one reason for the rapid assimilation of the Irish into the mainstream of this society.

Traditionally, the Irish have been members of the Democratic Party, the primary reason being the overwhelming discrimination against ethnic groups from Yankee Republicans.<sup>5</sup> This cold shoulder treatment furthered the Irish belief that the Democrats offered them the greatest hope for political power and increased economic and social influence.

To appreciate the preponderance of Irish Democratic voting, one must examine presidential elections. In 1884 Republican James G. Blaine, who made a point of stressing his Irish heritage, was expected to win the Irish vote and the election. But when Samuel D. Burchard, a Presbyterian clergyman, referred to the Democrats as the party of "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion," the Irish went to the polls in New York and gave the election to Grover Cleveland, the Democratic nominee.<sup>6</sup> Burchard's insult had the effect of turning the Irish vote back to the Democrats.

The trend of Irish American voters backing Democratic candidates continued through the election of 1896. This election featured the famous "Battle of Standards" over silver and gold between the Republican William McKinley and the Democrat William Jennings Bryan. *The Irish World*, "always friendly to organized labor, blamed both parties for the nation's financial troubles, but urged its readers to vote for the free silver candidate."<sup>7</sup> The magazine ultimately hailed Bryan's acceptance speech as "a masterpiece for its condemnation of imperialism, militarism and the trusts as all branches of one plant."<sup>8</sup>

Massive demonstrations sponsored by the United Irish Societies were staged in Chicago and Boston to denounce imperialism. The outcome of these public shows of strength included the Irish-American Union organized to oppose "pro-British" militarism and imperialism. Irish leaders frequently voiced their opposition to McKinley and Republican "imperialism."<sup>9</sup> "Shall Puerto Rico become America's Ireland?" questioned *The Irish World*, as both Anglophobia and Catholicism entered the campaign. Imperialism was cited as "a plant of English growth." The issue was simplified into one of Anglicanism versus Americanism. Many voters opposed the Republicans in order to "stop the murdering of Filipinos and to keep Cuba and Puerto Rico from becoming Protestantized."<sup>10</sup>

World War I found the Irish sensitive to foreign policy questions, and the

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 806-808.

<sup>6</sup>Carl Wittke, *The Irish in America* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. 176.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 178.

<sup>8</sup>*The Irish World* (New York), August 25, 1900.

<sup>9</sup>Carl Wittke, *The Irish in America* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. 180.

<sup>10</sup>*The Irish World* (New York), November 3, 1900.

Republicans made gains among those Irish voters who thought that the Democrats were adopting policies which were "too pro-British." Not only did the United States enter the war on the side of the British, but President Woodrow Wilson made disparaging remarks about the patriotism of the foreign born in general and the Irish in particular. The Democratic standard bearer criticized Americans who "need hyphens in their names because only part of them has come over," and quite naturally the Irish resented these remarks.<sup>11</sup> Wilson's refusal to include Ireland on the list of nations to benefit from self-determination after World War I contributed to Irish-American support for Warren Harding in 1920.

While the Irish may have voted for Harding, a Republican, the most significant electoral event of the 1920's for Irish Americans came with the nomination by the Democrats of Al Smith. Elected governor of New York four times, Smith was the first Irish Catholic to be nominated for President.

Smith was criticized because he was Irish, Roman Catholic, and from New York. The election of 1928 had the Democrat Smith opposed not only by Yankee Protestants but also by southerners and farmers who disagreed with his opposition to Prohibition. Not one to be easily discouraged, Smith formed a new coalition of urban, ethnic voters in large industrial northeastern cities. This coalition represented a revolution in political tactics. Smith polled 15½ million votes mostly from Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York, including a heavy representation of the Irish vote.<sup>12</sup>

Smith was unable to beat the invincible Herbert Hoover, but he was able to accomplish the goal of attracting immigrants and ethnics to the Democratic Party. "Al Smith came close to being for the people of the Lower East Side what Lincoln has been for the Frontier."<sup>13</sup> For Irish Catholic voters, Al Smith was one of their own.

Smith's election campaign was the beginning of the New Deal Coalition, which Franklin Roosevelt consolidated in 1932 by appointing many of his Irish supporters to important posts in the administration. James Farley, who managed Roosevelt's campaigns, was named Postmaster General, and Thomas Corcoran, who worked in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, was part of FDR's "Brain Trust." So the Irish, who had found a home in the Democratic Party, were now being rewarded for their service, which further solidified Irish ties to the Democrats. The New Deal brought forth large numbers of judgeships and federal posts for the Irish Americans. But as time went on, Roosevelt began appointing other ethnic groups in equal force.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup>James E. Johnson, *The Irish in America* (Minneapolis: Lerner Publications Company, 1976), pp. 61-62.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

<sup>13</sup>Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Irish of New York," in Laurence H. Fuchs, ed. *American Ethnic Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 88.

<sup>14</sup>John Duff, *The Irish in the United States* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971), p. 61-62.

Father Coughlin, a dynamic politically-oriented Irish-American priest, gained national attention during the election of 1936. Coughlin had a significant impact on the emerging political scene. Originally siding with Roosevelt after the collapse of 1929, Coughlin argued in favor of helping the "disoriented millions of middle class and working class people."<sup>15</sup> As the years wore on, however, he grew disillusioned with Roosevelt and was soon accusing him of siding with international bankers and communists against the American middle class.<sup>16</sup> With strong support from anti-communist Irish Americans, Coughlin formed the Union Party in 1936. The party's presidential nominee was William Lemke, who was able to poll 2% of the national total. Lemke's only support outside major metropolitan areas was from farm towns with heavy German and Irish voter turnout.<sup>17</sup>

While the overwhelming majority of Irish Americans did participate and vote with the Roosevelt coalition in the 1930's, further events brought disenchantment on the part of some Irish Catholic voters. First, anti-British feeling continued to be prevalent in Irish neighborhoods. Joseph Kennedy, a Boston Irishman who was ambassador to Great Britain, opposed American involvement in World War II. Furthermore, the Irish Americans were beginning to feel left out of the political gains in the Democratic Party. James Farley, who had served so faithfully in helping elect FDR in the 1930's, ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1940, in part because he and other Irish Americans felt it was their turn to get the big prize of the presidency. Still, the majority of the Irish Americans never really abandoned Roosevelt.

In 1948 the Irish remained a part of the Democratic coalition, supporting Harry Truman. Without the foreign entanglements, Truman was able to base his appeal upon economic conditions and issues which were of more concern to Irish voters, and as a result, he drew a record number of Irish votes in Boston.

During the 1950's the Irish American voters turned their backs on the Democrat Adlai Stevenson, and temporarily shifted their support to Republican Dwight Eisenhower. Stevenson's urbane, Anglo-Saxon intellectual characteristics were unappealing to the hard-working, middle-class Irish voters. Eisenhower was able to win 50% of the Irish vote.<sup>18</sup>

The Republican Party began to attract Irish Americans during this period of economic prosperity. The emergence of Joseph McCarthy on the national scene also encouraged converts. McCarthy, an Irishman who was elected to the Senate from Wisconsin, was Catholic and staunchly anti-communist. Coughlin's supporters became McCarthy's supporters and McCarthy became the favorite-son candidate of poor, older Irish neighborhoods in South Boston, Brooklyn and Chicago.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>15</sup>William V. Shannon, *The American Irish* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963), p. 296.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 301.

<sup>17</sup>Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 143.

<sup>18</sup>John Duff, *The Irish in the United States* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 61-62.

<sup>19</sup>Shannon, *The American Irish*, pp. 382-383.



McCarthy's appeal was not limited to his anti-communist sentiments. The Irish Americans were particularly drawn to his attacks on the white Anglo-Saxon, Protestant establishment. His enemies included Harvard University, the State Department, and the United States Army. "In the era of security clearances, to be an Irish Catholic became *prima facie* evidence of loyalty. Harvard men were to be checked. Fordham men were to do the checking."<sup>20</sup> McCarthy's ethnic name did not hurt him politically, and he was to say, "it is an advantage to be a Republican with a Democratic name."<sup>21</sup> Many of the fighting Irish liked McCarthy's style.

The election of Democrat John F. Kennedy in 1960 was the culmination of the Irish-American dream. Kennedy was the first Irish Catholic elected President, and to many Irish this meant they had arrived in America. The Irish who had worked their way up the political ranks in the twentieth century reached the pinnacle with Kennedy's election. Although Jews voted for JFK in higher percentages than the Irish, and although Kennedy was Harvard educated with WASP mannerisms, Irish Catholics saw him as one who could have been their son. What Al Smith had started in 1928, John Kennedy was to finish in 1960.

Irish Americans voted the Democratic ticket from their arrival in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century through most of the twentieth century. They found their jobs and opportunities in the Democratic Party and the Democratic coalition sought to appeal to ethnic groups. The Republicans had opportunities to get Irish votes, but the chances were short-lived. However, this may have changed. Do the Democrats still have the issues to enlist the Irish in their coalition? Will the Republicans broaden their appeal to the Irish to include not only foreign policy issues but also economic and social issues? These are some of the questions that will have to be examined to determine the political future of the Irish.

### The Polish Vote

Polish Americans were the least politically active of the major European ethnic groups in this country during the early twentieth century. This does not mean that Poles were politically indifferent, but rather, that their interest in politics did not develop until they began to compete with the Irish and Italians for political patronage and for higher positions within the Catholic hierarchy. Poles seemed more interested in private matters than in voicing their opinions.<sup>22</sup> The greatest contributing factor to the Polish seeming lack of political interest was the fact that many Polish people planned to return to Poland after achieving economic prosperity in this country.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup>Moynehan, "The Irish of New York," p. 98.

<sup>21</sup>Shannon, *The American Irish*, p. 386.

<sup>22</sup>Thernstrom, ed., *The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, p. 800.

<sup>23</sup>Helena Z. Lopata, *Polish Americans: Status, Competition, in an Ethnic Community* (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1976), p. 84.

Poles constituted the largest foreign born ethnic group in the city of Chicago (12%) in the early twentieth century, yet even with this large plurality a Polish-American congressman was not elected from Chicago until 1920. In fact, the first Polish American elected to Congress was a Milwaukee Republican in 1918.<sup>24</sup>

Urban Polish immigrants voted strictly Democratic in presidential elections. From 1888 to 1912, the Polish vote in Chicago averaged 61% Democratic. The only exception to this was in 1904 when the Democrats nominated Alton Parker to challenge the popular "trust-busting" Teddy Roosevelt. Only 41% of Poles backed the Democrat in this particular election.<sup>25</sup> In the presidential election of 1916, Woodrow Wilson was able to capture the Polish-American vote by supporting the reconstruction of an independent Poland, by opposing literacy tests for immigrants, and by encouraging world-wide support for the starving populations in war-torn Eastern Europe. And, as author Perry Weed noted, "By the time of the Versailles peace conference, Wilson committed himself to the policy of self-determination for the Poles."<sup>26</sup>

As other ethnic groups, the Polish supported Democrat Al Smith in 1928. "The Poles were comfortable with Smith's Catholicism and looked to Smith for protection against Protestant evangelism. The depression forced the Poles into even deeper support for the Democratic Party and the New Deal, and they consistently voted for Franklin Roosevelt in overwhelming majorities."<sup>27</sup>

Roosevelt came close to attracting the entire Polish-American population in the election of 1940. His strong stance against Hitler following the invasion of Poland in 1939 was, to say the least, a popular position with this particular ethnic group, and Poles in Buffalo voted nine to one in favor of Roosevelt. Some precincts ran as high as twenty to one for the Democrat. Buffalo became one of the Polish-American political strongholds in 1940 as voters elected the very first Polish-American judge and in 1949, the first Polish-American mayor, Joseph Mruc.<sup>28</sup>

Polish support for the Democratic Party began to waver around 1942, as Poles became more anxious about the war. Roosevelt was able to salvage the Polish vote in 1944 by receiving a "memorial" from the Polish-American Congress, and during his acceptance speech, he reassured Poles that he would protect their interests in Eastern Europe.<sup>29</sup>

Some Poles deserted the Democrats in the presidential election of 1952, with Yalta being a crucial factor. Under the Yalta Agreement, the Soviets took polit-

<sup>24</sup>Thernstrom, ed., *The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, p. 800.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 805.

<sup>26</sup>Perry L. Weed, *The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 187.

<sup>27</sup>Thernstrom, *The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, p. 800.

<sup>28</sup>Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, p. 64-65.

<sup>29</sup>Weed, *The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics*, p. 141.

ical control of several Eastern European countries, including Poland.<sup>30</sup> American Poles felt betrayed by this accord, so in 1952 when Republicans called for repudiation of the controversial agreement, some Poles jumped on the Republican presidential bandwagon.<sup>31</sup>

In 1960, Polish Americans shifted their votes back to the Democratic candidate, John Kennedy. Kennedy, a long-time supporter of the economic liberalism of blue collar Polish Americans, easily won a majority of the Polish Catholic vote.<sup>32</sup> Polish support for Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic nominee in 1964, continued, though there was some backlash to civil rights programs set up primarily for blacks.<sup>33</sup>

In 1968, the Democratic Slavic vote declined so much, even with Polish Catholic Ed Muskie running as the Democratic nominee for vice-president, that Hubert Humphrey was unable to win the states of New Jersey and Ohio, and therefore lost the election to Richard Nixon. Nixon appealed to Poles by nominating Spiro Agnew as his running mate. A Greek American, Agnew gained wide ethnic support in 1970 when he attacked neighborhood school permissiveness, radical liberals, and pornography.<sup>34</sup>

In the campaign of the 1972, Muskie ran for the Democratic presidential nomination. While he won many Polish voters in the primary, he was unable to capture the party's nomination. The Republican incumbent, Gerald Ford, alienated Polish Americans in the election of 1976, when, during a televised debate with Democratic challenger Jimmy Carter, Ford remarked that "Eastern Europe was not now and never would be under Soviet domination during his administration."<sup>35</sup> While Ford certainly meant to suggest that the United States would never concede the right of the Soviets to dominate Eastern Europe, his statement ultimately hurt him and possibly cost him the election.

Poles have predominately been Democrats throughout the twentieth century. Recently this traditional stand has shifted somewhat as the Republican Party has attempted to appeal to ethnic voters. Future Polish voting habits will depend on which issues receive maximum exposure and how those issues are framed.

### **The Italian Vote**

During the past century, Italian American voting habits have shifted back and forth between the Democrats and the Republicans. The Italians wholeheartedly supported the Democratic New Deal Coalition, but they have never

<sup>30</sup>Joseph A. Wyrwal, *Behold! The Polish Americans* (Detroit: Endurance Press, 1977), pp. 412-414.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 414.

<sup>32</sup>Michael S. Kramer and Mark R. Levy, *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 144.

<sup>33</sup>*The New York Times*, October 17, 1966.

<sup>34</sup>Weed, *The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics*, p. 158.

<sup>35</sup>*The New York Times*, October 16, 1976.



given their overwhelming allegiance to the Democratic Party as other ethnics have. The reasons for this are varied.

Like the Irish, the Italians immigrated to the United States in large groups. However, they had little or no political experience, and their low naturalization rate meant that the Italian-American vote could not be counted on to win national elections. Only 16% of Italians immigrating between 1899 and 1910 were naturalized.<sup>36</sup> As a whole, the group was not politically active and exhibited signs of alienation from the entire political process in this country.

Although information is sparse, it appears that Italian voters in the late nineteenth century favored the Republican Party. They believed that the Republicans and prosperity went hand in hand, and as long as jobs were plenty and there was food on the table, they were prepared to vote for the GOP.<sup>37</sup>

Studies indicate the Italian vote in Rhode Island and Syracuse, New York in the early twentieth century was strongly Republican.<sup>38</sup> However, as Samuel Lubell points out, the Republicans rewarded their Italian supporters with only token jobs.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, the Republican establishment became identified with restrictive immigration laws early in the twentieth century. Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican Yankee, led the fight for the passage of literacy tests for immigrants in the early 1900's,<sup>40</sup> and this encouraged Italians to look elsewhere for representation and political opportunity.

In 1928, the Democrats nominated Al Smith, a Catholic who appealed to the ethnic urban working man. This election marked a major shift in Italian voting toward the Democrats and Italian voters continued this Democratic trend in the election of 1932.<sup>41</sup> They voted in favor of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had inherited many of the urban Smith supporters, and they became an important part of the New Deal Coalition during the depression years of the 1930's.<sup>42</sup>

But Italian voters have not remained undyingly loyal to the Democrats. Part of the reason can be traced to the Irish-Italian conflict dating from the first days of immigration. In the early twentieth century, waves of Italian immigrants were welcomed into the Democratic Party by the politically established Irish. "The Irish were quick to enlist the Italian vote, but they reserved the real power for themselves."<sup>43</sup> With the Roosevelt election in 1932, the Irish received high administrative posts and maintained control of the wards.

<sup>36</sup>Thernstrom, ed., *The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, p. 551-552.

<sup>37</sup>Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, p. 78.

<sup>38</sup>Luciano J. Iorizzo and Salvatore Mondello, *The Italian Americans* (New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1971), pp. 148-149.

<sup>39</sup>Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, pp. 82-84.

<sup>40</sup>Jerry Mangione, *America is also Italian* (New York: R. T. Putnam and Sons, 1969), p. 82.

<sup>41</sup>Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, pp. 201-203.

<sup>42</sup>Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1973), p. 214.

<sup>43</sup>Richard A. Gabriel, *Ethnic Voting in Primary Elections: The Irish and Italians of Providence, R.I.* (Kingston, Rhode Island: Bureau of Government Research, 1969), p. 13.

Cities once wondered whether immigrants in ethnically mixed areas might not be permanently condemned to social and political inferiority under the tutelage of ward bosses. . . . Or would the Italians and Poles squander their political power and continue to be wooed by the Irish politicians at election time?<sup>44</sup>

Italians were gradually elected to political office in more significant numbers during the New Deal years. In 1933 Fiorello La Guardia became the first Italian American elected mayor of New York City. A progressive Republican who staunchly supported the New Deal, La Guardia took on the task of turning New York City into an efficient government system. By opposing immigration quota systems, La Guardia became the hero of the "little man," and with the help of FDR was able to abolish the Tammany Hall patronage organization.<sup>45</sup>

The Italian-American community's alliance with Franklin Roosevelt was shaken in 1940. Roosevelt publicly criticized Mussolini's attack on France, and many Italians resented this criticism.<sup>46</sup> Roosevelt's statement that "the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor"<sup>47</sup> did not earn him Italian votes, and he received only 41% of the Italian vote in New York City in 1940.<sup>48</sup> During the 1942 and 1946 elections the once solid Democratic neighborhoods in Brooklyn, Manhattan and Pittsburgh split down the middle between Roosevelt and his GOP opponents.<sup>49</sup> But, the majority of the Italian-American voters supported the Democrat, Harry Truman, in 1948.<sup>50</sup>

Italian voters began to assert their political influence after World War II. One of their first political acts was taking over Tammany Hall in 1947. During the following year, eight Italians were elected to the U.S. Congress, and several major cities in New Jersey elected Italian mayors. With this sudden burst of political strength, the Irish-Italian conflict plunged deeper into the heart of the Democratic Party.<sup>51</sup>

Dwight Eisenhower was able to draw about half of the Italian vote in the 1950's, but John Kennedy brought the Italians back to the Democratic column in 1960. He captured 80% of the Italian vote in Massachusetts, Illinois, Rhode Island and Ohio.<sup>52</sup> Many Italians saw Kennedy, an Irish Catholic, as a man who would pursue the ideas of Al Smith and the domestic policies of Franklin Roosevelt.

<sup>44</sup>Andrew Rolle, *The Italian Americans: Troubled Roots* (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 140.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>46</sup>Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, p. 137.

<sup>47</sup>Wayne MoQuin, ed., *A Documentary History of the Italian Americans* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 385.

<sup>48</sup>William Spinrad, *New Yorkers Cast their Ballots*, unpublished doctoral dissertation (Columbia University, 1955), pp. 56-130.

<sup>49</sup>Vincent Tortora, "Italian Americans: Their Swing to the G.O.P." in Wayne MoQuin, ed., *A Documentary History of the Italian Americans* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 402.

<sup>50</sup>Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, p. 216.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

<sup>52</sup>Institute of American Research/NBC News as quoted in Kramer and Levy, *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections*, p. 170.

In 1964 Lyndon Johnson was able to ride the Kennedy coattails, capturing 76% of the Italian vote.<sup>53</sup> Four years later Hubert Humphrey was able to win only 50% of the Italian vote, while Richard Nixon won 40% and George Wallace took 10%.<sup>54</sup> Nixon won a large majority of the Italian vote in New Jersey, thereby carrying the key state.

Never one to doubt the importance of the ethnic voter, Nixon appointed an Italian American, John Volpe, as Secretary of Transportation. In 1972 Nixon again did well with the Italian vote against George McGovern, winning 68% in New York, 61% in New Jersey, 53% in Pennsylvania, and 52% in Ohio.<sup>55</sup> The Italians particularly liked Nixon's law and order approach to crime, and McGovern's version of liberalism did not appeal to many Italians.

But overall, Italians have continued to vote Democratic. In order for the Republicans to be successful in the future in gaining the Italian vote they must not be perceived as just the party of the rich, the establishment, and the country club. Italians clearly are willing to vote Republican, but the GOP will have to make more consistent approaches to this ethnic group.

### The Jewish Vote

Jewish immigration to this country came in three waves. In the colonial period came the Sephardic Jews, followed by German Jews in the second half of the nineteenth century, and Russian Jews at the turn of the century.

The Republican Party attracted the arriving German Jews, who remained loyal to the party even though Ulysses S. Grant, who had previously expelled all Jewish traders from an area under his command, became the presidential nominee.<sup>56</sup> Why did the Jews vote Republican? One explanation for this phenomenon was that Republican Presidents from Rutherford B. Hayes to Theodore Roosevelt were staunch defenders of Jews and as a rule, they publicly criticized Jewish persecution in Russia and Eastern Europe.<sup>57</sup> In 1902, Secretary of State John Hay said, "This government cannot be a tacit party to such an international wrong. It is constrained to protest against the treatment to which Jews of Romania are subjected, not alone because it has unimpeachable rights to remonstrate against the resultant injury to itself, but in the name of humanity."<sup>58</sup>

American Jews were also attracted to Republican politics because of their strong aversion to the Democratic populism and to Tammany Hall. The populist movement included elements which characterized Jews as "capitalists, bankers,

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 238.

<sup>56</sup>Priscilla Fishman, ed., *The Jews of the United States* (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), p. 166.

<sup>57</sup>Nathaniel Weyl, *The Jew in American Politics* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1968), pp. 63-64.

<sup>58</sup>Rufus Lears, *The Jews in America: A History* (New York: KTAV Publishing House Inc., 1972), p. 219.



and part of the Gold Trust Conspiracy."<sup>59</sup> This hostility naturally motivated the Jews against the Democrats. In the election of 1896, Jews rejected the fundamentalist populism of William Jennings Bryan for the Republican William McKinley.

The twentieth century brought the first marked change in the Jewish vote. Four candidates, Republican nominee William Howard Taft, former president Theodore Roosevelt, Democrat Woodrow Wilson, and Socialist Eugene Debs, split the Jewish vote in the election of 1912.<sup>60</sup>

The erosion of support for the GOP and the resulting shift to Democratic voting continued in the election of 1916. This time Wilson received 55% of the Jewish vote, while the Republican, Charles Evans Hughes, received 45%.<sup>61</sup> The Jews came out in strong support of Wilson because he was perceived as a reformer who would take a more forceful position against Jewish persecution. Wilson was also considered an internationalist in world politics and therefore more likely to serve Jewish interests. His support of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, calling for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, further reinforced his support among Jews. Wilson stated, "I am persuaded that the allied Nations with the fullest concurrence of our government and people are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Commonwealth."<sup>62</sup> Influential Jews such as Henry Morgenthau, Bernard Baruch and Louis Brandeis were nominated to important government positions during Wilson's stay in office.

In the election of 1920, Republican Warren Harding won 43% of the Jewish vote, Socialist Eugene Debs won 38%, and the rest went to the Democrat James Cox.<sup>63</sup> The strong support for Debs may be attributed to Jewish involvement in trade unions and the leadership of men like Samuel Gompers, David Dubinsky, Morris Hillquit and Sidney Hillman.

The Democratic Party convention of 1924 divided between candidate William G. McAdoo, who had populist support and who was endorsed by the Ku Klux Klan, and Al Smith, a New York City politician who denounced the KKK and offered the convention a resolution condemning the Klan. (William Jennings Bryan spoke out against the resolution, and it did not pass.) Naturally, Jews were opposed to the KKK and were sympathetic to Smith. But because neither Smith, the urban candidate, nor McAdoo, the rural alternative, was able to gather the necessary votes for the nomination, John W. Davis, the compromise choice, received the Democratic nomination. Republican Calvin Coolidge captured a little over 25% of the Jewish vote, while Robert LaFollette, running on the Progressive ticket, received a good percentage of Jewish votes.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>Weyl, *The Jew in American Politics*, p. 67.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.

<sup>61</sup>Stephen D. Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), p. 151.

<sup>62</sup>Lears, *The Jews in America: A History*, pp. 258-259.

<sup>63</sup>Isaacs, *Jews in American Politics*, p. 151.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*

In 1928, Al Smith became the Democratic candidate and was able to capture 72% of the Jewish vote. The pattern of consistent Democratic voting by American Jews began with this election.<sup>65</sup> Smith appealed to the urban ethnic immigrant, especially to newly arriving Russian Jews living in eastern city slums. The Jews liked Smith because he was different. He was from New York City, Irish Catholic, hated the Ku Klux Klan, and promised social and economic reforms. His Jewish campaign manager, Joseph Proskauer, did not hurt his popularity in Jewish neighborhoods. However, Smith was ultimately defeated by Herbert Hoover.

Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to win 82% of the Jewish vote against Herbert Hoover in 1932, and the Jews became an important part of the New Deal Coalition.<sup>66</sup> FDR also followed in the Wilson tradition of appointing Jews to powerful positions. Henry Morgenthau, Jr. was Secretary of Treasury; Felix Frankfurter was appointed to the Supreme Court; several influential Jewish leaders like David Lilienthal and Samuel Rosenman held Roosevelt's confidence. All of this helped solidify Jewish loyalty to the Democratic Party.<sup>67</sup> From 1936 to 1944, Jewish voting for Roosevelt increased from 85% to 90%,<sup>68</sup> due to continued allegiance to Roosevelt's domestic policies, and more importantly to Roosevelt's foreign policy, which included his denunciations of Hitler and the Nazis.

In 1948, however, there was some defection of Jewish voters from Harry S. Truman and the Democrats. Truman received 60% to 75% of the Jewish vote, while Henry Wallace, the third party Progressive candidate, drew between 12% and 27% of the Jewish vote. Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican, won the rest.<sup>69</sup> Jewish support dropped because Truman was not an eastern intellectual like Roosevelt. In addition, Wallace's leftist ideology appealed to many Jewish voters. Once elected and an active President, however, Harry Truman gained support from Jewish groups for his support of the state of Israel.

In 1952, Republican Dwight Eisenhower swept the presidency, but not the Jews. Adlai Stevenson pulled 64% of the Jewish vote to Eisenhower's 36%.<sup>70</sup> Unlike other ethnic groups, after gaining greater social acceptance and wealth, the Jews did not support the Republican Party. Stevenson was perceived by the Jews as an intellectual and a supporter of New Deal policies, including civil rights legislation. Eisenhower was popular, but he was identified with the White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant establishment.

Even with the large Eisenhower victory in 1956, Jews continued their pattern of Democratic voting by giving Stevenson 60%.<sup>71</sup> This was largely because Joseph McCarthy was seen as a threat to members of the Jewish community, particu-

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 151.

<sup>67</sup>Fishman, ed., *The Jews of the United States*, p. 168.

<sup>68</sup>Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, p. 198.

<sup>69</sup>Weyl, *The Jew in American Politics*, p. 162.

<sup>70</sup>Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics*, pp. 151-153.

<sup>71</sup>Sowell, *Ethnic America*, p. 96.

larly those in Hollywood, and because John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under Eisenhower, was perceived as pro-Arab and anti-Israel by the U.S. Jewish community. Dulles further confirmed this belief when the United States criticized the Israeli-British-French takeover of the Suez Canal in 1956. Jews remained one of the strongest Democratic ethnic groups in voting patterns throughout the 1950's.

In 1960, the Jewish community cast between 80% and 90% of its vote for John Kennedy against Richard Nixon.<sup>72</sup> Kennedy was the first ethnic President elected in the United States, and the Jews helped him considerably. While Jews were pro-Kennedy, they bitterly hated Nixon. Nixon was remembered by the Jewish community for the 1950 California U.S. Senate race and for "Jew bating" Helen Gahagan Douglas, the Democratic nominee.<sup>73</sup> Nixon, who was a member of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, also accused Douglas of being "soft on communism." Anti-Nixon Jewish sentiment probably cost Nixon the states of New York and Illinois, which in turn cost him the presidency.<sup>74</sup>

Johnson won approximately 90% of the Jewish vote in 1964, despite the fact that Goldwater's grandfather was Jewish.<sup>75</sup> Johnson was perceived as a New Deal Democrat who espoused the cause of civil rights and would soon end the Vietnam struggle, while Goldwater was portrayed as radical and dangerous. His conservatism did not sit well with Jews.

Jews gave Democrat Hubert Humphrey approximately 80% of the vote in 1968, even though Humphrey was tied to Johnson's Vietnam posture, and the Jews were among the most critical of American military involvement in Vietnam.<sup>76</sup> But during the campaign, Humphrey reminded Jewish voters of his civil rights stance and liberal record, and the Jews found him far preferable to the same Nixon they had distrusted a decade earlier.

Nonetheless, in the 1972 presidential election, Richard Nixon received 35% of the Jewish vote to George McGovern's 65%.<sup>77</sup> McGovern was a different kind of Democrat from Hubert Humphrey. Like Goldwater in 1964, McGovern was viewed as outside the American mainstream, and his Israel position differed from that of the other Democratic candidates. McGovern wanted Israel to use American planes only for defensive purposes and believed that Israel should pay reparations to the Palestinians.<sup>78</sup> This did not appeal even to liberal Jews. One other factor was important. McGovern received his strongest support from the emerging women's rights groups, and he spoke strongly in support of affirma-

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<sup>72</sup>Stephen D. Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics*, p. 152.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>75</sup>Fishman, p. 168.

<sup>76</sup>Isaacs, *Jews and American Politics*, p. 152.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 153.

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 187.



tive action programs for minorities. McGovern was not the typical New Deal Democrat who appealed to organized labor, a traditional Democratic base of support. Instead, he was backed by the counterculture. Many Jews, like other ethnic groups, did not see McGovern as their kind of Democrat.

Because of these factors and his strong support of Israel, Nixon made significant inroads with Jewish voters. In New York, the Jewish vote went seven to one against Nixon in 1968, but in 1972 Nixon lost the vote by only 61% to 39%.<sup>79</sup> The fact that Nixon captured 39% of Jewish voters was enough to enable him to win in New York State in 1972. Still, McGovern, not Nixon, won a large majority of Jewish votes, indicating the extent of Jewish liberalism.

What emerges from this historical analysis is that Jews have been among the most liberal groups in voting in presidential elections. The Jewish experience with persecution and their concern for charity and community were reflected in the New Deal philosophy of social welfare, civil rights, and redistribution of income. The continuation of this Jewish Democratic voting shall depend upon whether the Democrats continue their traditional appeal, or reject the New Deal Coalition as McGovern did. In any case it remains to be seen whether or not the New Deal philosophy has relevance for today's Jews.

### The Mexican Vote

Mexican Americans did not emerge as a national political factor until the presidential election of 1960. The reasons for Mexican political non-involvement are numerous. Mexican Americans have encountered cultural, racial and political barriers in this country, and for the most part, they have lived in poverty and had few opportunities for advancement. Their education level has been low, and many have not mastered English. The first recorded Mexican-American vote was in the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. A strong believer in the responsibility of government for the economic and social welfare of its citizens, Roosevelt made certain the New Deal Coalition would have positive benefits for Mexican Americans. The three R's of the New Deal program were relief, recovery and reform, the first of which, relief, was to have the strongest impact on Mexicans who migrated to the United States.

Government agencies in the central and southwestern sections of the country took on the difficult task of pulling Mexican Americans out of the Depression. For example, the government opened range lands for use by subsistence farmers. These farmers were given first preference of land through the establishment of an Interdepartmental Rio Grande Board. In addition, the federal government expanded the activities of its various agencies to help reduce ethnic conflict and improve the economic condition of Mexican Americans.<sup>80</sup> Because of

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>80</sup>Matt S. Meier and Feliciano Rivera, *A History of Mexican Americans* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 156.

these two factors, Mexican Americans in Texas, Arizona, California, Colorado and New Mexico consistently voted for FDR.<sup>81</sup>

Mexican Americans came out in full force in the 1960 election of John Kennedy. In New Mexico, Kennedy won 70% of the Chicano vote, which enabled him to carry the state by a margin of only 2,000 votes. In Texas, the Kennedy-Johnson ticket won 91% of the Chicano vote. The 200,000 Mexican plurality enabled Kennedy to win Texas by fewer than 50,000 votes.<sup>82</sup> Nationally, Kennedy won 85% of the Chicano vote. His support from this ethnic group was so overwhelming that "Viva Kennedy" organizations appeared throughout the entire Southwest.

Chicanos continued to support the Democrats in 1964. Lyndon Johnson won 90% of the national Mexican-American vote, and one study in South Tucson, Arizona indicated that Johnson took 97.3% of Chicanos voting there.<sup>83</sup>

In 1968 Hubert Humphrey received 87% of the Chicano vote, while Richard Nixon took only 10% and George Wallace won 2%. Humphrey's Chicano plurality was not as large as previous years because of low voter turnout,<sup>84</sup> which some attribute to the assassination of Robert Kennedy, a hero to the Mexican community. Arizona recorded one-third fewer Chicano votes in 1968 than in 1960. The same was true in Colorado. Humphrey's vote in these two states was 81% and 75% respectively.<sup>85</sup> Texas was the only exception to the low Chicano turnout in 1968, and because of the high turnout Nixon lost the state. Republican strategists realized too late that they should not have quickly written off the Mexican vote, and if Nixon had been able to win an additional 5% of the Chicano vote he would have captured the 25 electoral votes of Texas from Humphrey.<sup>86</sup>

Nixon did not ignore Mexican Americans in 1972. Concentrating their efforts in Texas and four other southwestern states, the Republicans began their plan to entice the Mexican-American voter. The Republican administration began by providing high administrative positions and more government jobs to Mexican Americans. Federal dollars were also funneled into programs directly aimed at Mexican Americans in key states. Chicanos, who had grown unhappy with the Democrats, noticed the efforts of the administration and supported Nixon in greater numbers than before.<sup>87</sup> This was the first election in which the Republicans acknowledged the Mexican voter.

<sup>81</sup> Armando B. Rendon, *Chicano Manifesto* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 243.

<sup>82</sup> Kramer and Levy, *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections*, pp. 73-85, 248-251.

<sup>83</sup> Donald M. Freeman, "Party, Vote and the Mexican American in South Tucson," in F. Chris Garcia, ed., *La Causa Politica: A Chicano Political Reader* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), p. 62.

<sup>84</sup> Kramer and Levy, *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections*, pp. 73-85, 248-251.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 73-85, 248-251.

<sup>86</sup> Tony Castro, *Chicano Power* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1974), p. 198.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198-199.

In recent years Mexican Americans have become more politically organized. They should emerge as a political force in the future in many areas, and they will probably follow their own independent political interests in coming elections. As recently as 1975, the National Hispanic Caucus was formed within the Democratic Party to look after the "needs and aspirations of 15 million Hispanic-Americans."<sup>88</sup> For the moment, the Democrats can count on drawing a sizable Hispanic vote, but this ethnic group is not wedded to one party and Mexican Americans could provide a real opportunity for either the Democrats or the GOP, depending on which one shows interest in their concerns.

<sup>88</sup>*The New York Times*, November 3, 1975.



## Chapter 3: Methodology

The purpose of this study is to identify the attitudes and behavior of five ethnic groups: Italian Catholics, Irish Catholics, Polish Catholics, Hispanic Catholics and Jews.<sup>1</sup> However, while we are generalizing about ethnic groups, we are in actuality dealing with individuals who are members of those groups. Because of this, a methodological approach is needed which will allow us to locate and interview a random sampling of each group, within time and cost constraints. The methodological challenge is one of rare element sampling—finding and interviewing respondents with particular characteristics (in this instance self-reported ethnic and religious status) when these characteristics are not found in segments of the population which are totally geographically homogeneous.<sup>2</sup> Unlike congressional campaigns, for example, which have a target population defined by district or state boundaries, this survey must target respondents who are dispersed throughout the country.

In order to draw the 1,000 respondents (200 from each ethnic group), a number of approaches were considered:

### (1) *Use of Past Surveys*

In rare element sampling it is possible to combine past national surveys in order to accumulate enough responses from each of the ethnic groups. That is, it is possible to "pyramid" surveys by adding one to another until 200 Italians, 200 Irish, 200 Poles, 200 Hispanics and 200 Jews have been included in the "sample."

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<sup>1</sup>As noted in Chapter 1, we see no need to become involved in an extensive discussion of whether each of these groups qualifies as an "ethnic group" under every possible definition. Some would argue that Jews and Hispanics are not ethnic groups, but rather, religious and language groups. We would readily acknowledge that German Jews differ from Russian Jews and that both differ from Ethiopian Jews. We would also acknowledge that orthodox and reform Jews have had substantially different experiences and have noticeably different attitudes. But while there are any number of ways to classify people, we believe that there is enough of a common background among Jews to justify classifying them as an ethnic (or religioethnic) group. Similarly, some may choose to take issue with our Hispanic category. After all, our category includes Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans and other Latin Americans. But these groups have a common heritage and language, as well as a geographic concentration in Central America and the Caribbean, which set them apart from other Americans. In addition, many other political observers have employed the category. For example, David Broder devotes a chapter to Hispanics in his *Changing of the Guard*, Levy and Kramer discuss Chicanos and Puerto Ricans in one chapter of *The Ethnic Factor* and NBC News/The Associated Press used a "Hispanic" category in their 1980 election day surveys. These are just a few examples. Finally, Appendix III shows the distribution of respondents, and it is clear that the great majority of Hispanic respondents reside in the West and Southwest. Therefore, it would be reasonable to suppose that a large number of our Hispanics are Mexican. In any case, our purpose is to examine the political attitudes of certain groups rather than to prove that a particular group does or does not qualify as an ethnic group.

<sup>2</sup>See Leslie Kish, *Survey Sampling* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), pp. 404-410.

The deficiencies of this approach are obvious. The 1,000 responses technically would not constitute one sample since they would come from different respondents who were reacting to questions which would have been posed slightly differently. Moreover, the data would come from surveys stretching back over a number of years. Clearly, if you are asking a group of people their attitudes on employment, inflation and interest rates, it makes a difference if the economy is weak or strong at the time of the survey. In terms of foreign policy, the respondents are likely to have different attitudes toward the Soviet Union depending on whether the Soviets have just invaded Afghanistan or whether they have offered an arms control proposal. Because timing is so important, pyramiding previous surveys is not a preferable alternative.

(2) *Full Probability National Sample*

This approach would involve surveying a random national sample and screening for ethnic group membership until a sample of 200 for each group is achieved. From a statistical point of view, this is by far the most preferable approach because of its randomness and its national scope. However, since this study is concerned with only five ethnic groups, a random national sample would be highly inefficient and extremely costly. Given the relatively small number of Jews in the population, for example, almost fifty random contacts would be necessary for every interview with a Jewish respondent.

(3) *A Concentrated Sample within Geographic Clusters Ascertained to have a High Proportion of Each Ethnic Group*

This approach would involve in-depth interviewing within specified geographic clusters, using appropriate screens. For example, if one wanted to use this approach to interview Poles, one might sample in certain sections of Buffalo, Hamtramck (Michigan), Cleveland and Chicago. It would be possible using this method to develop a sample which reflects the age, sex, income and education profiles of the particular ethnic group. However, this approach would have a somewhat lower external sampling validity than a random national sample since the respondent sample would not be entirely representative of the total ethnic population within the country. In addition, this procedure would be somewhat inefficient since even within geographically clustered areas a large number of respondent contacts would be necessary for each completed interview with a target individual.

(4) *A Priori Screening of Respondents Based on Last Name within High Density Ethnic Geographic Areas, Based on Randomly Selected Directory Listing*

This approach is high in efficiency, since it limits the sample on the basis of the ethnicity of the last name and since it focuses on high density geographic areas. However, this approach has slightly lower statistical representativeness in that it excludes non-ethnic last names and it focuses only on high density areas.

*The methodology employed in this research combines elements of each of these four approaches.* The basic framework of this study is a nationwide random surname sample of all telephone households in the United States. The sample was obtained from a private sampling firm which has a computerized data base consisting of 65 million telephone listings nationwide. The firm has compiled an ethnic surname screening routine which allows a computerized selection of those household phone numbers listed which meet the surname qualification. This selection procedure thus produces a national random sample of respondents representative of households with telephones listed under selected and specific ethnic surnames.

Every household in this sample, which consisted of 12,000 names, was contacted by phone during the survey. Immediately, each respondent was screened for appropriate ethnic and religious qualifications. The nationwide sample was unbalanced in terms of ethnic group representativeness, so it produced a completed number of interviews which varied from ethnic group to ethnic group (see Table 3.1). Each ethnic group sample was thereafter supplemented until the requisite number of interviews (200) was completed.

**Table 3.1**  
**Interviews Completed from Surname Sample**

| Group    | Total Interviews Completed | Number of Interviews from Original Surname Sample | Number of Interviews from Supplemental Samples |
|----------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| Irish    | 200                        | 200                                               | —                                              |
| Polish   | 200                        | 45                                                | 155                                            |
| Italian  | 200                        | 133                                               | 67                                             |
| Jewish   | 200                        | 169                                               | 31                                             |
| Hispanic | 200                        | 167                                               | 33                                             |
| Total    | 1,000                      | 714                                               | 286                                            |

The methodology employed to supplement the initial interviews differed from group to group. For Hispanic respondents, each completed Hispanic interview obtained from the national probability sample was used as a cluster point from which additional sample points were generated using random digit dialing techniques. The last number of those completed interview telephone numbers were dropped and other numbers were substituted randomly. This procedure maintained the national randomness of the original Hispanic survey and was possible because of the relative homogeneity of Spanish surnamed residential patterns. That is, it was possible to supplement the original sample this way because Spanish surnamed households tend to cluster in similar areas and are therefore likely to have similar phone number stems.

Even after this technique was used, it was still necessary to supplement the Hispanic sample. Therefore, additional Hispanic, as well as Italian and Polish, interviews were supplemented using random samples from each of the largest fif-



teen Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in the United States. U.S. Census data on the percent of the population in each SMSA, both foreign born and of foreign parentage, was used to distribute the sample proportionately across these SMSAs for each ethnic group. A sample of ethnic surnamed respondents was then drawn by trained sampling personnel from telephone directories within each SMSA using a systematic random sampling technique. The use of ethnic surnamed respondents drawn randomly is directly comparable in selection criteria to the national household sample which is the basic framework of this study.

There are no U.S. Census figures showing the current distribution of Jewish individuals across SMSA's in the United States. We therefore took the distribution of completed Jewish interviews, analyzed the area codes from which they were obtained, and drew a new Jewish surname sample from these same geographic areas, in proportion to the distribution of the originally obtained responses.

In summary, the final samples for each ethnic group consist of respondents randomly selected from nationwide telephone households on the basis of their "ethnic group" last name. The samples were selected both from nationwide telephone listings and from large SMSA telephone listings. Thus, the samples for each ethnic group are *broadly* representative of the responses which would have been obtained if we had interviewed every individual with an ethnic last name in the 15 largest SMSAs, and nationwide.

Every individual contacted in this study was screened for appropriate ethnic status (including religion), age (18 years and older), and voter status (whether they were registered to vote) at the beginning of the interview. Five different interview schedules were utilized, one for each ethnic group. No non-English interviews were conducted. Interviewing was accomplished between the dates of May 15 and June 1, 1982.

The methodology employed in this study was selected to provide the best possible sample within time and cost limits. However, certain voters who otherwise would have qualified as "ethnics" were excluded by the sampling technique. For example, ethnics who do not have "ethnic surnames" were automatically passed over in generating the sample. This would include potential respondents who Americanized their names (or whose ancestors changed their names), as well as women with ethnic maiden names who married men with non-ethnic surnames and therefore would not be selected for inclusion in the sample. In addition, with any surname-based sample there is the possibility that some names will not be identified with a particular ethnic group.

Since all of the interviews were conducted in English, some non-English speaking respondents may have been excluded from the pool of respondents. This is most applicable to the Hispanic sample, since of the five ethnic groups under consideration, the Hispanics include the most recent immigrants and the largest number of non-English speakers.

There is a third, probably even smaller group which is also excluded from the sample: those without telephones. Those with unlisted numbers would also be

excluded from the sample, with the exception of those who may have fallen in the group contacted during random digit dialing.

While the methodological approach of the survey may have excluded some potential respondents from the sample, in addition, some of the people in the random sample excluded themselves. In any survey, some people are either not at home or refuse to participate, and there is always the question of whether these "non-respondents" would have altered the survey's findings had they participated. In our survey, there was an unusually high refusal rate, particularly among those in the Jewish surname sample. The reason for this is almost certainly the way in which the survey questions were ordered. Ordinarily, it is preferable to begin a survey with relatively innocuous questions so that the respondents will be inclined to participate in the study. But given that this study is an examination of five selected ethnic groups, it was necessary to begin the questioning by almost immediately asking those contacted about their ethnic background and religious preference. These are relatively personal (and, hence, sensitive) questions which some people may prefer not to discuss, particularly since the respondent has no idea about the content of the study. However, it would be efficient and extremely costly to go through a 30 minute telephone interview only to find out that the respondent was not a member of one of the groups being researched, and for this reason it was necessary to begin with a screen for ethnic status and religion.

The obvious question is whether those excluded by the sampling technique have significantly different attitudes from those sampled and whether they constitute a large enough number to alter the results. That is, one could argue that Jewish or Polish women who marry non-ethnics (and, hence, would be "missed" by the surname approach) have a weaker sense of their ethnicity or are less traditional in their values. Non-English speaking Hispanics could be poorer and more traditional than those Hispanics who are more fully acculturated. None of these suggestions are unreasonable, but, on the other hand, there is no reason to believe that those missed by the sampling approach are measurably different in their attitudes from those who responded to the survey. Moreover, the likelihood that non-English speaking ethnics would be registered voters probably is quite small. All of this suggests that, given no evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that the sampling approach (or, more correctly, the combination of approaches) has produced a randomly distributed and reasonably representative sample of the five ethnic groups being examined.

## Chapter 4: Ethnic and Economic Policy

The standard political wisdom is that elections are won or lost on the basis of "pocketbook issues" such as inflation and unemployment, and not on foreign policy or social issues. Given the economic climate of Spring 1982—lessening inflation, but higher unemployment, high interest rates and rampant speculation in the media about whether the United States was entering another "depression"—it is not surprising that over half of the ethnic sample identified one of the economic issues as "the most important problem facing the country." Economic problems were clearly uppermost on people's minds, although they did not always agree which of the economic problems was the most important.

While the economy was the number one problem according to the respondents and to the media, war or the threat of it also received a great deal of attention. The Falkland Islands crisis was underway during the time the survey was being conducted and the media was giving it considerable coverage, along with the growing anti-nuclear movement. Consistent with this setting, almost one-fifth of the ethnic respondents identified foreign policy issues as the most important ones facing the United States, and the overwhelming majority of those responses referred to the threat of nuclear war.

Together, economic and foreign policy issues accounted for three-quarters of the responses. Crime and drugs were identified as the most important issue by over 5% of those responding, while moral and religious concerns were named by only 2% of the sample. Unemployment (19.3%) was viewed as the most important problem, with inflation (15.6%) and the threat of nuclear war (15.0%) close behind. Many respondents also generalized in their answer, citing "the economy" (13.6%) as the most important problem.

Three months before our survey, the Gallup Poll found that 87% of a national sample identified the economy as the number one problem, with only 11% identifying foreign policy and defense issues as more important. Another 5% of the sample mentioned crime, while 4% identified the "moral decline in society" as the nation's number one problem. The most important economic problem in January, according to Gallup, was inflation and the high cost of living, with unemployment running a weak second. If Gallup's results are compared with the results of this survey, it is clear that the public has become increasingly concerned about unemployment and the threat of nuclear war. Inflation continues to be an issue, but it no longer is the dominant issue it was twelve months ago.

When our sample was asked to identify the most important problem facing their community today, more than one-quarter identified some element of the economy or of their personal economic situation. Given the concern by respondents over the economy in general, it is not surprising that economic matters would be indicated at the local level as well. The second most popular response would probably fit under the heading "crime." Between one-fifth and one-



Table 4.1

In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing our country today—that is, the one you yourself are most concerned about?  
(PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT THAT?)

|                      | Unemployment | Inflation | The Economy | Interest Rates | Tax Concerns | Recession/Depression | Threat of Nuclear War | Crime/Drugs | President Reagan | Moral/Religious Concerns |
|----------------------|--------------|-----------|-------------|----------------|--------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Irish Respondents    | 16.0%        | 19.5%     | 9.5%        | 2.5%           | 2.5%         | 3.5%                 | 19.5%                 | 5.0%        | 3.0%             | 2.5%                     |
| Polish Respondents   | 24.0         | 16.5      | 13.0        | 2.5            | 0.0          | 2.0                  | 12.5                  | 5.5         | 1.5              | 0.5                      |
| Italian Respondents  | 21.0         | 11.5      | 12.5        | 4.5            | 0.5          | 3.0                  | 18.0                  | 8.0         | 2.0              | 2.0                      |
| Jewish Respondents   | 16.5         | 15.0      | 22.0        | 7.5            | 0.0          | 2.5                  | 12.0                  | 5.5         | 4.0              | 2.0                      |
| Hispanic Respondents | 19.0         | 15.5      | 12.5        | 3.0            | 1.0          | 1.5                  | 13.5                  | 4.5         | 3.0              | 3.0                      |
| All Respondents      | 19.3%        | 15.6%     | 13.9%       | 4.0%           | 0.8%         | 2.5%                 | 15.1%                 | 5.7%        | 2.7%             | 2.0%                     |

  

|                      | Falkland Islands/Argentina | Social Security/Elderly | Political Leadership/Politicians | Energy Concerns | National Defense/Strong Military | Aliens/Illegal Aliens | Starvation/Poverty | Disarmament/Race | Social Issues |
|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------|
| Irish Respondents    | 3.5%                       | 1.5%                    | 2.0%                             | 1.0%            | 1.0%                             | 0.0%                  | 1.0%               | 0.0%             | 0.5%          |
| Polish Respondents   | 1.5                        | 1.0                     | 0.0                              | 1.0             | 0.5                              | 0.0                   | 2.0                | 2.5              | 2.5           |
| Italian Respondents  | 3.0                        | 3.0                     | 2.0                              | 0.5             | 0.0                              | 0.5                   | 0.0                | 0.5              | 1.5           |
| Jewish Respondents   | 1.0                        | 1.0                     | 2.0                              | 0.0             | 0.5                              | 0.0                   | 0.5                | 1.5              | 1.0           |
| Hispanic Respondents | 4.0                        | 1.0                     | 0.5                              | 0.5             | 1.5                              | 2.0                   | 2.0                | 0.0              | 0.5           |
| All Respondents      | 2.6%                       | 1.5%                    | 1.3%                             | 0.6%            | 0.7%                             | 0.5%                  | 1.1%               | 0.9%             | 1.2%          |

  

|                      | No Problems | Many Problems | Other | Don't Know/No Answer | n =  |
|----------------------|-------------|---------------|-------|----------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 0.5%        | 1.0%          | 2.0%  | 2.5%                 | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 0.0         | 0.5           | 7.0   | 3.5                  | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 0.5         | 0.5           | 2.5   | 2.5                  | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 0.5         | 1.0           | 1.5   | 2.5                  | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 0.0         | 0.5           | 5.5   | 5.5                  | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 0.3%        | 0.7%          | 3.7%  | 3.3%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 135.544 DF=92 PROB=0.0021

**Table 4.2**  
**Greatest Problem**

| Problem                       | January 1982 | October 1981 | May 1981 | January 1981 |
|-------------------------------|--------------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| High Cost of Living/Inflation | 49%          | 52%          | 59%      | 73%          |
| Unemployment/Recession        | 28           | 19           | 15       | 8            |
| International                 | 5            | 3            | 4        | 2            |
| Crime                         | 5            | 4            | 5        | 2            |
| Fear of War                   | 5            | 4            | 3        | 2            |

Source: The Gallup Report, Report No. 198, March, 1982, pp. 26-27.

quarter of respondents identified crime, police protection, or drugs and alcohol as the major problem facing their community. Only the Irish were significantly less concerned about crime.

#### **"The Greatest Economic Problem"**

On economic issues, there is a remarkable consistency in the responses of the five ethnic groups. For example, when asked to identify the greatest economic problem facing the United States, a plurality of each group selected unemployment, with inflation running a not very close second and high interest rates third. Fewer than 10% of any group mentioned the unbalanced federal budget, even though the budget was a much discussed issue during the time the survey was being taken.

Those respondents who earned over \$40,000 a year were much more likely than their fellow ethnics to see high interest rates and the unbalanced budget as the greatest economic problems, but even they identified unemployment as the number one problem.

From a practical point of view, high-turnout respondents were much more likely than others to identify high interest rates as the greatest economic problem facing the country. Similarly, while Republicans, Democrats and ticket-splitters all identify unemployment as the greatest problem, ticket-splitters were more concerned about interest rates than were the other groups. Thus, the two groups on which an election may turn, high-turnout individuals and ticket-splitters, see interest rates as second only to unemployment as a major problem. Republicans tend to see inflation as almost as great a problem as unemployment, while Democrats almost singlemindedly focus on unemployment.

#### **Cutting Programs**

When asked which of eight programs should be cut first, four of the groups selected defense spending, while one group, the Italians, selected welfare. On this question, the Italian respondents proved to be far more conservative than the other groups. A total of 51.5% of Italian respondents said that welfare or food stamps should be cut first, while only 29% of Jews agreed. Once again, Hispanic respondents displayed uncertainty. Only 28% supported cutting

Table 4.3

Now on the local level, what do you consider to be the most important problem facing your community today—that is, the one you yourself are most concerned about? (PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT THAT?)

|                      | Crime | Taxes | Unemployment | Economy | Inflation | Drugs/<br>Alcohol | School/<br>Education | Police<br>Protection | Housing | Roads/<br>Highways |
|----------------------|-------|-------|--------------|---------|-----------|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------|--------------------|
| Irish Respondents    | 10.5% | 9.0%  | 17.5%        | 5.0%    | 7.0%      | 4.0%              | 4.0%                 | 0.5%                 | 1.0%    | 1.5%               |
| Polish Respondents   | 22.5  | 7.5   | 26.5         | 3.0     | 3.5       | 2.5               | 5.0                  | 1.0                  | 2.5     | 0.5                |
| Italian Respondents  | 21.0  | 12.5  | 12.5         | 2.5     | 5.0       | 3.0               | 7.0                  | 2.5                  | 2.5     | 1.0                |
| Jewish Respondents   | 23.0  | 2.5   | 16.0         | 10.0    | 5.0       | 0.5               | 4.5                  | 1.0                  | 2.0     | 1.5                |
| Hispanic Respondents | 18.5  | 3.5   | 19.5         | 3.5     | 6.5       | 4.0               | 5.0                  | 2.5                  | 1.0     | 1.5                |
| All Respondents      | 19.1% | 7.0%  | 18.4%        | 4.8%    | 5.4%      | 2.8%              | 5.1%                 | 1.5%                 | 1.8%    | 1.2%               |

  

|                      | Environment/<br>Pollution | Budget | Water<br>Problems | Politics/<br>Politicians | Transportation/<br>Traffic | Overpopulation/<br>Overgrowth | Elderly/<br>Social<br>Security | Anti-<br>Welfare | Proposition<br>2 1/2 | Government/<br>Justice<br>System |
|----------------------|---------------------------|--------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Irish Respondents    | 1.5%                      | 1.5%   | 1.0%              | 4.5%                     | 0.5%                       | 1.0%                          | 3.0%                           | 0.5%             | 2.0%                 | 1.0%                             |
| Polish Respondents   | 1.0                       | 0.0    | 0.0               | 2.0                      | 1.0                        | 1.5                           | 0.5                            | 1.0              | 0.0                  | 0.5                              |
| Italian Respondents  | 0.5                       | 1.0    | 0.5               | 3.5                      | 2.5                        | 0.5                           | 0.0                            | 0.5              | 0.5                  | 0.5                              |
| Jewish Respondents   | 2.5                       | 0.5    | 1.0               | 2.0                      | 2.5                        | 0.5                           | 2.0                            | 0.5              | 0.0                  | 0.5                              |
| Hispanic Respondents | 1.5                       | 0.0    | 1.5               | 0.5                      | 0.0                        | 0.5                           | 1.0                            | 0.5              | 0.0                  | 1.0                              |
| All Respondents      | 1.4%                      | 0.6%   | 0.8%              | 2.5%                     | 1.3%                       | 0.8%                          | 1.3%                           | 0.6%             | 0.5%                 | 0.7%                             |

  

|                      | Concern/<br>Youth | Social Issues | Refugees/<br>Illegal<br>Aliens | Discrimination/<br>Racism | No Problems | Other | Don't Know/<br>No Answer | n =  |
|----------------------|-------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------|--------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 0.5%              | 1.0%          | 0.0%                           | 0.0%                      | 9.0%        | 5.0%  | 8.0%                     | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 0.0               | 3.0           | 0.5                            | 0.5                       | 6.0         | 3.0   | 5.0                      | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 1.5               | 2.5           | 0.0                            | 0.0                       | 5.5         | 4.5   | 6.5                      | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 0.5               | 1.5           | 1.5                            | 2.0                       | 7.5         | 2.0   | 7.0                      | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 1.5               | 1.5           | 1.5                            | 1.0                       | 6.0         | 3.0   | 13.5                     | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 0.8%              | 1.9%          | 0.7%                           | 0.7%                      | 6.8%        | 3.5%  | 8.0%                     | 1000 |

Chi square 171.917 DF=108 PROB=0.0001



Table 4.4  
What do you personally feel is the greatest economic problem we, as a country, face today? (RECORD MENTION, DO NOT READ)

|                      | High<br>Interest<br>Rates | Inflation | Unemployment | Foreign<br>Competition | Productivity | Unbalanced<br>Federal<br>Budget | Other | Don't Know<br>No Answer | n =  |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------|--------------|------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 12.0%                     | 18.5%     | 24.5%        | 4.5%                   | 6.5%         | 8.0%                            | 15.5% | 10.5%                   | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 10.5                      | 20.0      | 35.0         | 2.5                    | 3.0          | 4.0                             | 15.0  | 10.0                    | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 15.0                      | 17.0      | 32.0         | 3.0                    | 2.5          | 8.0                             | 11.0  | 11.5                    | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 15.5                      | 16.0      | 32.5         | 4.0                    | 4.0          | 7.0                             | 13.5  | 7.5                     | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 14.0                      | 17.0      | 23.5         | 1.5                    | 3.5          | 9.0                             | 17.0  | 14.5                    | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 13.4%                     | 17.7%     | 29.5%        | 3.1%                   | 3.9%         | 7.2%                            | 14.4% | 10.8%                   | 1000 |

Chi square 31.385 DF=28 PROB=0.3002

**Table 4.5**  
**Greatest Economic Problem**  
by family income

|                   | High<br>Interest<br>Rates | Inflation | Unemployment | Unbalanced<br>Budget | Other | n=    |
|-------------------|---------------------------|-----------|--------------|----------------------|-------|-------|
| Under \$20,000    | 12.7%                     | 18.9%     | 31.1%        | 4.3%                 | 33.0% | 370   |
| \$20,000-\$40,000 | 12.8                      | 17.8      | 30.4         | 8.0                  | 31.0  | 398   |
| Over \$40,000     | 18.1                      | 16.9      | 22.9         | 10.8                 | 31.3  | 166   |
| All Respondents   | 13.4%                     | 17.7%     | 29.5%        | 7.2%                 | 32.2% | 1000* |

\*includes refusals

defense first, a reflection of their conservatism in foreign policy (see chapter 6), while 43.5% said that expenditures for welfare and food stamps should be decreased first. On this issue, then, Hispanics appear to be to the "left" of Italians but considerably to the "right" of Jews.

Over 42% of college graduates said that defense spending was least important and could be cut first, while only 37.6% favored cutting either food stamps or welfare first. However, among ethnics with less than a college education, a plurality favored cutting either food stamps or welfare rather than defense spending. Given the relationship between education and turnout, it is not surprising that high-turnout individuals are much more likely to favor cutting defense before other programs, while over 40% of low income voters would prefer to cut either food stamps or welfare first. Differences also appeared between Republicans and Democrats. Democrats were much more likely to favor defense cuts than were Republicans, and moderate and liberal Democrats supported cuts more than any of the other groups.

In the responses to this question, there was a noticeable difference between respondents who agreed that "the number one threat to peace in the world today is the Soviet Union" and those who did not agree. Not surprisingly, the more the respondent distrusted the Soviets, the more likely he or she was to think that defense spending was more important than food stamps, welfare or other social programs. However, even of those who identified a Soviet threat, a plurality agreed that if there are cuts in the federal budget, then defense spending should be cut first. All groups agreed that Social Security is the most important program and should be cut last, though a sizable portion of the Italian sample (22%) identified defense spending as the last to be cut.

### **Defense Spending and a Balanced Budget**

When the five ethnic groups were presented with the clear alternative of either balancing the federal budget or increasing defense spending, there was a strong preference among all groups for a balanced budget. Respondents between 18 and 34 were more certain that a balanced budget is preferable, as were moderate and liberal Democrats.

Table 4.6

Suppose for a moment that in order to balance the federal budget we had to cut back on some federal programs. Which of the following should be cut first—that is, which of the following programs would be *least* important to the country as a whole if something had to be cut back? (READ LIST, ROTATE) Which should be cut *next*? And which of these is *most* important—that is, should be the *last* program to be cut?

|                      | (a) Defense spending | (b) Federal aid to education | (c) Federal health protection | (d) Social Security | (e) Food stamps | (f) Welfare | (g) Federal aid to the handicapped | (h) Federal low income programs |                      |
|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|
|                      |                      |                              |                               |                     |                 |             |                                    |                                 |                      |
|                      | Defense Spending     | Federal Aid To Education     | Federal Health Protection     | Social Security     | Food Stamps     | Welfare     | Federal Aid To The Handicapped     | Low Income Programs             | Don't Know/No Answer |
|                      |                      |                              |                               |                     |                 |             |                                    |                                 | n =                  |
| Irish Respondents    | 35.5%                | 6.0%                         | 3.0%                          | 1.5%                | 18.0%           | 22.5%       | 1.0%                               | 5.5%                            | 7.0%                 |
| Polish Respondents   | 36.0                 | 8.0                          | 1.5                           | 2.5                 | 10.5            | 27.5        | 0.5                                | 4.5                             | 9.0                  |
| Italian Respondents  | 26.5                 | 2.0                          | 1.5                           | 1.0                 | 23.0            | 28.5        | 0.5                                | 10.5                            | 6.5                  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 45.5                 | 4.5                          | 4.5                           | 1.5                 | 15.0            | 14.0        | 0.5                                | 5.5                             | 9.0                  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 28.0                 | 7.5                          | 3.5                           | 1.0                 | 22.0            | 22.0        | 0.0                                | 8.5                             | 7.5                  |
| All Respondents      | 34.3%                | 5.6%                         | 2.8%                          | 1.5%                | 17.7%           | 22.9%       | 0.5%                               | 6.9%                            | 7.8%                 |

  

|                      | Defense Spending | Federal Aid To Education | Federal Health Protection | Social Security | Food Stamps | Welfare | Federal Aid To The Handicapped | Low Income Programs | Don't Know/No Answer |
|----------------------|------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------|--------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
|                      |                  |                          |                           |                 |             |         |                                |                     | n =                  |
| Irish Respondents    | 13.0%            | 17.0%                    | 4.0%                      | 35.0%           | 2.0%        | 3.0%    | 10.5%                          | 5.0%                | 10.5%                |
| Polish Respondents   | 12.5             | 11.5                     | 7.0                       | 39.5            | 3.0         | 4.5     | 10.5                           | 4.5                 | 7.0                  |
| Italian Respondents  | 22.0             | 10.5                     | 4.5                       | 34.0            | 2.0         | 2.0     | 11.0                           | 4.0                 | 10.0                 |
| Jewish Respondents   | 9.5              | 15.5                     | 6.5                       | 31.0            | 3.0         | 5.0     | 9.5                            | 5.0                 | 15.0                 |
| Hispanic Respondents | 12.5             | 16.5                     | 8.5                       | 31.5            | 3.5         | 6.5     | 7.5                            | 6.5                 | 7.0                  |
| All Respondents      | 13.9%            | 14.2%                    | 6.1%                      | 34.2%           | 2.7%        | 4.2%    | 9.8%                           | 5.0%                | 9.9%                 |

\*Chi square 62.958 DF=32 PROB=0.0009

\*\*Chi square 44.058 DF=32 PROB=0.0761



**Table 4.7**  
**"Which Program Should Be Cut First From Federal Budget?"**  
 by ideology and turnout

|                             | Defense<br>Spending | Food Stamps | Welfare | n=   |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|-------------|---------|------|
| <b>Ideology</b>             |                     |             |         |      |
| Conservative Republican     | 16.2%               | 25.4%       | 31.5%   | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican | 12.3                | 21.5        | 40.0    | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter             | 29.4                | 21.0        | 22.9    | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat       | 32.0                | 16.8        | 24.2    | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat   | 50.8                | 12.5        | 15.2    | 335  |
| <b>Turnout</b>              |                     |             |         |      |
| Low Turnout                 | 27.9%               | 21.0%       | 21.5%   | 233  |
| Medium Turnout              | 34.8                | 16.8        | 24.5    | 543  |
| High Turnout                | 40.2                | 16.5        | 20.5    | 224  |
| All Respondents             | 34.3%               | 17.7%       | 22.9%   | 1000 |

**Table 4.8**  
**"Which Program Should Be Cut First From Federal Budget?"**  
 by respondents' attitude to: "The U.S.S.R. is the number one threat to peace."

|                   | Defense<br>Spending | Food Stamps | Welfare | n=   |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------|---------|------|
| Agree/strongly    | 27.9%               | 20.2%       | 25.4%   | 476  |
| Agree             | 30.1                | 19.6        | 20.3    | 143  |
| Unsure            | 45.7                | 11.4        | 10.0    | 70   |
| Disagree          | 39.7                | 17.7        | 26.5    | 136  |
| Disagree/strongly | 46.9                | 12.0        | 20.6    | 175  |
| All Respondents   | 34.4%               | 17.7%       | 22.9%   | 1000 |

**Table 4.9**  
**If it came down to—(ROTATE)—(1) balancing the federal budget, or (2) increasing our country's defense spending, which would you favor?**

|                      | Balancing<br>Federal Budget | Unsure | Up Defense<br>Spending | n=   |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|--------|------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 61.5%                       | 11.5%  | 27.0%                  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 63.5                        | 11.5   | 25.0                   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 58.5                        | 10.5   | 31.0                   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 69.0                        | 6.0    | 25.0                   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 60.0                        | 12.0   | 28.0                   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 62.5%                       | 10.3%  | 27.2%                  | 1000 |

Chi square 8.670 DF=8 PROB=0.3709

**Table 4.10**  
**Balanced Budget versus Increased Defense Spending**  
by age and ideology

|                             | Balanced Budget | Unsure | Defense Spending | n =  |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|--------|------------------|------|
| <b>Age*</b>                 |                 |        |                  |      |
| 18-34                       | 73.3%           | 5.6%   | 21.1%            | 375  |
| 35-54                       | 57.5            | 11.2   | 32.4             | 315  |
| 55+                         | 54.8            | 16.1   | 29.0             | 310  |
| <b>Ideology**</b>           |                 |        |                  |      |
| Conservative Republican     | 56.9%           | 10.0%  | 33.1%            | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican | 58.5            | 9.2    | 32.3             | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter             | 54.7            | 15.0   | 30.4             | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat       | 63.3            | 9.0    | 27.7             | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat   | 70.2            | 8.7    | 21.2             | 335  |
| All Respondents             | 62.6%           | 10.3%  | 27.1%            | 1000 |

\*Chi square 38.194 DF=4 PROB=0.0001

\*\*Chi square 19.515 DF=8 PROB=0.0123

### Student Loans

However, the difficulty in balancing the budget is illustrated most clearly by responses received when the 1000 registered voters were asked whether they were more or less likely to support a candidate who favored "cutting federal guaranteed loans to middle and upper class college students." Over 47% of those responding said they would be less likely to support such a candidate, while only 31.5% said they would be more likely to back a candidate who adopted that position. Note that the question did *not* mention students in general or low income students, but rather, "middle and upper class students," some of whom could reasonably be expected to bear the burden of their own education costs. Of the five ethnic groups, only the Poles split evenly on the desirability of cutting the loans. Respondents 55 years old and older were split on the subject, with 37.1% saying they would be more likely to support someone who wanted to cut student loans and 38.7% saying they would oppose a candidate who adopted that position. Younger ethnics—those between 18 and 54—would support a pro-loan candidate by a margin of almost two-to-one. Differences on the basis of income seem minimal. Families with incomes under \$20,000 could be expected to benefit from cuts in guaranteed loans to middle and upper income students, since logically, more loan money would be available to them. But they are no less likely to support a candidate who favors loans for the relatively well-to-do.

### Workfare

While the results of this survey suggest that it is difficult to cut programs in order to balance the budget (with the possible exception of defense), and that certain government programs are now regarded as untouchable, the ethnic

Table 4.11

Would you be more or less likely to support someone who is in favor of cutting federal guaranteed loans to middle and upper class college students? (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                      | More Likely/Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | No Difference | Less Likely | Less Likely/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|----------------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 13.5%                | 10.5%       | 6.0%   | 15.5%         | 22.0%       | 32.5%                    | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 20.5                 | 19.5        | 6.0    | 15.5          | 13.5        | 25.0                     | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 24.0                 | 11.0        | 6.5    | 11.0          | 10.0        | 37.5                     | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 14.5                 | 14.5        | 10.5   | 15.5          | 16.5        | 28.5                     | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 17.5                 | 12.0        | 7.0    | 11.5          | 18.5        | 33.5                     | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 18.0%                | 13.5%       | 7.2%   | 13.8%         | 16.1%       | 31.4%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 39.933 DF=20 PROB=0.0051

Table 4.12

Likelihood of supporting someone who favors cutting guaranteed loans to middle and upper class students  
by family income

|                   | More Likely/Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | No Difference | Less Likely | Less Likely/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|-------------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|
| Under \$20,000    | 18.1%                | 14.3%       | 7.6%   | 13.0%         | 15.4%       | 31.6%                    | 370  |
| \$20,000-\$40,000 | 20.1                 | 14.1        | 5.0    | 14.3          | 17.1        | 29.4                     | 398  |
| \$40,000 and over | 14.5                 | 9.6         | 8.4    | 15.1          | 16.3        | 36.1                     | 166  |
| Refused           | 13.6                 | 13.6        | 15.2   | 12.1          | 15.2        | 30.3                     | 66   |
| All Respondents   | 18.0%                | 13.4%       | 7.2%   | 13.8%         | 16.2%       | 31.4%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 16.488 DF=15 PROB=0.3504



groups agreed about the advisability of having those who receive government funds accept work in return, as long as the recipient is not sick, disabled or elderly. By a margin of 77.5% to 17.6% the members of the sample said they would favor a law requiring people receiving government assistance to accept a job if one were available. Irish respondents favored the proposal by six-to-one, with Italians at five-to-one, Jews and Poles at four-to-one, and Hispanic respondents at slightly under three-to-one. Hispanics who opposed the proposal tended to have less education and a lower family income. They also tended to identify themselves as Hispanic rather than American.<sup>1</sup> However, even those categories favored the proposal by better than two-to-one. Moreover, a majority of the 1000 respondents from all five ethnic groups were strongly in favor of requiring recipients of assistance to accept employment. High-turnout respondents were particularly supportive of the proposal, with over 80% in favor and only 13.4% opposed.

Table 4.13

Think for a moment about a new law which would require anyone who received any form of government assistance to accept a job if one were available. The law would not apply to people who were sick, disabled, or elderly. Would you favor or oppose such a law?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                      | Favor Strongly | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | Oppose Strongly | n=   |
|----------------------|----------------|-------|--------|--------|-----------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 65.0%          | 17.5% | 5.0%   | 4.0%   | 8.5%            | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 65.5           | 14.0  | 2.5    | 7.5    | 10.5            | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 64.5           | 13.0  | 7.0    | 3.0    | 12.5            | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 61.5           | 16.5  | 5.0    | 7.5    | 9.5             | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 53.0           | 17.0  | 5.0    | 8.0    | 17.0            | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 61.9%          | 15.6% | 4.9%   | 6.0%   | 11.6%           | 1000 |

Chi square 24.648 DF=16 PROB=0.0763

### Approaching Economic Issues

While there is a consensus on the part of the respondents that government must play a crucial role in the delivery of social services, the ethnics indicated that they were willing to accept additional cuts in certain social welfare programs. But they do not consider support for assistance to the needy or handicapped as fiscal irresponsibility. It is possible to approve of government assistance and at the same time recognize a responsibility on the part of the recipients to make compensation in some way for the financial support they receive. The sample's overwhelming support for the proposition that all able-bodied recipients of gov-

<sup>1</sup>The Ethnic-American variable derives from survey question 41. That question asked respondents to rate themselves from 1 (American) to 7 (Irish, Polish, Italian, Jewish or Hispanic, depending on the ethnic background of the respondent). Those who answered "1" were placed in the "American" category, while all others were classified as leaning ethnic. This categorization was arbitrary and based on the distribution of responses, so that approximately half of the sample fell in each of the two categories.

ernment assistance be required to accept a job if one is available indicates that a political party which makes the proposal an important part of its agenda will find great support in the ethnic community. Those who, for whatever reasons, find it necessary to oppose the measure might be vulnerable to charges of fiscal irresponsibility and could be placed on the defensive.

On more general economic issues, the public's reaction is generally one of confusion. For example, when a June 14-15, 1982 NBC News/Associated Press nation-wide telephone survey asked 1,597 adults, "Over the past year, do you think the nation's inflation rate has gone up, gone down or stayed the same?", an incredible 51% of the sample said it had risen. Only 25% were aware that it had dropped and 22% responded that it had stayed about the same. The explanation may be that when asked, "Which of the following most affects *you* personally—unemployment, inflation, or interest rates?", a plurality answered inflation (47%), with interest running second (31%) and unemployment trailing (19%). However, when asked to identify "the most important economic problem for the government to help control during the next three years," 44% of respondents identified unemployment, 34% named interest rates and 19% answered inflation.

The public's responses to questions about the economy may well be a reflection of the way that the print and electronic media have chosen to cover the economy. The Republicans have done relatively little to take credit for the dip in the inflation rate between early 1981 and mid-1982, and evidently the public is not fully aware of the progress which has been made against inflation. Since it makes better television to show lines in an unemployment office or to interview people who are out of work than to show a chart indicating monthly changes in the inflation rate, the Republicans cannot expect the media to make their case for them.

Responses in our ethnic survey reinforce the view that the public is unsure about the current economic setting. While almost 30% of those ethnics surveyed identified unemployment as the nation's greatest economic problem, slightly more than 30% mentioned either high interest rates or inflation as the number one economic problem. Another one-third of the sample came up with a completely different answer or could not come up with one at all. Instead of running television campaign advertisements which attempt to take credit for the Social Security cost-of-living increase, the Republicans would be wise to address the public's concern about the economy by emphasizing the economic gains that have been made since January of 1981. And for the most part, that means the decrease in the inflation rate.

However, even if the GOP convinces the public that inroads have been made against inflation, the Republicans will still have to deal with the problems of high interest rates and unemployment. And it is around these two issues that a broad-based Democratic front can be developed. Conservative Democrats, many of whom agree with Republicans on foreign policy and social issues, are even more concerned about unemployment than are moderate and liberal Democrats. This makes those conservative Democrats susceptible to appeals

**Table 4.14**  
**Most important economic problem facing country**  
**by turnout and ideology**

|                   | High<br>Interest<br>Rates | Inflation | Unemployment | Foreign<br>Competition | Productivity | Unbalanced<br>Federal<br>Budget | Other | Don't Know<br>No Answer | n =  |
|-------------------|---------------------------|-----------|--------------|------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|------|
| <b>Turnout*</b>   |                           |           |              |                        |              |                                 |       |                         |      |
| Low turnout       | 9.9%                      | 17.2%     | 31.8%        | 3.0%                   | 3.9%         | 5.2%                            | 12.9% | 16.3%                   | 233  |
| Medium turnout    | 12.2                      | 18.6      | 29.8         | 3.0                    | 3.9          | 7.7                             | 14.0  | 10.9                    | 543  |
| High turnout      | 20.1                      | 16.1      | 26.8         | 3.6                    | 3.6          | 8.0                             | 17.0  | 4.9                     | 224  |
| <b>Ideology**</b> |                           |           |              |                        |              |                                 |       |                         |      |
| Conservative      |                           |           |              |                        |              |                                 |       |                         |      |
| Republican        | 16.9%                     | 19.2%     | 23.9%        | 3.9%                   | 7.7%         | 10.0%                           | 14.6% | 3.9%                    | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal  |                           |           |              |                        |              |                                 |       |                         |      |
| Republican        | 6.2                       | 23.1      | 21.5         | 1.5                    | 4.6          | 7.7                             | 23.1  | 12.3                    | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter   | 17.3                      | 16.8      | 26.6         | 3.7                    | 1.9          | 6.1                             | 14.0  | 13.6                    | 214  |
| Conservative      |                           |           |              |                        |              |                                 |       |                         |      |
| Democrat          | 11.3                      | 18.0      | 34.0         | 2.7                    | 2.3          | 7.4                             | 11.7  | 12.5                    | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal  |                           |           |              |                        |              |                                 |       |                         |      |
| Democrat          | 12.5                      | 16.4      | 31.9         | 3.0                    | 4.5          | 6.6                             | 14.9  | 10.2                    | 335  |
| All Respondents   | 13.4%                     | 17.7%     | 29.6%        | 3.1%                   | 3.8%         | 7.2%                            | 14.4% | 10.8%                   | 1000 |

\*Chi square 29.117 DF=14 PROB=0.0101

\*\*Chi square 40.059 DF=28 PROB=0.0653



from more liberal Democrats. Possibly of even greater importance, high-turnout individuals and ticket-splitters are more concerned than other groups about high interest rates. Again, this could pose significant problems to Republicans in the years to come, since it means that likely voters and those who sometimes vote Republican are concerned about what continues to be an important economic problem. Should interest rates drop, however, the Republicans would stand to benefit.

Social Security, guaranteed student loans, and government assistance for the disabled can be cut only at a very high political cost. But large numbers of ethnics continue to believe that there is a substantial amount of waste in social programs, as evidenced by their willingness to see cuts in "welfare" and "food stamps," and it is now up to the budget-cutters to tap that sentiment by finding programs where more cuts can be made.

One way to make necessary budget cuts more acceptable to the electorate is to frame the issue properly. Democratic strategists and candidates have had considerable success branding Ronald Reagan as insensitive to the poor and Republican programs as lacking in fairness. The GOP must counter these charges or risk substantial electoral defeats, and one way for the party to do so is by framing certain issues for populist appeal. Student loans are a case in point. In 1981, the President proposed adding a "needs test," limiting guaranteed student loans to amounts needed to cover a student's educational cost. Congress passed the "needs test," but applied the test only to students from families with incomes over \$30,000 per year. Nevertheless, the administration was castigated by some for executing cuts in student loans, and the media probably added to the opposition by interviewing prospective college students who said that they could not attend the college of their choice without the loans. Our own survey shows that among ethnics there continues to be widespread opposition to cuts in the student loan program, even for middle and upper-class families. Evidently, the Republicans never succeeded in making the argument that middle and upper class families should bear the burden of educating their own children and that tax revenue generated from the less well-to-do should not go to subsidize the education of students whose families have annual incomes in excess of \$25,000. Nor did the administration successfully challenge the implicit argument that students have a "right" to attend high-priced Ivy League schools.

The public's perception of the condition of the economy historically has been and, in all likelihood, will continue to be the dominant issue in elections. A weak economy with high interest rates, high levels of unemployment and a high inflation rate, can be disastrous to the party in power. But if certain economic indicators suggest a growing economy, the party in power can take advantage of those signs. Moreover, the party can address issues in such a way as to maximize support on those issues, even though the economy as a whole is believed by the public to be weak. This is the challenge which faces the Republicans in 1982 and, no doubt, will face both parties throughout the 1980's.

## Chapter 5: Ethnicity and Social Policy

The umbrella of social policy covers government spending for social programs, crime and the so-called social issues, involving moral and religious questions. Together they define the limits of government responsibility and power outside of economics and foreign policy. On some questions there is a marked consistency in the responses from the five ethnic groups, but on most questions, one or two groups appear to have staked out particularly liberal positions compared to the other ethnics.

### Social Responsibility

The degree to which the American people have come to rely on the government is illustrated most strikingly by one particular survey question. When asked who or what should be "most responsible" for dealing with the problems of the handicapped, the elderly and poor, over 70% of each ethnic group placed the burden on the federal, state and local government.

While there were differences among the groups as to how much responsibility each level of government should have, there was agreement that relatives and religious and charitable institutions, which at one time played such an important role in helping the needy, do not have primary responsibility for the handicapped, elderly or poor. In fact, aside from the Hispanics, who picked the state government as having the greatest responsibility for dealing with the poor, all of the groups responded that the federal government is the most responsible for dealing with the three needy groups. There was no appreciable difference in the response when controls were introduced for age, education or whether or not the respondent thought of himself purely as an American or as an ethnic American. Only those earning over \$40,000 a year placed significant responsibility on the family and relatives, and even then, only in regard to the elderly.

The set of responses to these questions was rather unexpected, since some of the groups in the sample are generally characterized as having particularly strong family and religious bonds, which ordinarily might be expected to be apparent in their responses. Italians, for example, are reported to have strong family ties, yet they do not differ in their responses from the other groups. At least 70% of each group, including the Italians, said primary responsibility for the handicapped, elderly and poor should rest with one of the three levels of government.

The attitude that the government is responsible for the welfare of the handicapped, elderly and poor carries over to other areas. When asked the more general question about "spending on social programs, such as Aid to Dependent Children, welfare, and Medicare," two groups, Jews and Hispanics, showed support for more spending, while Polish and Italian respondents split evenly between more and less spending and Irish respondents showed a slight preference for less spending. A particularly high number of Hispanics strongly supported

Table 5.1

Which of the following should be *most responsible* for dealing with the problems of the handicapped in this country? The elderly? And the problems of people without enough money who live below the poverty line? (READ LIST FOR EACH QUESTION)

| Handicapped*         |                  |                  |                    |                     |                   |                       | n =  |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Federal Government   | State Government | Local Government | Business/ Industry | Religion/ Charities | Family/ Relatives | Don't Know/ No Answer |      |
| Irish Respondents    | 30.0%            | 14.0%            | 5.5%               | 2.5%                | 11.5%             | 5.5%                  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 41.0             | 9.5              | 2.5                | 3.5                 | 12.5              | 5.0                   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 42.5             | 10.5             | 5.5                | 3.5                 | 9.0               | 6.0                   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 38.0             | 11.0             | 2.5                | 2.0                 | 15.5              | 7.5                   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 36.5             | 10.5             | 4.5                | 2.5                 | 13.0              | 4.0                   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 37.6%            | 11.1%            | 4.1%               | 2.8%                | 12.3%             | 5.6%                  | 1000 |

  

| Elderly**            |                  |                  |                    |                     |                   |                       | n =  |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Federal Government   | State Government | Local Government | Business/ Industry | Religion/ Charities | Family/ Relatives | Don't Know/ No Answer |      |
| Irish Respondents    | 39.5%            | 11.5%            | 2.5%               | 4.0%                | 18.0%             | 5.5%                  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 45.0             | 6.0              | 1.5                | 2.5                 | 14.5              | 5.5                   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 45.5             | 8.0              | 1.5                | 0.5                 | 11.5              | 6.5                   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 50.0             | 7.0              | 1.5                | 2.0                 | 16.0              | 7.0                   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 36.5             | 9.5              | 4.0                | 1.0                 | 15.5              | 4.5                   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 43.3%            | 8.4%             | 2.2%               | 2.0%                | 15.1%             | 5.8%                  | 1000 |

  

| Below Poverty line*** |                  |                  |                    |                     |                   |                       | n =  |
|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Federal Government    | State Government | Local Government | Business/ Industry | Religion/ Charities | Family/ Relatives | Don't Know/ No Answer |      |
| Irish Respondents     | 41.0%            | 16.0%            | 3.5%               | 5.5%                | 5.5%              | 6.0%                  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents    | 41.0             | 11.0             | 2.5                | 6.0                 | 6.0               | 7.0                   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents   | 44.5             | 13.0             | 1.5                | 4.5                 | 4.0               | 5.0                   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents    | 46.5             | 10.5             | 3.0                | 4.5                 | 4.0               | 7.5                   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents  | 35.5             | 9.0              | 2.5                | 3.0                 | 4.0               | 7.5                   | 200  |
| All Respondents       | 41.7%            | 11.9%            | 2.6%               | 4.7%                | 4.7%              | 6.6%                  | 1000 |

\*Chi square 22.560 DF=24 PROB=0.5458 \*\*Chi square 35.375 DF=24 PROB=0.0631 \*\*\*Chi square 26.693 DF=24 PROB=0.3190



Table 5.2

In general, are you in favor of *more* federal government spending on social programs, such as Aid to Dependent Children, welfare, and Medicare, or *less* government spending on these programs?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                      | More/Strongly | More  | Unsure | Less  | Less/Strongly | n =  |
|----------------------|---------------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 26.5%         | 13.0% | 14.5%  | 16.0% | 30.0%         | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 28.0          | 16.0  | 9.5    | 9.5   | 37.0          | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 27.5          | 17.0  | 10.5   | 9.5   | 35.5          | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 29.5          | 23.0  | 16.5   | 10.5  | 20.5          | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 38.0          | 15.5  | 13.5   | 8.0   | 25.0          | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 29.9%         | 16.9% | 12.9%  | 10.7% | 29.6%         | 1000 |

Chi square 37.726 DF=16 PROB=0.0017

increased government spending on social programs. While this would suggest a generally broad consensus for current or higher spending levels, not all ethnic demographic groups wanted more spending for social programs. Support appears to reflect age, education and income differences within each group. Young adults, those between 18 and 34, were most likely to support more spending for social programs, while those 35-54 were noticeably least likely. Those with the lowest incomes (less than \$20,000 per year) were also significantly more likely to support spending. Finally, except for Jewish respondents, college graduates tended to oppose more spending, while their fellow group members with less education were somewhat more supportive. For Jews, the most conservative respondents on spending for social programs appear to be those who have not received a college degree but have reached a high income level.

### The Equal Rights Amendment

On some social issues the three European Catholic groups appear to be much more conservative than either Hispanics or Jews, but on other questions there is a consensus. For example, at least 60% of each of the ethnic group samples supported the Equal Rights Amendment and 54% of the 1000 respondents said they would be more likely to support a candidate who voted for the Equal Rights Amendment.

While Jewish and Hispanic respondents feel more strongly about the E.R.A., an overwhelming majority of all five of the groups supported the measure. Not all ethnics back the amendment equally, but the differences are explained by age and education rather than ethnicity. That is, there is much more support for the Equal Rights Amendment among younger respondents and, except for Hispanics and Irish, among more highly educated respondents. When asked whether they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who supports the E.R.A., all age and education groups agree they would.

Our survey gives support to recent polls which have found that the E.R.A. is favored nationally by a two-to-one margin. A July 1981 Gallup Poll, for example,

**Table 5.3**  
**Support for More Federal Government Spending on Social Programs**  
 by age, education and family income, per ethnic group

|                     | Irish<br>Respondents | Polish<br>Respondents | Italian<br>Respondents | Jewish<br>Respondents | Hispanic<br>Respondents | All<br>Respondents |
|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| Age                 |                      |                       |                        |                       |                         |                    |
| 18-34               | 48.1%                | 50.0%                 | 53.6%                  | 59.1%                 | 58.3%                   | 54.1%              |
| 35-54               | 27.9                 | 40.0                  | 31.4                   | 48.2                  | 44.1                    | 38.1               |
| 55 +                | 40.0                 | 41.9                  | 50.0                   | 50.0                  | 58.3                    | 46.8               |
| Education           |                      |                       |                        |                       |                         |                    |
| High School or less | 42.9%                | 46.3%                 | 47.3%                  | 41.1%                 | 58.3%                   | 48.0%              |
| Some College        | 38.9                 | 47.7                  | 51.6                   | 50.0                  | 47.3                    | 46.4               |
| College             | 36.2                 | 35.4                  | 35.6                   | 59.6                  | 50.0                    | 45.3               |
| Family Income       |                      |                       |                        |                       |                         |                    |
| Less than \$20,000  | 46.8%                | 46.6%                 | 54.3%                  | 60.7%                 | 65.2%                   | 54.9%              |
| \$20,000-\$40,000   | 35.2                 | 45.2                  | 37.2                   | 58.3                  | 42.3                    | 43.0               |
| More than \$40,000  | 34.2                 | 32.0                  | 37.0                   | 38.8                  | 48.2                    | 38.0               |
| All Respondents     | 39.5%                | 44.0%                 | 44.5%                  | 52.5%                 | 53.5%                   | 46.8%              |

For additional data, see Appendix IV

Table 5.4

Now I'd like your opinion on several issues which people have been talking about. For each one, please tell me whether you favor or oppose the issue. First—The Equal Rights Amendment or E.R.A.—the constitutional amendment about women.  
(PROMPT: DO YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE THIS AMENDMENT?)

|                      | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 65.5% | 13.0%  | 21.5%  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 61.0  | 9.5    | 29.5   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 61.0  | 10.5   | 28.5   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 73.5  | 10.0   | 16.5   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 73.0  | 8.0    | 19.0   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 66.8% | 10.2%  | 23.0%  | 1000 |

Chi square 18.733 DF=8 PROB=0.0164

asked those who had heard of the amendment whether they supported it, and 63% said they did, 32% said they opposed it, and 5% had no opinion about the amendment. Other polls have shown the Equal Rights Amendment supported by a slightly smaller majority. An April 1981 CBS News/*News York Times* survey found support for the E.R.A. at 57% and a late June 1982 CBS News survey put support for the amendment at 52%.

The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution failed in 1982 (or three years earlier if one fails to accept the legality of the extension granted by Congress), but it is likely that sometime in the near future members of Congress are going to be required to vote on the issue once again. The responses of the five ethnic groups indicate that candidates who oppose the amendment will be taking a position which differs from the one taken by a sizable element of the electorate. Not only did two-thirds of the sample favor the amendment, but more than half of the respondents said they were more likely to support a candidate who favors the E.R.A. Moreover, those who would "strongly" support such a candidate outnumber those who would "strongly" oppose such a candidate by a margin of three-to-one.

Opponents of the amendment have pointed out that *state* E.R.A. measures have been ahead in polls but have been defeated on election day, as in Iowa and Florida. The discrepancies between the survey research and the actual votes suggest that either the polling is inaccurate, that the anti-E.R.A. respondents feel more deeply about the issue, or that the anti-E.R.A. forces are politically more adept. Given the variety of national polls and the fact that they *all* show support for the E.R.A., it seems unlikely that the surveys are misreading public sentiment. As for commitment to the issue, Table 5.5 suggests that those who are strongly more likely to support a pro-E.R.A. candidate outnumber those who are strongly less likely to support a pro-E.R.A. candidate by a three-to-one margin.<sup>1</sup> If all this is correct, then the victory by the anti-E.R.A. forces must

<sup>1</sup>Some would take issue with the view that a great many supporters of the E.R.A. are strongly committed to that position. As William Raspberry noted, "The polls accurately reflect the widespread support for the principle. What they do not reflect is the fact that the support is tepid." *Washington Post*, July 19, 1982, p. A13.



**Table 5.5**  
**Someone who voted for the Equal Rights Amendment or the E.R.A. (PROMPT: WOULD YOU MORE LIKELY OR LESS LIKELY**  
**TO VOTE FOR A CANDIDATE WHO VOTED FOR THE E.R.A.?)**  
**IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?**

|                      | More Likely/Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | No Difference | Less Likely | Less Likely/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|----------------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 33.5%                | 19.5%       | 2.0%   | 30.5%         | 6.5%        | 8.0%                     | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 31.5                 | 17.5        | 3.0    | 28.0          | 9.0         | 11.0                     | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 36.5                 | 11.0        | 6.5    | 22.0          | 8.5         | 15.5                     | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 40.0                 | 21.0        | 6.0    | 25.5          | 2.5         | 5.0                      | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 38.5                 | 22.0        | 5.0    | 17.0          | 4.0         | 13.5                     | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 36.0%                | 18.2%       | 4.5%   | 24.6%         | 6.1%        | 10.6%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 50.588 DF=20 PROB=0.0002

**Table 5.6**  
**Attitudes Toward the E.R.A.—in Percent Favor/Oppose**  
**by age, education, per ethnic group**

|                     | Irish<br>Respondents | Polish<br>Respondents | Italian<br>Respondents | Jewish<br>Respondents | Hispanic<br>Respondents | All<br>Respondents |
|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|
| Age                 |                      |                       |                        |                       |                         |                    |
| 18-34               | 73.4-20.3            | 80.3-13.6             | 69.6-21.4              | 84.9- 9.1             | 75.0-16.7               | 76.5-16.3          |
| 35-54               | 62.3-23.0            | 58.3-31.7             | 70.0-22.9              | 67.9-19.6             | 73.5-20.6               | 66.7-23.5          |
| 55+                 | 60.0-20.0            | 46.0-41.9             | 46.0-39.2              | 68.0-20.5             | 62.5-25.0               | 55.5-30.3          |
|                     | n = 200              | 200                   | 200                    | 200                   | 200                     | 1000               |
| Education           |                      |                       |                        |                       |                         |                    |
| High School or less | 64.9-15.6            | 58.3-30.6             | 55.5-32.7              | 67.9-19.6             | 72.8-21.4               | 63.2-25.1          |
| Some College        | 64.8-29.6            | 63.6-27.3             | 74.2-16.1              | 60.0-20.0             | 72.7-20.0               | 67.0-23.2          |
| College             | 68.1-20.3            | 64.6-29.2             | 64.6-27.1              | 81.7-13.5             | 73.8-11.9               | 72.1-19.6          |
|                     | n = 200              | 200                   | 200                    | 200                   | 200                     | 1000               |
| All Respondents     | 66.0-21.0            | 61.0-29.5             | 61.0-26.5              | 73.5-16.5             | 73.0-19.0               | 66.9-22.9          |

have been due to their organization and lobbying. Logically, pro-E.R.A. forces can be expected to learn something from their defeat, making them more formidable opponents in the future. This does not necessarily mean that the Equal Rights Amendment will be added to the Constitution within the next few years. After all, the amendment is not subject to a national ratification, but rather, to a series of state ratifications. Therefore, it is possible to have the support of a majority of Americans without being able to pass a constitutional amendment in the necessary number of state legislatures. However, our survey suggests that among the respondents from the five ethnic groups, support for the E.R.A. is a clear plus, and opponents of the issue must defuse it, redefine it, or accept the political consequences.

### Affirmative Action

There is a widespread consensus among ethnic respondents against preferential treatment in hiring and college admission for members of groups who have suffered past discrimination. Of the five groups, Hispanics are the most likely to support affirmative action, but even 60% of them say that ability, as defined by test scores, should be the main consideration for hiring and college acceptance. Older Hispanics are more likely to support affirmative action programs than those in the 18-34 and 35-55 age ranges, who are opposed to those programs by about two-to-one. Not surprisingly, those who identified themselves as at least partially "Hispanic," and therefore had a higher "ethnic consciousness," were more strongly supportive of preferential treatment than were those who identified themselves solely as "American." All categories of Jews say they are opposed to preferential treatment, although those with a college education and those who are moderate to liberal Democrats are not nearly as strongly opposed. For example, while over 70% of Jewish respondents with less than a college educa-

Table 5.7

*Some people say that to make up for past discrimination, women and members of minority groups should be given better treatment for getting jobs and places in college. Others say that ability, as determined by test scores, should be the main consideration.*

*Which of these two views comes closest to your own opinion?*

**IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?**

|                      | Better<br>Treatment/<br>Strongly | Better<br>Treatment | Unsure | Ability | Ability/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------|---------|----------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 9.0%                             | 6.0%                | 7.5%   | 13.5%   | 64.0%                | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 9.0                              | 2.5                 | 7.0    | 9.5     | 72.0                 | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 10.5                             | 3.0                 | 6.5    | 8.0     | 72.0                 | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 9.0                              | 6.0                 | 9.0    | 12.0    | 64.0                 | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 26.5                             | 5.5                 | 7.5    | 14.0    | 46.5                 | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 12.8%                            | 4.6%                | 7.5%   | 11.4%   | 63.7%                | 1000 |

Chi square 61.246 DF=16 PROB=0.0001

**Table 5.8**  
**Attitudes Toward Better Treatment Versus Ability**  
 by age and degree of ethnic consciousness

|                      | Favor<br>Better<br>Treatment/<br>Strongly | Favor<br>Better<br>Treatment | Unsure | Favor<br>Ability | Favor<br>Ability/<br>Strongly | n=   |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|------------------|-------------------------------|------|
| Age                  |                                           |                              |        |                  |                               |      |
| 18-34                | 13.6%                                     | 5.6%                         | 6.1%   | 16.5%            | 58.1%                         | 375  |
| 35-54                | 10.8                                      | 4.8                          | 7.9    | 9.5              | 67.0                          | 315  |
| 55+                  | 13.9                                      | 2.9                          | 2.9    | 7.1              | 67.4                          | 310  |
| Ethnic Consciousness |                                           |                              |        |                  |                               |      |
| Lean American        | 26.6%                                     | 3.1%                         | 4.7%   | 7.8%             | 57.8%                         | 498  |
| Lean Ethnic          | 27.3                                      | 6.8                          | 7.6    | 17.4             | 40.9                          | 484  |
| All Respondents      | 12.8%                                     | 4.6%                         | 7.5%   | 11.4%            | 63.7%                         | 1000 |

tion strongly prefer ability rather than preferential treatment as a primary criterion for hiring or college admission, only 54.8% of college-educated Jews felt the same way. While 21% of moderate and liberal Democratic Jews said they back better treatment for members of minority groups and 67% oppose such preferential treatment, only 9% of other Jews—ticket-splitters, Republicans and conservative Democrats—favor better treatment, and 85% are opposed to it. Hispanics who are also moderate or liberal Democrats display the same attitudes toward the issue as do their Jewish ideological counterparts.

Our findings differ from those of a January 1982 Harris survey. When asked about the statement "Minorities and women are not entitled to any special consideration," 37% of a national sample agreed and 60% disagreed.<sup>2</sup> According to Harris, "By any measure, these results indicate a solid endorsement of the principle of affirmative action." Harris goes on to suggest that the change of opinion has resulted from the fact

that the pendulum has begun to swing back toward the view that those groups have been hurt by cutbacks in federal spending, and a compassionate nation must now help them out of their plight in special, focused ways, including strong federal leadership.<sup>3</sup>

Harris' conclusion is purely speculative and cannot be read from the data. In fact, our survey of 1000 ethnic respondents indicates that even the most ideologically liberal among them believe that ability, rather than preferential treatment, should be the determining factor in hiring and college admission. While there is no way of knowing for certain why there is such a large discrepancy between Harris' data and our results, and assuming there is not such a great difference

<sup>2</sup>This is in marked contrast to an October 1978 Harris survey in which 73% agreed and 20% disagreed.

<sup>3</sup>*The Harris Survey*, "Americans Favor Affirmative Action," no. 8, January 28, 1982, p. 2.



**Table 5.9**  
**Attitudes Toward Better Treatment Versus Ability**  
by ideology

|                                | Favor<br>Better<br>Treatment/<br>Strongly | Favor<br>Better<br>Treatment | Unsure | Favor<br>Ability | Favor<br>Ability/<br>Strongly | n=   |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|------------------|-------------------------------|------|
| Conservative<br>Republican     | 7.7%                                      | 0.8%                         | 2.3%   | 11.5%            | 77.7%                         | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Republican | 6.3                                       | 6.2                          | 7.7    | 4.6              | 69.2                          | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitters               | 9.8                                       | 2.8                          | 10.8   | 7.9              | 68.7                          | 214  |
| Conservative<br>Democrat       | 13.7                                      | 3.5                          | 4.7    | 13.3             | 64.8                          | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Democrat   | 16.1                                      | 7.5                          | 9.6    | 13.4             | 53.4                          | 335  |
| All Respondents                | 12.8%                                     | 4.5%                         | 7.5%   | 11.4%            | 63.8%                         | 1000 |

between ethnics and the electorate as a whole, one probable explanation is the framing of the issue. Harris asked his sample to comment on a negative statement, while our question presented the alternatives of "better treatment" and "ability" as considerations for college admission and hiring. It is possible that presenting the issue in terms of "ability" may yield a greater anti-affirmative action response.<sup>4</sup> In any case, Harris' assessment is dubious at best.

The *Bakke* and *Weber* cases are now history, but the issue of affirmative action continues to be one which splits Jewish respondents from their traditional liberal allies. Indeed, opposition to "preferential treatment" continues to be extremely strong and is a potentially powerful political issue depending on how it is presented. Republicans oppose preferential treatment by almost seven-to-one, ticket-splitters by more than six-to-one and moderate and liberal Democrats by three-to-one.

Candidates who emphasize "ability" as a criterion for college acceptance or for a job are likely to find popular support for that position, at least among the five ethnic groups.

### **Busing**

Ethnic group responses to a question on busing mirrored their responses about affirmative action. A majority of each group opposed busing, but Hispanics were more likely than the other groups, and particularly the other Catholic groups, to support busing for "better racial balance in the schools." Hispanics who had a high school education or less were the most receptive to busing, fav-

<sup>4</sup>A July 9-July 14, 1982 Harris Survey asked 1,250 adults whether they support "federal laws requiring affirmative action programs for women and minorities in employment, provided there are no rigid quotas." According to Harris, 69% said they favored such legislation. Once again, the phrasing of the question was more likely to get a pro-affirmative action response.

oring it by the narrowest of margins, 47.6% to 44.5%, while those Hispanics who had some college but did not have a degree were the most solidly opposed, 60% to 27.3%. Younger adults are measurably more supportive of busing than are older ethnics. While only 17.1% of those 55 years and older and only 18.7% of those between 35 and 54 favor busing, 32.3% of those between the ages of 18 and 34 said they support busing to achieve a better racial balance. Those who identified themselves as being at least partially ethnic rather than solely as "American" also tended to be more supportive of busing.

Busing is not the highly visible issue it once was, but it continues to be one that can excite people. Not only is there strong opposition to busing, even among Jews, but critics of busing are more likely to turn out on election day than are proponents. Even moderates and liberals of both parties oppose busing, and liberal candidates and incumbents who try to defend busing "for better racial balance" will have trouble explaining their position to members of the ethnic groups examined here.

**Table 5.10**

**Finally—do you favor busing children to achieve a better racial balance in the schools?  
(PROMPT: DO YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE BUSING?)**

|                      | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 16.5% | 4.0%   | 79.5%  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 19.0  | 7.0    | 74.0   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 17.0  | 4.0    | 79.0   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 24.5  | 7.5    | 68.0   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 39.5  | 10.0   | 50.5   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 23.3% | 6.5%   | 70.2%  | 1000 |

Chi square 55.890 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

**Table 5.11**

**Attitudes Toward Busing  
by turnout and ideology**

|                         | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|-------------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Turnout                 |       |        |        |      |
| Low turnout             | 33.1% | 5.2%   | 61.8%  | 233  |
| Medium turnout          | 21.7  | 6.8    | 71.5   | 543  |
| High turnout            | 17.0  | 7.6    | 75.5   | 224  |
| Ideology                |       |        |        |      |
| Conservative Republican | 15.4% | 1.5%   | 83.1%  | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal        |       |        |        |      |
| Republican              | 32.3  | 3.0    | 64.6   | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter         | 14.0  | 6.1    | 79.9   | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat   | 24.6  | 7.0    | 68.4   | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal        |       |        |        |      |
| Democrat                | 29.6  | 9.3    | 61.2   | 335  |
| All Respondents         | 23.3% | 6.6%   | 70.1%  | 1000 |

## Abortion

Abortion undoubtedly has and continues to be one of the most controversial issues of public policy. A constitutional amendment banning abortion is opposed by all of the groups surveyed in this study, with Poles and Italians more likely than the other groups to support such an amendment. Jews oppose the amendment by a six-to-one margin.

However, when the respondents who said they opposed a constitutional amendment banning all abortions were asked whether they would support a measure which banned abortions except in cases of rape or incest, four of the five groups expressed support. That is, those opposing *any* amendment (what we will call "hard opposed") were relatively few when compared with those opposing an amendment because it did not exclude victims of rape and incest (what we will call "soft opposed"). Jews would still oppose an anti-abortion amendment that excluded rape and incest, and Irish Catholic support is relatively low when compared to the other Catholic groups. Still, about 60% of the total sample would support an amendment banning abortion which excluded rape and incest victims. White-collar and self-employed respondents tended to have "harder" opposition to a constitutional amendment banning abortion than did blue-collar workers, although roughly the same percentage of each (32%-33%) would back such an amendment.

Additional responses from the sample suggest that opposition to an amendment is not as strong as one might first think. When the 1000 respondents were asked whether they would be more or less likely to vote for a candidate who supports a constitutional amendment banning abortion, a different perspective appears. Only among the Jewish sample would a plurality be less likely to vote for a pro-amendment candidate. Hispanics are divided evenly on the question, while razor-thin majorities of the other groups would be more likely to support a candidate who backs an amendment banning abortion. Looking at the total sample, 40% said they would be *less* likely to support a candidate who favors an amendment, while 33.5% said they would be *more* likely to back such a candidate. Of the total Catholic sample, 38.6% would be *more* likely to vote for a pro-amend-

Table 5.12  
[Do you support or oppose] a constitutional amendment banning abortion?  
(PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

|                      | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n=   |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 37.5% | 10.5%  | 52.0%  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 40.0  | 13.0   | 47.0   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 41.5  | 9.0    | 49.5   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 13.0  | 9.5    | 77.5   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 37.0  | 9.0    | 54.0   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 33.8% | 10.2%  | 56.0%  | 1000 |

Chi square 56.640 DF=8 PROB=0.0001



Table 5.13

## Attitudes Toward a Constitutional Amendment Banning Abortion

by ethnic group, income, age and family income

Hard oppose=opposition to any amendment

Soft oppose=opposition to an amendment that does not exclude rape and incest

|                      | Favor | Unsure | Soft Oppose | Hard Oppose | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|--------|-------------|-------------|------|
| <b>Ethnic Groups</b> |       |        |             |             |      |
| Irish Respondents    | 37.5% | 14.0%  | 19.0%       | 29.5%       | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 40.0  | 16.5   | 29.5        | 14.0        | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 41.5  | 12.5   | 29.5        | 16.5        | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 13.0  | 10.0   | 22.5        | 54.5        | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 37.0  | 14.0   | 32.0        | 17.0        | 200  |
|                      |       |        |             |             | 1000 |
| <b>Education</b>     |       |        |             |             |      |
| High School or less  | 38.3% | 18.9%  | 29.1%       | 13.7%       | 454  |
| Some College         | 33.0  | 10.7   | 29.9        | 26.3        | 224  |
| College              | 27.6  | 7.5    | 20.5        | 44.4        | 322  |
|                      |       |        |             |             | 1000 |
| <b>Age</b>           |       |        |             |             |      |
| 18-34                | 30.7% | 9.9%   | 27.5%       | 32.0%       | 375  |
| 35-54                | 33.3  | 10.2   | 26.0        | 30.5        | 315  |
| 55+                  | 37.7  | 21.0   | 25.8        | 15.5        | 310  |
|                      |       |        |             |             | 1000 |
| <b>Income</b>        |       |        |             |             |      |
| Under \$20,000       | 36.5% | 16.8%  | 28.4%       | 18.4%       | 370  |
| \$20,000-\$40,000    | 32.9  | 11.8   | 27.6        | 27.6        | 398  |
| More than \$40,000   | 30.7  | 8.4    | 18.1        | 42.8        | 166  |
|                      |       |        |             |             | 934  |
| All Respondents      | 33.7% | 13.4%  | 26.5%       | 26.4%       | 1000 |

ment candidate and 33.8% would be *less* likely. Thus, while a clear majority of the sample opposes a constitutional amendment, a candidate who supports an amendment is not necessarily going to be hurt by his position and may actually be helped among a number of ethnic groups.

When the respondents were asked whether federal money should ever be used to pay for an abortion, 49.7% of the total sample said "No" and another 5.9% was uncertain. Only Jews favored the use of federal money, and they did so by a margin of almost two-to-one. The four Catholic groups, on the other hand, opposed the use of any federal money by a 54.2%-39.9% margin.

There have been numerous surveys asking what people think about abortion, and the issue has been approached from a number of different perspectives. Some polls ask about the Supreme Court's *Roe v. Wade* decision, which in 1973 legalized abortions during the first three months of pregnancy. Others ask about the morality involved or about a woman's "control over her own body" or the "life of the unborn child."<sup>5</sup> When in August of 1980 a *Time/Yankelovich*

<sup>5</sup>See Raymond J. Adamek, "Abortion and Public Opinion in the United States," *National Right to Life News*, v. 9, no. 8 (April 22, 1982), special supplement.

Table 5.14

[Would you be more or less likely to vote for] someone who supports a constitutional amendment banning abortion. (PROMPT: WOULD YOU BE MORE LIKELY OR LESS LIKELY TO VOTE FOR A CANDIDATE WHO SUPPORTS BANNING ABORTION OR WOULD IT MAKE NO DIFFERENCE?)  
IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                      | More Likely/<br>Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | No Difference | Less Likely | Less Likely/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|----------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 25.5%                    | 14.5%       | 3.5%   | 25.5%         | 7.5%        | 23.5%                    | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 28.0                     | 10.5        | 4.0    | 23.5          | 12.0        | 22.0                     | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 29.5                     | 10.0        | 5.0    | 22.0          | 8.0         | 25.5                     | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 9.0                      | 4.0         | 8.5    | 13.5          | 11.5        | 53.5                     | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 28.5                     | 8.0         | 5.0    | 22.0          | 12.0        | 24.5                     | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 24.1%                    | 9.4%        | 5.2%   | 21.3%         | 10.2%       | 29.8%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 102.214 DF=20 PROB=0.0001

Table 5.15

Do you think that federal money should be used to help a woman pay for an abortion in some circumstances, or do you think that federal money should *never* be used to help pay for an abortion?

|                      | Federal<br>Money Used | Unsure | No Federal<br>Money | n =  |
|----------------------|-----------------------|--------|---------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 36.5%                 | 5.5%   | 58.0%               | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 42.5                  | 5.5    | 52.0                | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 38.0                  | 6.0    | 56.0                | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 61.5                  | 7.0    | 31.5                | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 42.5                  | 6.5    | 51.0                | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 44.2%                 | 6.1%   | 49.7%               | 1000 |

Chi square 36.764 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

survey asked registered voters whether they support a constitutional amendment banning abortion, 63% said they opposed the measure and 37% said they supported it. A *New York Times*/CBS News poll had similar findings: 67% opposed and 29% in favor, as did a July 1982 Harris Survey, which found a majority opposed to such an amendment, 62% to 31%. But in June of 1980 Gallup found that 25% of respondents wanted abortion legal under all circumstances, 18% of respondents wanted it illegal under all circumstances and 53% adopted a centrist position in favor of keeping abortion legal under certain circumstances. Compared with the findings of those surveys, the data from our sample suggest that Catholic ethnics are somewhat more supportive of an amendment, though it must be noted that even those groups oppose a general constitutional restriction on abortion.

Our sample opposed federal funding for abortion, though not as strongly as those sampled in May of 1981 by an ABC News/*Washington Post* survey. Our 1000 ethnic respondents opposed government funding 49.7% to 44.2%, while the ABC News/*Washington Post* survey found 54% opposed and 40% in favor, the same percentages as our Catholic respondents.

How does the abortion issue affect a congressional race? According to the responses from our total sample, the answer appears to be that while abortion is one of the most controversial issues around, and although it arouses strong reactions from opponents and proponents, it appears to be something of a stand-off. Each side can interpret the figures as it sees fit, and the impact of the issue may depend on how any given campaign is able to frame the issue. As noted earlier (see Tables 5.12 and 5.13), a majority of ethnic respondents oppose a constitutional amendment banning abortion, as do a majority of the Catholic respondents. But when support and opposition for a pro-amendment candidate is examined, it appears that Catholic respondents do not penalize a candidate who favors a constitutional amendment. Moreover, there appears to be a good deal of support for an amendment which restricts abortion, as long as it stipulates certain exceptions. However, ethnics who tend to have a high voter turnout



rate are more likely to be opposed to a constitutional amendment, even if it includes those exceptions.

One way for anti-abortion conservatives to approach the abortion issue may be through federal funding. Conservatives oppose the use of federal money for abortions; moderate and liberal Democrats, on the other hand, support the use of funds and moderate and liberal Republicans are split on the issue. The key group could be ticket-splitters, who strongly oppose funding. Because of their fluid voting habits, ticket-splitters frequently play a decisive role in elections. Since in this case they are opposed to federal funding of abortion, anti-abortion conservatives could draw them into a majority coalition, at least on this one issue.

**Table 5.16**  
**Attitudes Toward a Constitutional Amendment Banning Abortion**  
by turnout

Hard oppose=opposition to any amendment  
Soft oppose=opposition to an amendment that does not exclude rape and incest

|                 | Favor | Unsure | Soft Oppose | Hard Oppose | n=   |
|-----------------|-------|--------|-------------|-------------|------|
| Low turnout     | 37.3% | 15.9%  | 30.9%       | 15.9%       | 233  |
| Medium turnout  | 33.3  | 14.6   | 26.5        | 25.6        | 543  |
| High turnout    | 30.8  | 8.0    | 21.9        | 39.3        | 224  |
| All Respondents | 33.7% | 13.4%  | 26.5%       | 26.4%       | 1000 |

Chi square 35.409 DF=6 PROB=0.0001

**Table 5.17**  
**Attitudes Toward Federal Funding of Abortion**  
by ideology

|                             | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n=   |
|-----------------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Conservative Republican     | 33.9% | 6.2%   | 60.0%  | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican | 49.2  | 6.6    | 44.6   | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter             | 38.8  | 6.1    | 55.1   | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat       | 35.6  | 5.9    | 58.6   | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat   | 57.6  | 6.3    | 36.1   | 335  |
| All Respondents             | 44.3% | 6.1%   | 49.6%  | 1000 |

Chi square 43.836 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

### Tuition Tax Credits

The five ethnic groups under discussion had measurably different points of view regarding tuition tax credits for parents who send their children to private or parochial schools. While 60% of Jews opposed tax credits, large majorities of Irish, Polish and Italians approved them, with the margins ranging from two-to-one to four-to-one. Hispanics also supported the credits, but by a narrower margin than the other Catholic groups. Those with a high school education or

Table 5.18

**Tuition Tax Credit—where parents are given tax credits if they choose to send their children to private or parochial schools.**  
(PROMPT: IF NECESSARY)

|                      | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 69.0% | 5.5%   | 25.5%  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 73.0  | 5.5    | 21.5   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 67.5  | 4.5    | 28.0   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 32.5  | 7.5    | 60.0   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 54.5  | 8.0    | 37.5   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 59.3% | 6.2%   | 34.5%  | 1000 |

Chi square 94.770 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

less are more likely to support tuition tax credits than those with a college degree. Age and income do not seem particularly relevant, but ideology may be a factor. Conservative Republicans and conservative Democrats are significantly more supportive of tuition tax credits than are moderate and liberal Democrats. Moderate and liberal Republicans also support the credits, which suggests that ideology is not crucial. But moderate and liberal Republicans frequently tend to be slightly more conservative than their Democratic counterparts, and ideology cannot be ruled out entirely. Nationally, support for tuition tax credits appears to be much weaker. A March 1981 Gallup survey for *Newsweek* showed 52% of respondents opposed to tax credits and only 34% in favor. In October of 1981, an NBC News/Associated Press survey found 46% of those responding saying that parents who send their children "to elementary and secondary private schools" should get a tax break. A clear majority, 54%, were opposed. Thus,

Table 5.19

**Attitudes Toward Tuition Tax Credits**  
by education and ideology

|                         | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|-------------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Education*              |       |        |        |      |
| High School/Less        | 63.9% | 7.7%   | 28.4%  | 454  |
| Some College            | 58.9  | 6.3    | 34.8   | 224  |
| College Graduate        | 53.1  | 4.0    | 42.9   | 322  |
| Ideology**              |       |        |        |      |
| Conservative Republican | 69.2% | 3.9%   | 26.9%  | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal        |       |        |        |      |
| Republican              | 64.6  | 7.7    | 27.7   | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter         | 62.2  | 6.5    | 31.3   | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat   | 64.1  | 5.9    | 30.1   | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal        |       |        |        |      |
| Democrat                | 49.0  | 6.9    | 44.2   | 335  |
| All Respondents         | 59.3% | 6.2%   | 34.5%  | 1000 |

\*Chi square 19.190 DF=4 PROB=0.0007

\*\*Chi square 25.728 DF=8 PROB=0.0012

our Catholic ethnic respondents proved to be much more conservative on this issue than the electorate as a whole.

Even if one's attitude toward tuition tax credits is related to ideology, it becomes evident that religion is also a determining factor. Polish, Irish and Italian respondents, whether they be Republicans, conservative Democrats, ticket-splitters or moderate or liberal Democrats, all support tuition tax credits. Moderate or liberal Hispanic Democrats are split on the issue, but the three other Hispanic groups support the measure. By contrast, the reaction of Jewish voters is completely different. None of the groups, including Jewish Republicans, support the tax credits. To be sure, Jewish Republicans are considerably more supportive of tuition tax credits than are moderate and liberal Jewish Democrats, but Jewish Republicans are also considerably less supportive of tax credits than are Hispanic, Italian, Irish or Polish Republicans. Because of this, it is logical to assume that religion is a significant factor in explaining Jewish attitudes. Evidently, Jews are concerned about tuition tax credits going to parochial schools. Candidates in areas with large Jewish constituencies would be wise to consider the political consequences of supporting tax credits and, probably, all measures which blur the distinction between church and state.

In summary, tuition tax credits for private and parochial schools were supported by the four Catholic ethnic groups, but were opposed by Jewish respon-

**Table 5.20**  
**Attitudes Toward Tuition Tax Credits**  
by ideology  
per Jewish, Hispanic and Italian/Irish/Polish samples

|                                        | Favor        | Unsure      | Oppose       | n =         |
|----------------------------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| <b>Jews</b>                            |              |             |              |             |
| Republican*                            | 42.3%        | 5.9%        | 47.1%        | 34          |
| Ticket-Splitter                        | 34.3         | 5.7         | 60.0         | 35          |
| Conservative Democrat                  | 35.5         | 16.1        | 48.4         | 31          |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat              | 26.0         | 6.0         | 68.0         | 100         |
|                                        |              |             |              | 200         |
| <b>Hispanics</b>                       |              |             |              |             |
| Republican*                            | 70.6%        | 5.9%        | 23.5%        | 17          |
| Ticket-Splitter                        | 56.3         | 12.5        | 31.3         | 32          |
| Conservative Democrat                  | 57.3         | 7.3         | 35.4         | 82          |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat              | 46.4         | 7.3         | 46.4         | 69          |
|                                        |              |             |              | 200         |
| <b>Italian/Irish/Polish (combined)</b> |              |             |              |             |
| Conservative Republican                | 75.8%        | 4.2%        | 20.0%        | 95          |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican            | 65.3         | 6.1         | 28.6         | 49          |
| Ticket-Splitter                        | 70.2         | 5.4         | 24.5         | 147         |
| Conservative Democrat                  | 74.1         | 2.8         | 23.1         | 143         |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat              | 63.9         | 7.2         | 28.9         | 166         |
|                                        |              |             |              | 600         |
| <b>All Respondents</b>                 | <b>59.3%</b> | <b>6.2%</b> | <b>34.5%</b> | <b>1000</b> |

\*Sample not broken down into "Conservative Republicans" and "Moderate/Liberal Republicans" because of small sample size



**Table 5.21**  
**Attitudes Toward Tuition Tax Credits**  
by turnout

|                 | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|-----------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Low turnout     | 65.7% | 4.7%   | 29.6%  | 233  |
| Medium turnout  | 61.0  | 7.2    | 31.9   | 543  |
| High turnout    | 48.7  | 5.4    | 46.0   | 224  |
| All Respondents | 59.3% | 6.2%   | 34.5%  | 1000 |

Chi square 19.313 DF=4 PROB=0.0007

dents. Interestingly, low and medium turnout individuals were much more likely to support the tax credits than were high-turnout ethnic respondents. This means that while there may be strong support in the Catholic portion of the electorate for tuition tax credits, a candidate who backs the proposal must take steps to insure that supporters of the measure get to the polls.

### Law and Order

On three issues dealing with the power of the courts, their treatment of criminals, and the death penalty, there is a remarkable degree of consensus among respondents. About one-quarter of the total sample says that the courts have too much power, while another one-quarter says they do not have enough. There are differences among the groups on whether or not the courts have the right amount of power (28% of Poles say "yes," while a significantly higher 47.5% of Jews agree), but the ratio of "too much" to "not enough" is quite similar for all groups, regardless of age, education, income, or ideological bent.

All of the groups adopt a conservative position on what could be called "the crime issue." Over 70% of all the respondents said that the courts have not been severe enough in their treatment of convicted criminals, with over 80% of Italians and Poles agreeing that the courts have been too lenient. However, younger Poles and Jews, those between the ages of 18-35, are less likely than their older

**Table 5.22**  
**In general, do you feel that courts in this country have too much power,**  
**about the right amount of power, or not enough power?**

|                      | Too Much | Right Amount | Not Enough | Don't Know/<br>No Answer | n =  |
|----------------------|----------|--------------|------------|--------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 26.0%    | 43.0%        | 25.0%      | 6.0%                     | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 28.5     | 28.0         | 34.0       | 9.5                      | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 28.5     | 30.0         | 29.0       | 12.5                     | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 18.5     | 47.5         | 21.0       | 13.0                     | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 27.5     | 35.0         | 27.5       | 10.0                     | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 25.8%    | 36.7%        | 27.3%      | 10.2%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 33.672 DF=12 PROB=0.0008

Table 5.23

And, do you feel that courts in this country are *too harsh* in their treatment of people convicted of crimes, *not harsh enough* in their treatment, or is their treatment of people convicted of crimes *about right*?

|                      | Too Harsh | Not Harsh Enough | About Right | Don't Know/<br>No Answer | n =  |
|----------------------|-----------|------------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 2.0%      | 79.0%            | 14.5%       | 4.5%                     | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 1.5       | 85.5             | 9.0         | 4.0                      | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 1.5       | 84.0             | 9.5         | 5.0                      | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 2.0       | 73.5             | 19.0        | 5.5                      | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 4.0       | 73.5             | 19.0        | 3.5                      | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 2.2%      | 79.1%            | 14.2%       | 4.5%                     | 1000 |

Chi square 21.672 DF=12 PROB=0.0414

counterparts to agree that the courts have not been harsh enough in their treatment of criminals.

On the emotionally charged issue of the death penalty for convicted murderers, 71.3% of the total sample supported capital punishment, with a low of 63.5% of Hispanics and a high of 83.0% of Poles backing the death penalty. Those respondents who had a high school education or less were also more inclined to support the death penalty, while younger respondents were less likely. However, given the extent of support by all ages, levels of education, income, and even ideology, it is apparent that there is a national consensus in favor of the death penalty for those convicted of murder. The results of this survey of members of five different ethnic groups are strikingly similar to those of a 1980 National Opinion Research Center (NORC) poll, which showed that 72% of respondents favored the death penalty for convicted murderers, while only 28% opposed that type of punishment.

The potentially most significant issue of the 1980's is crime. That is, candidates who support the death penalty for convicted murders, who criticize the courts for not being severe enough with criminals, and who support measures to protect the citizenry should find significant electoral support among Italians, Irish, Poles, Hispanics and Jews. Ticket-splitters and conservative Democrats

Table 5.24

And, do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?  
(PROMPT: IF NECESSARY)

|                      | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 66.0% | 8.5%   | 25.5%  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 83.0  | 5.5    | 11.5   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 74.5  | 7.5    | 18.0   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 69.5  | 11.0   | 19.5   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 63.5  | 12.0   | 24.5   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 71.3% | 8.9%   | 19.8%  | 1000 |

Chi square 25.745 DF=8 PROB=0.0012

**Table 5.25**  
**Attitudes Toward Death Penalty**  
by ideology

|                             | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n=   |
|-----------------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Conservative Republican     | 79.2% | 7.7%   | 13.1%  | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican | 78.5  | 7.7    | 13.9   | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter             | 78.5  | 8.4    | 13.1   | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat       | 73.8  | 6.6    | 19.5   | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat   | 60.3  | 11.6   | 28.1   | 335  |
| All Respondents             | 71.3% | 8.9%   | 19.8%  | 1000 |

Chi square 34.322 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

strongly support both the death penalty and harsher treatment by the courts, and candidates who do not strongly support both positions will have problems at the ballot box.

There is another reason for believing that a candidate who deals with the electorate's concern about crime will benefit politically. When the sample was asked about the most important problem facing their communities, a sizable number of respondents listed crime (see Table 4.3). In fact, crime was a close second to economic issues for each of the groups except the Irish. Crime, therefore, appears to be a reasonably salient issue to many voters.<sup>6</sup> Given the public's attitude toward criminal penalties, a candidate could pick up support by making some sort of crime prevention/punishment program a visible part of his or her campaign.<sup>7</sup>

### Environment versus Development

Finally, this survey asked respondents to choose between two alternatives which have come to be known as "pro-environment" and "pro-development." Specifically, the ethnic groups were asked whether they thought it acceptable "to cause some disruption in the environment if that's what it takes to find and produce enough energy to make sure that the country has a good economy with plenty of jobs" or whether "we must not disturb or harm the environment," even if that were to have a negative impact on the economy. Over 54% of the

<sup>6</sup>For another view, see *The Baron Report*, No. 156, August 2, 1982.

<sup>7</sup>Actually, "crime" is an ongoing concern among members of the public. Over at least the last decade, when a survey asks whether there is more, less or the same amount of crime as one year earlier, a plurality of respondents say there is more crime. This could mean that crime is a latent issue which becomes visible only when the media highlights it or when political leaders decide to address it.

|             | More | Less | Same | No Opinion |
|-------------|------|------|------|------------|
| 1982        | 47%  | 17%  | 28%  | 8%         |
| 1981        | 54   | 8    | 29   | 9          |
| 1977        | 43   | 17   | 32   | 8          |
| 1975        | 50   | 12   | 29   | 9          |
| (Dec.) 1972 | 51   | 10   | 27   | 12         |



Table 5.26

Now I'd like to read you some statements about *energy* made by two people. Please tell me which one comes closest to your own opinion.

*Mr. Jones says that it is okay to cause some disruption in the environment if that's what it takes to find and produce enough energy to make sure that the country has a good economy with plenty of jobs.*

*Mr. Smith says that we must not disturb or harm the environment, even if it means that we have fewer jobs or a weaker economy.*

Which point of view comes closest to your own?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                      | Disruption<br>Okay/<br>Strongly | Some<br>Disruption | Unsure | Must Not<br>Disturb | Not Disturb<br>Strongly | n =  |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------|---------------------|-------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 30.0%                           | 21.5%              | 9.5%   | 12.5%               | 26.5%                   | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 35.0                            | 21.0               | 11.0   | 7.0                 | 26.0                    | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 42.5                            | 18.0               | 9.5    | 9.5                 | 20.5                    | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 32.5                            | 17.0               | 17.0   | 14.0                | 19.5                    | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 37.5                            | 16.0               | 9.5    | 16.5                | 20.5                    | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 35.5%                           | 18.7%              | 11.3%  | 11.9%               | 22.6%                   | 1000 |

Chi square 28.605 DF=16 PROB=0.0267

Table 5.27

Attitudes Toward Environmental Disruption  
by ideology

|                                | Disruption<br>Okay/<br>Strongly | Some<br>Disruption | Unsure | Must Not<br>Disturb | Not Disturb<br>Strongly | n =  |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------|---------------------|-------------------------|------|
| Conservative<br>Republican     | 43.1%                           | 21.5%              | 9.2%   | 11.5%               | 14.6%                   | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Republican | 40.0                            | 23.1               | 6.2    | 6.2                 | 24.6                    | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter                | 42.5                            | 13.6               | 14.5   | 7.9                 | 21.5                    | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat          | 34.0                            | 19.9               | 10.6   | 12.1                | 23.4                    | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Democrat   | 28.4                            | 19.1               | 11.9   | 15.5                | 25.1                    | 335  |
| All Respondents                | 35.5%                           | 18.7%              | 11.3%  | 11.9%               | 22.6%                   | 1000 |

Chi square 32.301 DF=16 PROB=0.0091

total sample agreed that some disruption was acceptable, including a plurality of each ethnic group. The least likely to support disruption, the Jewish respondents, showed a clear preference for development, though they had a significantly higher "unsure" response rate than any of the other groups. There appears to be little or no relationship between age, education or income and respondents' attitudes on development and the environment, though blue-collar respondents were slightly more pro-development and older ethnics tended to give a much higher rate of "unsure" responses.

On the question of whether or not society should risk some environmental dis-

ruption for the sake of economic development, there is no clear difference between high-turnout and low-turnout constituents. However, there is an ideological element to the responses (see Table 5.27), with conservative Republicans supportive and moderate and liberal Democrats opposed. Moderate and liberal Republicans seem to have mixed feelings on the subject. While 40% strongly support disruption, if necessary, 24.6% are strongly opposed to any disruption. Those candidates who choose to make environmentalism a high-priority issue will have to convince ticket-splitters and conservative Democrats that disruption of the environment is dangerous, and given ethnic group responses in this survey, that will not be an easy task.

### **Approaching Social Policy**

On social policies which have moral or religious overtones, such as the E.R.A., abortion and tuition tax credits, Jewish respondents proved to be quite liberal. However, on other policies, such as preferential treatment for minorities, crime and development versus environmentalism, Jewish respondents were much more inclined to be politically conservative.

Hispanics, on the other hand, were more conservative on the moral/religious social questions and considerably less conservative on those social policies such as preferential treatment and the death penalty.

The three European Catholic groups were more conservative than their Jewish or Hispanic counterparts, with Polish and Italian respondents being identifiably more conservative than the Irish.

Our survey indicates that among ethnics, conservatives could be placed on the defensive on the E.R.A. and possibly on abortion. In each case, liberals have successfully defined the issues in terms of "freedom," and conservatives will be at a disadvantage as long as the issue is framed in such a way, regardless of the defeat of the E.R.A. That amendment was defeated probably because the opponents of the amendment out-worked the supporters and because some of the more extreme feminists alienated portions of the electorate. If that changes, then the anti-E.R.A. forces will be in trouble.<sup>8</sup> Opponents of a constitutional amendment could blunt the pro-E.R.A. forces by supporting narrowly-drawn legislation which would meet some of the concerns of the pro-amendment forces or by redefining the issue so that "freedom" is on the side of those who oppose an E.R.A.

If liberals hold the "fairness" issue on the E.R.A., conservatives seem to hold it for preferential treatment, crime and, possibly, even on tuition tax credits. But if tuition tax credits are turned into a purely religious issue, some moderate and conservative ethnic voters who support the proposal may have second thoughts about it. Once again, this points up the importance of framing the issue, and each side must take the initiative to present its policies to the electorate in the most favorable light.

<sup>8</sup>On the other hand, if opinion turns against the E.R.A., as some polling suggests, anti-E.R.A. candidates would benefit. See Carl Leubsdorf, "Polls show turn against ERA," *Dallas Morning News*, September 1, 1982.

## Chapter 6: Ethnics and Foreign Policy

The results of the foreign policy and defense spending questions put to the five ethnic groups reveal a general skepticism about spending, but a basic agreement on the number one threat to world peace. However, there are variations among the groups' responses which suggest differences in the ways they view the world and America's role in maintaining international order.

All of the groups agreed that the Soviet Union presents the greatest threat to world peace, with at least half of the Italian, Polish and Hispanic samples agreeing strongly. The Jewish and Irish respondents agreed about the threat, but they felt much less strongly about it.

Table 6.1

And do you agree or disagree with this statement—"The number one threat to peace in the world today is the Soviet Union."

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                      | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 44.0%              | 14.5% | 5.5%   | 16.5%    | 19.5%                 | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 50.5               | 15.5  | 7.0    | 9.5      | 17.5                  | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 54.0               | 10.5  | 5.5    | 15.0     | 15.0                  | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 39.5               | 18.5  | 7.0    | 15.5     | 19.5                  | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 50.0               | 12.5  | 10.0   | 11.0     | 16.5                  | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 47.6%              | 14.3% | 7.0%   | 13.5%    | 17.6%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 21.904 DF=16 PROB=0.1463

In all cases, those respondents who had graduated from college were significantly less likely to agree on the nature of the Soviet threat than were those who had no college education. Similarly, those who made under \$20,000 and those who were blue collar workers were more likely to perceive the Soviets as the number one threat than were their fellow ethnics who had higher incomes or white collar jobs. Age also appears to be relevant, with older ethnics more likely than younger ones to identify a Soviet threat. Broken down politically, Republicans, conservative Democrats and ticket-splitters were likely to agree about the Soviets, while liberal Democrats clearly were less likely to see a menace.

Given these characteristics, it is easy to understand why, of the five groups under examination, Jewish and Irish respondents are less likely to see a significant Soviet threat. Over half of the Jewish sample graduated college and half of the Irish respondents are college educated, while the percentage of blue collar workers in those groups is much smaller than in the others.



**Table 6.2**  
**"The Number One Threat to Peace in The World Today is the Soviet Union"**  
 by education, occupation, family income, age and ideology.

|                                | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|------|
| <b>Education*</b>              |                    |       |        |          |                       |      |
| High School/Less               | 55.7%              | 13.0% | 7.9%   | 11.2%    | 12.1%                 | 454  |
| Some College                   | 46.9               | 14.7  | 6.3    | 13.8     | 18.3                  | 224  |
| College Graduate               | 36.7               | 15.8  | 6.2    | 16.8     | 24.5                  | 322  |
| <b>Occupation**</b>            |                    |       |        |          |                       |      |
| Self-Employed/<br>White Collar | 40.8%              | 16.9% | 6.1%   | 17.3%    | 19.0%                 | 463  |
| Blue Collar                    | 50.0               | 13.8  | 5.6    | 12.8     | 17.9                  | 196  |
| Not Employed                   | 59.6               | 11.6  | 10.7   | 5.8      | 12.4                  | 225  |
| Other                          | 47.4               | 10.3  | 6.0    | 15.5     | 20.7                  | 116  |
| <b>Family Income***</b>        |                    |       |        |          |                       |      |
| Under \$20,000                 | 53.5%              | 13.0% | 8.7%   | 11.1%    | 13.8%                 | 370  |
| \$20,000-\$40,000              | 46.2               | 13.6  | 5.5    | 14.3     | 20.4                  | 398  |
| \$40,000 and over              | 40.4               | 16.3  | 6.0    | 16.9     | 20.5                  | 166  |
| Refused                        | 40.9               | 21.2  | 9.1    | 15.2     | 13.6                  | 66   |
| <b>Age†</b>                    |                    |       |        |          |                       |      |
| 18-34                          | 40.5%              | 15.2% | 4.8%   | 16.5%    | 22.9%                 | 375  |
| 35-54                          | 48.3               | 14.0  | 6.0    | 14.3     | 17.5                  | 315  |
| 55+                            | 55.5               | 13.6  | 10.7   | 9.4      | 11.0                  | 310  |
| <b>‡Conservative</b>           |                    |       |        |          |                       |      |
| Republican                     | 53.9%              | 10.0% | 5.4%   | 11.5%    | 19.2%                 | 130  |
| <b>Moderate/Liberal</b>        |                    |       |        |          |                       |      |
| Republican                     | 49.2               | 13.9  | 6.2    | 12.3     | 18.5                  | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter                | 48.1               | 17.8  | 8.4    | 8.9      | 16.8                  | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat          | 54.3               | 13.3  | 7.0    | 15.2     | 10.2                  | 256  |
| <b>Moderate/Liberal</b>        |                    |       |        |          |                       |      |
| Democrat                       | 39.4               | 14.6  | 6.9    | 16.4     | 22.7                  | 335  |
| All Respondents                | 47.6%              | 14.3% | 7.0%   | 13.6%    | 17.5%                 | 1000 |

\*Chi square 37.540 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

\*\*Chi square 41.393 DF=12 PROB=0.0001

\*\*\*Chi square 21.363 DF=12 PROB=0.0453

†Chi square 37.740 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

‡Chi square 32.918 DF=16 PROB=0.0076

**Table 6.3**  
**Percentage of Each Ethnic Group**  
 by occupation

|                      | Blue Collar | White Collar | Not<br>Employed<br>& Other | n =  |
|----------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 15.0%       | 55.0%        | 30.0%                      | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 22.0        | 42.0         | 36.0                       | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 24.0        | 41.5         | 34.5                       | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 2.5         | 55.0         | 42.5                       | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 34.5        | 38.0         | 27.5                       | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 19.6%       | 46.3%        | 34.1%                      | 1000 |

Finally, it appears that the likelihood of a respondent's agreeing with the view that the Soviet Union is the number one threat in the world today is related to that respondent's ideological self-identification. The Jews and Irish sampled, the groups most likely to question the existence of a Soviet threat, identify themselves as liberal to a greater extent than do members of the other ethnic groups. Partisanship and union membership are apparently not involved. Hispanic, Polish and Italian Democrats are just as likely to perceive a Soviet threat as are their Republican or ticket-splitting counterparts, and union members are no more or less likely than non-members to see the Soviet Union as the number one threat.

However, the general assessment of the Soviet Union is not reflected in the respondents' attitudes about defense spending. When asked whether they would be more likely to support a candidate who voted to cut the defense budget, a plurality of Irish, Poles and Jews said yes. However, the Italians divided almost evenly between those who said they would and those who said they would not support such a candidate, and Hispanics showed themselves to be the most conservative on this issue, responding 44%-39% that they would be *less* likely to support a candidate who favored defense cuts. The 1000 respondents in the total sample clearly are split on the issue. Considering only those who said they felt strongly about the subject, half said they would prefer a candidate who voted to cut the defense budget while the other half said that they would be less likely to vote for such a candidate. Approximately 50% of the respondents said they felt strongly about the issue, while only 14% said it made little difference to them in the voting calculus. Apparently ethnics feel the issue is important, but they are split in their attitudes toward it.

While young adults (18-34) and older adults (55 and older) are likely to back a candidate who supports cuts in the defense budget, respondents between 35 and 54 years of age are less likely to support such a candidate. Blue collar workers, and particularly blue collar Hispanics, are also more inclined to vote against someone who wants to cut the defense budget, as are Republicans. Democrats, especially those who identify themselves as moderate or liberal, are more likely to support one who advocates defense cutbacks. But while 45% of conservative Democrats in the total sample would back a defense spending cutter and 36% would oppose him, Hispanic conservative Democrats are less likely to support someone who voted to cut defense spending by a 41%-37% margin.

Throughout the early 1970's there was a broad consensus for cutting defense spending. Opinion changed during the decade, so that by the early 1980's there was an equally broad consensus for increasing defense spending. These results are from surveys of national samples taken prior to the recent nuclear freeze drive of mid-1982. And the results of our ethnic survey support the view that after a period of supporting increased defense appropriations, the public is once again backing cuts. For example, 42% of this study's sample said they would prefer someone who voted to cut defense spending, while approximately 35% held the opposite view. While the reasons for the public's attitude in the early to mid-1970's may be different from their reasons today, (reaction to Vietnam and

Table 6.4  
[Would you be more or less likely to support] someone who voted to cut our defense budget. (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)  
IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                      | More Likely/Strong | More Likely | Unsure | No Difference | Less Likely | Less Likely/<br>Strong | n =  |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------------|--------|---------------|-------------|------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 25.0%              | 19.5%       | 5.5%   | 17.0%         | 13.0%       | 20.0%                  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 28.0               | 17.5        | 6.0    | 15.5          | 9.5         | 23.5                   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 24.5               | 14.5        | 7.0    | 13.5          | 10.0        | 30.5                   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 27.0               | 18.0        | 14.5   | 15.5          | 9.5         | 15.5                   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 23.0               | 16.5        | 7.5    | 9.0           | 12.5        | 31.5                   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 25.5%              | 17.2%       | 8.1%   | 14.1%         | 10.9%       | 24.2%                  | 1000 |

Chi square 39.193 DF=20 PROB=0.0063



**Table 6.5**  
**Public Attitude Toward Defense Spending**

|                   | Too Little | Too Much | About Right | No Opinion |
|-------------------|------------|----------|-------------|------------|
| March 12-15, 1982 | 19%        | 36%      | 36%         | 9%         |
| 1981              | 51         | 15       | 22          | 12         |
| 1976              | 22         | 36       | 32          | 10         |
| 1973              | 13         | 46       | 30          | 11         |

Source: *The Gallup Report*, Report No. 199, April, 1982, p. 39.

detente with the Soviet Union as compared with current budgetary problems and the updated anti-war movement), the result is the same—support for cuts in defense spending.

The Hispanic respondents showed themselves to be the most conservative of the five groups on two other foreign policy questions. When asked whether they would support a freeze on American and Soviet nuclear weapons even if it meant that the United States "has slightly fewer weapons," 60.3% of the total sample said they would support a freeze. Only 49% of Hispanics would support such a freeze, while 63.1% of the other 800 respondents would favor it. The data also indicate that the higher one's income and education, the more likely he will be to support a nuclear freeze. Similarly, white collar and self-employed workers are more likely to support the measure than are their blue collar counterparts.

A May poll taken by the National Broadcasting Company and the Associated Press showed that 83% of those responding said they would favor "a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons in both the United States and the Soviet Union," while only 14% were opposed. Two months earlier, 74% favored it and 18% were opposed. However, it would be incorrect to look at the ethnics' responses in this survey and conclude that they are less inclined to support a freeze. Our survey asked whether respondents would support a freeze even if the United States were to have "slightly fewer weapons," and that wording would be expected to provide a higher number of negative responses than the NBC/AP survey. What is significant is that even with the military inferiority implied by the question, support for the freeze from the 1000 respondents runs at two-to-one.

**Table 6.6**  
**[Do you favor or oppose) a freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, even if that means the U.S. has slightly fewer weapons. (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)**

|                      | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 66.5% | 9.5%   | 24.0%  | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 62.0  | 7.0    | 31.0   | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 55.5  | 9.5    | 35.0   | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 68.5  | 8.0    | 23.5   | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 49.0  | 10.5   | 40.5   | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 60.3% | 8.9%   | 30.8%  | 1000 |

Chi square 24.051 DF=8 PROB=0.0022

Respondents who see the Soviets as the number one threat to world peace are measurably more likely to be cautious about an American-Soviet nuclear freeze, as well as about cuts in the defense budget. They are also more likely to be ticket-splitters and conservative Democrats, the sorts of voters a moderate or liberal Democratic candidate must keep and a Republican candidate must capture.

At first glance, it may appear that ticket-splitters and conservative Democrats are more "hawkish" than Republicans, but that does not seem to be the case. When asked about their attitudes toward defense spending, for example, conservative Democrats and ticket-splitters show a much greater willingness than Republicans to cut defense spending. But they are also more cautious than moderate and liberal Democrats. In addition, conservative Democrats and ticket-splitters fall somewhere between conservative Republicans and moderate and liberal Democrats on the question of whether or not the United States should

**Table 6.7**  
**"The Number One Threat to Peace in the World Today is the Soviet Union"**  
 by ideology

|                                | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|------|
| Conservative Republican        | 53.9%              | 10.0% | 5.4%   | 11.5%    | 19.2%                 | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Republican | 49.2               | 13.9  | 6.2    | 12.3     | 18.5                  | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter                | 48.1               | 17.8  | 8.4    | 8.9      | 16.8                  | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat          | 54.3               | 13.3  | 7.0    | 15.2     | 10.2                  | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Democrat   | 39.4               | 14.6  | 6.9    | 16.4     | 22.7                  | 335  |
| All Respondents                | 47.6%              | 14.3% | 7.0%   | 13.6%    | 17.5%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 32.918 DF=16 PROB=0.0076

**Table 6.8**  
**If it came down to—(ROTATE)—(1) balancing the federal budget, or (2) increasing our  
 country's defense spending, which would you favor?**

|                             | Balancing<br>Federal Budget | Unsure | Up Defense<br>Spending | n =  |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|------------------------|------|
| Conservative Republican     | 56.9%                       | 10.0%  | 33.1%                  | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican | 58.5                        | 9.2    | 32.3                   | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter             | 54.7                        | 15.0   | 30.4                   | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat       | 63.3                        | 9.0    | 27.7                   | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat   | 70.2                        | 8.7    | 21.2                   | 335  |
| All Respondents             | 62.6%                       | 10.3%  | 27.1%                  | 1000 |

Chi square 19.515 DF=8 PROB=0.0123

Table 6.9

Suppose for a moment that in order to balance the federal budget we had to cut back on some federal programs. Which of the following should be cut first—that is, which of the following programs would be *least* important to the country as a whole if something had to be cut back? (READ LIST, ROTATE) Which should be cut *next*? And which of these is *most* important—that is, should be the *last* program to be cut?

|                                | (a) Defense spending          |                                |                                 |                    | (e) Food stamps                    |         |                                      |                        | n =                      |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
|                                | (b) Federal aid to education  |                                |                                 |                    | (f) Welfare                        |         |                                      |                        |                          |
|                                | (c) Federal health protection |                                |                                 |                    | (g) Federal aid to the handicapped |         |                                      |                        |                          |
|                                | (d) Social Security           |                                |                                 |                    | (h) Federal low income programs    |         |                                      |                        |                          |
|                                | Cut First                     |                                |                                 |                    |                                    |         |                                      |                        |                          |
|                                | Defense<br>Spending           | Federal<br>Aid To<br>Education | Federal<br>Health<br>Protection | Social<br>Security | Food Stamps                        | Welfare | Federal<br>Aid To The<br>Handicapped | Low Income<br>Programs | Don't Know/<br>No Answer |
| Conservative<br>Republican     | 16.2%                         | 6.9%                           | 3.9%                            | 0.8%               | 25.4%                              | 31.5%   | 0.8%                                 | 10.8%                  | 3.9%                     |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Republican | 12.3                          | 4.6                            | 0.0                             | 0.0                | 21.5                               | 40.0    | 0.0                                  | 12.3                   | 9.2                      |
| Ticket-Splitter                | 29.4                          | 4.2                            | 1.4                             | 0.9                | 21.0                               | 22.9    | 0.5                                  | 7.5                    | 12.2                     |
| Conservative<br>Democrat       | 32.0                          | 8.5                            | 3.1                             | 2.7                | 16.8                               | 24.2    | 0.8                                  | 6.6                    | 5.1                      |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Democrat   | 50.8                          | 3.9                            | 3.6                             | 1.2                | 12.5                               | 15.2    | 0.3                                  | 4.2                    | 8.4                      |
| All Respondents                | 34.4%                         | 5.6%                           | 2.8%                            | 1.4%               | 17.7%                              | 22.9%   | 5.0%                                 | 6.9%                   | 7.8%                     |

Chi square 120.274 DF = 32 PROB = 0.0001



Table 6.10

[Would you favor or oppose] a freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, even if that means the U.S. has slightly fewer weapons. (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

|                             | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|-----------------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Conservative Republican     | 55.4% | 7.7%   | 36.9%  | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican | 60.0  | 15.4   | 24.6   | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter             | 59.8  | 8.8    | 31.3   | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat       | 56.6  | 10.6   | 32.8   | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat   | 65.4  | 6.9    | 27.8   | 335  |
| All Respondents             | 60.3% | 8.9%   | 30.8%  | 1000 |

Chi square 11.899 DF=8 PROB=0.1558

Table 6.11

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement—"The U.S. must get involved in helping stop the spread of communism in South America and Central America."  
IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                                | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|------|
| Conservative Republican        | 39.3%              | 24.6% | 6.9%   | 8.5%     | 20.8%                 | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Republican | 30.8               | 16.9  | 13.9   | 12.3     | 26.2                  | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter                | 37.4               | 10.3  | 16.4   | 7.5      | 28.5                  | 214  |
| Conservative Democrat          | 32.4               | 14.5  | 14.5   | 12.1     | 26.6                  | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Democrat   | 24.5               | 13.7  | 13.1   | 17.3     | 31.3                  | 335  |
| All Respondents                | 31.6%              | 14.8% | 13.4%  | 12.4%    | 27.8%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 44.121 DF=16 PROB=0.0002

help "stop the spread of communism in South America and Central America." (See Table 6.11).

This suggests that some Republican candidates might have success with conservative Democrats and ticket-splitters by emphasizing the connection between the Soviet threat and defense spending. The Democrats, on the other hand, must separate the two issues and convince those two groups that cuts in defense spending do not increase American vulnerability. Since they are torn between moderate and liberal Democrats on the one hand and conservative Republicans on the other, ticket-splitters and conservative Democrats appear to be the crucial groups in the ultimate decision about defense spending.

On the question of the United States' role in stopping communism in Latin America, the Hispanics again displayed a decidedly conservative bent, with over 56% of Hispanic respondents agreeing that "the U.S. must get involved in helping stop the spread of communism in South America and Central America." Al-

most half of the Irish and Italians agreed with the statement, while the Polish sample was split on the issue. The Jewish respondents proved to be far more liberal than the other groups, with only 34% agreeing with the statement.

While older ethnics were generally more conscious of a Soviet threat than were their younger fellow ethnics, they were noticeably less likely to agree that the United States should stop the spread of communism in Latin America. However, Hispanic older Americans were more likely to support action in Latin America and much less likely than other older respondents to perceive a Soviet threat.

Neither income, education, occupation nor party identification explains why Hispanics support American involvement, why Jews oppose it, and why the other groups fall somewhere in between. However, aside from ethnicity, one other variable does appear to be relevant—ideology. Conservative Republicans strongly support American action to stop the spread of communism in Latin America, while moderate and liberal Democrats disagree. Ticket-splitters, conservative Democrats, and moderate and liberal Republicans are much closer to the position of the conservative Republicans than to that of moderate and liberal Democrats. This conservative-liberal dichotomy is not surprising. Conser-

**Table 6.12**  
**American Involvement in Latin America**  
by age

|                      | 18-34<br>Support/Oppose | 35-54<br>Support/Oppose | 55+<br>Support/Oppose | n =  |
|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 51%-42%                 | 54%-27%                 | 38%-38%               | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 45 -32                  | 47 -40                  | 39 -41                | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 50 -42                  | 51 -37                  | 44 -40                | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 28 -60                  | 34 -44                  | 38 -38                | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 52 -39                  | 66 -26                  | 45 -37                | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 47%-45%                 | 52%-35%                 | 41%-39%               | 1000 |

**Table 6.13**  
**Perception of Soviets as Number One Threat**  
by age

|                      | 18-34<br>Agree/Disagree | 35-54<br>Agree/Disagree | 55+<br>Agree/Disagree | n =  |
|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 53%-44%                 | 52%-41%                 | 71%-20%               | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 57 -41                  | 65 -27                  | 74 -13                | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 57 -37                  | 60 -37                  | 72 -17                | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 42 -51                  | 67 -23                  | 64 -28                | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 63 -27                  | 66 -27                  | 45 -20                | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 56%-39%                 | 62%-32%                 | 69%-29%               | 1000 |

vatives tend to see communism as an international phenomenon which cannot be separated from the major Marxist powers such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Liberals, on the other hand, adopt an ideological position which frequently views socialist movements as "national revolutionary movements" and which is probably somewhat less tolerant of pro-American right-wing regimes. They regard anti-communism as too rigid and passé, and are thus less willing to be identified with the conservatives' concern about "the spread of communism" in Latin America.

In spite of the fact that the Jewish respondents were generally less likely to view the Soviets as the number one threat to world peace and more likely to support a candidate who favors cuts in the defense budget, it might be expected that the Jewish sample would be "hawkish" about American support for Israel. In fact, the Jewish respondents were split over the issue.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, a stronger commitment to Israel was exhibited by Italians. Only 46.5% of Jews said that the United States "should continue to support Israel, even if it means straining relations with the Palestinians," while 44% disagreed. However, Italians backed support of Israel 50.5%-27.0%. Large numbers of non-Jews were undecided about the question, but it seems clear that Polish respondents were less likely than the other Catholic groups to favor support of Israel.

For Jewish respondents, first and second generation Jews were less likely to support Israel than were third generation Jews or, for that matter, Jews born outside of the United States. Older Jews, those with a college education, and those making less than \$40,000 per year were also more likely to back Israel. Finally, those Jews who identified themselves more strongly as "American" rather than as "Jewish" also tended to be more supportive of Israel.

But the snapshot of a pro-Israel Jewish respondent does not necessarily hold for the other ethnic groups. Italians backed Israel across the board, with the only two relevant variables being sex and ethnic identification. Men were much more supportive of Israel than women and those who identified themselves as more "American" than "Italian" were also stronger backers of Israel. For Polish and Irish respondents, college graduates were more pro-Israel, as were white collar and self-employed workers. Blue collar Poles were clearly *opposed* to American support of Israel. And in all groups except the Irish, where there was no significant difference between those who saw themselves as "American" and those who saw themselves as "Irish," the respondents who identified themselves as "American" were more supportive of Israel.

Supporters of Israel have a slightly greater turnout rate than do supporters of a "more even-handed" policy in the Middle East. However, the difference between the high-turnout group and the other groups is traceable to the "unsure" category, with low- and medium-turnout individuals much less likely to have an opinion on the issue. Conservative Republicans and moderate and liberal Democrats show the strongest support for Israel, with ticket-splitters, conservative

<sup>1</sup>The following discussion applies to responses which were given prior to the Israeli army's move into Lebanon during the summer of 1982.

Table 6.14

*Some people feel that we spend too much money and effort supporting Israel, and that we should be more even-handed towards the Palestinians and Arabs in the Middle East. Others feel that we should continue to support Israel, even if it means straining relations with the Palestinians and Arabs.*

*Which of these views comes closest to your own opinion?*

**IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?**

|                      | U.S. Help/<br>Strongly | U.S. Should<br>Help | Unsure | U.S.<br>Stay Out | Stay Out/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------|------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 26.5%                  | 17.0%               | 27.5%  | 12.0%            | 17.0%                 | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 32.0                   | 12.0                | 19.0   | 15.5             | 21.5                  | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 35.5                   | 15.0                | 22.5   | 4.0              | 23.0                  | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 36.0                   | 11.5                | 8.5    | 8.5              | 35.5                  | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 27.5                   | 16.0                | 26.0   | 11.0             | 19.5                  | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 31.5%                  | 14.3%               | 20.7%  | 10.2%            | 23.3%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 62.485 DF=16 PROB=0.0001

Table 6.15

**Support for Israel  
by ethnic identity**

|                      | Support Israel | Be More<br>Even-Handed | Don't Know | n =  |
|----------------------|----------------|------------------------|------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    |                |                        |            |      |
| Lean Irish           | 42.1%          | 30.3%                  | 27.6%      | 76   |
| Lean American        | 44.7           | 28.5                   | 26.8       | 123  |
| Polish Respondents   |                |                        |            |      |
| Lean Polish          | 41.9           | 44.2                   | 14.0       | 86   |
| Lean American        | 45.5           | 31.1                   | 22.3       | 112  |
| Italian Respondents  |                |                        |            |      |
| Lean Italian         | 44.5           | 33.3                   | 22.2       | 72   |
| Lean American        | 53.9           | 23.4                   | 22.7       | 128  |
| Jewish Respondents   |                |                        |            |      |
| Lean Jewish          | 44.1           | 50.0                   | 5.9        | 118  |
| Lean American        | 56.3           | 33.8                   | 9.9        | 71   |
| Hispanic Respondents |                |                        |            |      |
| Lean Hispanic        | 41.7           | 31.8                   | 26.5       | 132  |
| Lean American        | 46.9           | 26.6                   | 26.6       | 64   |
| All Respondents      | 45.8%          | 20.7%                  | 33.5%      | 1000 |

Democrats and moderate and liberal Republicans much less supportive. In fact, Polish and Hispanic conservative Democrats were openly opposed to a policy which supports Israel and strains relations with the Arab world. Surprisingly, there is no relationship between the extent of one's support for Israel and support or opposition to President Ronald Reagan's policy toward Israel. There appears to be a slight tendency on the part of the European Catholic groups and a somewhat greater tendency on the part of Hispanics to disagree with Reagan's



**Table 6.16**  
**Support for Israel**  
**by turnout group**

|                 | U.S. Help/<br>Strongly | U.S. Should<br>Help | Unsure | U.S.<br>Stay Out | Stay Out/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|-----------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------|------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Low turnout     | 27.9%                  | 14.1%               | 24.0%  | 12.9%            | 21.0%                 | 233  |
| Medium turnout  | 29.8                   | 14.7                | 22.1   | 9.4              | 23.9                  | 543  |
| High turnout    | 38.8                   | 13.8                | 13.8   | 9.4              | 24.1                  | 224  |
| All Respondents | 31.5%                  | 14.3%               | 20.7%  | 10.2%            | 23.3%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 15.047 DF=8 PROB=0.0582

**Table 6.17**

*Some people feel that we spend too much money and effort supporting Israel, and that we should be more even-handed towards the Palestinians and Arabs in the Middle East. Others feel that we should continue to support Israel, even if it means straining relations with the Palestinians and Arabs.*

**Which of these views comes closest to your own opinion?**  
**IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?**

|                                | U.S. Help/<br>Strongly | U.S. Should<br>Help | Unsure | U.S.<br>Stay Out | Stay Out/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------|------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Conservative<br>Republican     | 38.5%                  | 16.9%               | 10.8%  | 10.8%            | 23.1%                 | 130  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Republican | 33.9                   | 10.8                | 16.9   | 7.7              | 30.8                  | 65   |
| Ticket-Splitter                | 24.8                   | 15.0                | 27.1   | 7.5              | 25.7                  | 214  |
| Conservative<br>Democrat       | 31.3                   | 11.3                | 23.1   | 10.2             | 24.2                  | 256  |
| Moderate/Liberal<br>Democrat   | 32.5                   | 16.1                | 19.4   | 12.2             | 19.7                  | 335  |
| All Respondents                | 31.4%                  | 14.4%               | 20.7%  | 10.2%            | 23.3%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 28.148 DF=16 PROB=0.0304

policy. Jews, on the other hand, say they are significantly less likely to support him because of his policy toward Israel. However, when support for the Reagan position is compared with the respondents' attitude toward Israel, it is clear that the two variables are not related. Those respondents who believe strongly that the United States should support Israel say that by 44.6% to 29.3% they are *less* likely to support the President because of his Israel policy. Those respondents who feel strongly that the United States should be more "even-handed" are also *less* likely to support Reagan, by an almost identical 42.9% to 30.0%.

Either Reagan's policy toward Israel is unclear and has confused the respondents or they responded to the question in terms of their overall reaction to the President rather than to his Middle East policy. In any case, it makes it difficult to take seriously those responses about whether the President's policy toward

Table 6.18  
Support for Reagan Policy Toward Israel  
by support for Israel

|                    | More Likely/Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | Less Likely | Less Likely/Strongly | n =  |
|--------------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|-------------|----------------------|------|
| U.S. Help/Strongly | 19.4%                | 9.9%        | 26.1%  | 12.1%       | 32.5%                | 314  |
| U.S. Should Help   | 6.9                  | 15.3        | 39.6   | 22.9        | 15.3                 | 144  |
| Unsure             | 8.7                  | 10.6        | 47.3   | 11.1        | 22.2                 | 207  |
| U.S. Stay Out      | 2.9                  | 20.6        | 35.3   | 21.6        | 19.6                 | 102  |
| Stay Out/Strongly  | 19.3                 | 10.7        | 27.0   | 7.3         | 35.6                 | 233  |
| All Respondents    | 13.7%                | 12.1%       | 33.6%  | 13.3%       | 27.3%                | 1000 |

Chi square 104.296 DF=16 PROB=0.0001

Table 6.19

*Some people think that the U.S. should continue diplomatic pressures to help Polish citizens retain some freedom from the Soviet Union, but that the U.S. should not get actively involved in Poland.*  
*Others think that the U.S. should go further, set up embargoes, and engage in other non-military activities in Poland, even if they might heighten tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.*

*Which-of these comes closest to your own opinion?*

**IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?**

|                      | Uninvolved/Strong | Uninvolved | Unsure | Non-Military Assistance | Non-Military Assistance/Strong | n =  |
|----------------------|-------------------|------------|--------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 44.0%             | 16.5%      | 9.0%   | 9.0%                    | 21.5%                          | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 38.0              | 10.0       | 4.5    | 12.0                    | 35.5                           | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 44.5              | 12.0       | 7.5    | 9.5                     | 26.5                           | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 40.0              | 22.5       | 8.0    | 10.5                    | 19.0                           | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 43.0              | 13.0       | 13.0   | 10.0                    | 21.0                           | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 41.9%             | 14.8%      | 8.4%   | 10.2%                   | 24.7%                          | 1000 |

Chi square 38.793 DF=16 PROB=0.0012

Table 6.20  
Attitude Toward Poland  
Polish Respondents Only

|                     | Uninvolved/Strongly | Uninvolved | Unsure | Non-Military Assistance | Non-Military Assistance/Strongly | n = |
|---------------------|---------------------|------------|--------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|-----|
| Education           |                     |            |        |                         |                                  |     |
| High School or Less | 44.4%               | 7.4%       | 5.6%   | 10.2%                   | 32.4%                            | 108 |
| Some College        | 36.4                | 11.4       | 6.8    | 13.6                    | 31.8                             | 44  |
| College             | 25.0                | 14.6       | 0.0    | 14.6                    | 45.8                             | 48  |
| Age                 |                     |            |        |                         |                                  |     |
| 18-34               | 28.8                | 12.1       | 3.0    | 18.2                    | 37.9                             | 66  |
| 35-54               | 38.3                | 10.0       | 10.0   | 8.3                     | 33.3                             | 60  |
| 55 +                | 46.0                | 8.1        | 1.4    | 9.5                     | 35.1                             | 74  |
| Occupation          |                     |            |        |                         |                                  |     |
| Self-Employed/      |                     |            |        |                         |                                  |     |
| White Collar        | 31.0                | 9.5        | 6.0    | 14.3                    | 39.3                             | 84  |
| Blue Collar         | 43.2                | 11.4       | 6.8    | 9.1                     | 29.6                             | 44  |
| Not Employed        | 43.6                | 9.1        | 0.0    | 12.7                    | 34.6                             | 55  |
| Other               | 41.2                | 11.8       | 5.9    | 5.9                     | 35.3                             | 17  |
| Ethnicity           |                     |            |        |                         |                                  |     |
| Lean American       | 45.5                | 9.8        | 3.6    | 4.5                     | 36.6                             | 112 |
| Lean Ethnic         | 29.1                | 10.5       | 4.7    | 20.0                    | 34.9                             | 86  |
| All Poles           | 38.0%               | 10.0%      | 4.5%   | 12.0%                   | 35.5%                            | 200 |



Israel has helped him or hurt him. From a purely pragmatic viewpoint, this suggests a cautious policy towards Israel. In some areas of the country, the electorate will reward a candidate who backs Israel, while other constituencies will be less sympathetic to Israel.

## **Poland**

While the ethnic respondents' support for Israel was far from overwhelming, it was significantly greater than their support for American non-military intervention in the Polish situation. When given a choice of embargoes and other non-military activity, on one hand, and purely diplomatic pressures on the other, a strong majority of ethnic respondents opted for the latter. Polish respondents were split evenly on the question, but the other four groups were strongly opposed to more extensive, though non-military, forms of involvement. Opposition to extensive involvement cut across age, education and occupation of the total sample, but Polish respondents showed marked differences when divided into certain demographic groups. For example, more educated, younger and white-collar Poles tended to be more supportive of American intervention, as were those Poles who had a stronger Polish identity. But in general, it is clear that there is not a broad base of support for extra-diplomatic, non-military action in Poland.

## **Defining Foreign Policy Issues**

On foreign policy questions, Italians and Hispanics proved to be much more conservative than the other groups. Both of these groups perceive the existence of a Soviet threat and both are *relatively* more cautious about the benefits of a nuclear freeze. Moreover, while Jews, Irish and Poles say they would be more likely to vote for someone who wants to cut the defense budget, Italians and Hispanics disagree.

Conservatives clearly face a problem in convincing the ethnic public that increased defense spending is necessary. While it is true that respondents who agreed that the Soviet Union is the greatest threat to world peace were more likely to favor increased defense spending, even a majority of those respondents opted for a balanced budget over increased defense spending.

Supporters of increased military spending evidently have not convinced those in the ethnic sample that more money for defense is a high priority. The data indicate that there is a constituency for cutting the defense budget (or, at least, opposed to increases in that budget), and that high-turnout ethnic individuals are particularly supportive of defense cuts. Conservatives must be either more persuasive in establishing the link between defense spending and national security or more willing to look for new systems or strategies which reflect the public's attitude toward defense dollars.

As in the case with other areas of public policy, conservatives will benefit only if they define the issues and frame the alternatives in such a way as to attract public support. It is not difficult to get people to agree with the almost meaning-

**Table 6.21**  
**Balanced Budget versus Increased Defense Spending**  
 by "The number one threat to peace in the world today is the Soviet Union"

|                   | Balancing<br>Federal Budget | Unsure | Up Defense<br>Spending | n =  |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|--------|------------------------|------|
| Agree/Strongly    | 56.3%                       | 10.3%  | 33.4%                  | 476  |
| Agree             | 66.4                        | 11.9   | 21.7                   | 143  |
| Unsure            | 64.3                        | 17.1   | 18.6                   | 70   |
| Disagree          | 69.9                        | 11.0   | 19.1                   | 136  |
| Disagree/Strongly | 70.3                        | 5.7    | 24.0                   | 175  |
| All Respondents   | 62.6%                       | 10.3%  | 27.1%                  | 1000 |

Chi square 27.580 DF=8 PROB=0.0006

less generalization that the United States should be militarily strong. It is even possible, according to our survey, to get a majority of ethnic respondents to agree with the statement that the United States should help stop communism in Latin America. But given the media's very graphic coverage of the human tragedies which result from international conflict, it is difficult to persuade the public to think of foreign policy as *realpolitik*. That is, conservatives must convince the electorate that a strong and internationally active America (and that does not necessarily mean dispatching forces around the world) is likely to defer America's adversaries from adventurism. The argument has been made that human tragedy can be averted through strength, but it has been put forth only to a limited extent, and conservatives have allowed their liberal opponents to seize the "peace offensive" and to wipe Iran, Afghanistan and Nicaragua from the public's consciousness.

## Chapter 7: Ethnicity and Coalitions

Election outcomes are determined by whether one political campaign can put together a coalition of like-minded people which is larger than the opponent's coalition. The building blocks of these coalitions are individuals from various demographic groups, whether they be of a political, social, economic or religious nature. The results of this study of 1000 ethnic respondents suggest that certain coalitions are very likely, while coalitions of other groups are not. Of course, the members of coalitions differ from issue to issue. That is, a voter is at one time a member of many groups and therefore is pulled in different directions. Success in the electoral arena depends on the ability of a coalition to define issues so that the voter ultimately casts his ballot the way one coalition—one party or candidate—wants.

In talking about coalitions, it is easy to fall into the trap of saying that certain groups are a "lost cause" and should not be included in the equation of a particular winning coalition. But in all but presidential elections (where the electoral college alters the simple numerical contest), a vote in one town is worth just as much as a vote in another town, and a vote from one individual is worth as much as a vote from any other. Thus, a Republican candidate who can draw 40% of the Jewish vote or 30% of the black vote still "loses" those groups, but in relation to the "normal" Republican vote, he has picked up substantial support—support which might make the difference between victory and defeat.

As noted earlier, each of the five ethnic groups examined in this study has a history of Democratic voting. And yet, on a number of issues, our ethnic respondents appear to hold the sorts of conservative views not associated with liberal elements of the Democratic Party. A sizable percentage of Hispanics identify themselves as conservative Democrats, but only 8.5% said they usually vote Republican. Even among Jews, who have a reputation of being liberal Democrats, over 30% identified themselves as either Republicans or conservative Democrats. Given these facts, what are the prospects of conservative candidates making inroads in each of the five groups? Should liberals and Democrats be concerned about the possibility of defections by ethnics?

### Reviewing the Issues

On foreign policy issues, Italian and Hispanic respondents proved to be significantly more conservative than their Polish, Irish or Jewish counterparts. Both of these ethnic groups were much less likely to support cuts in the defense budget and were much more suspicious of a nuclear freeze. The Hispanics were particularly receptive to the view that the United States should get involved in stopping communism in Latin America. Jewish and Irish respondents proved to be particularly liberal, as each group supported the freeze and cuts in defense

**Table 7.1**  
**Party Status, Voting Behavior and Target Groups**  
by ethnic groups

| <b>Ethnic Group</b> | <b>Current Political Party Status</b> | <b>Usual Voting Behavior</b> | <b>Political Target Groups</b> |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Irish               | Republican                            | Republican                   | Conservative Republican        |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | Moderate/Liberal Republican    |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Ticket-Splitter                |
|                     | n = 194                               | n = 200                      | Conservative Democrat          |
| Polish              | Republican                            | Republican                   | Moderate/Liberal Democrat      |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | n = 200                        |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Conservative Republican        |
|                     | n = 193                               | n = 200                      | Moderate/Liberal Republican    |
| Italian             | Republican                            | Republican                   | Ticket-Splitter                |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | Conservative Democrat          |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Moderate/Liberal Democrat      |
|                     | n = 199                               | n = 200                      | n = 200                        |
| Jewish              | Republican                            | Republican                   | Conservative Republican        |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | Moderate/Liberal Republican    |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Ticket-Splitter                |
|                     | n = 194                               | n = 200                      | Conservative Democrat          |
| Hispanic            | Republican                            | Republican                   | Moderate/Liberal Democrat      |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | n = 200                        |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Conservative Republican        |
|                     | n = 194                               | n = 200                      | Moderate/Liberal Republican    |
|                     | Republican                            | Republican                   | Ticket-Splitter                |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | Conservative Democrat          |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Moderate/Liberal Democrat      |
|                     | n = 194                               | n = 200                      | n = 200                        |
|                     | Republican                            | Republican                   | Conservative Republican        |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | Moderate/Liberal Republican    |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Ticket-Splitter                |
|                     | n = 194                               | n = 200                      | Conservative Democrat          |
|                     | Republican                            | Republican                   | Moderate/Liberal Democrat      |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | n = 200                        |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Conservative Republican        |
|                     | n = 194                               | n = 200                      | Moderate/Liberal Republican    |
|                     | Republican                            | Republican                   | Ticket-Splitter                |
|                     | Independent                           | Ticket-Splitter              | Conservative Democrat          |
|                     | Democrat                              | Democrat                     | Moderate/Liberal Democrat      |
|                     | n = 194                               | n = 200                      | n = 200                        |



spending, and were much more skeptical than their fellow ethnics about the Soviet threat. Poles appear divided on foreign policy. They strongly agree that the Soviet Union is the number one threat to world peace, but they say they would back someone who proposed reducing the defense budget. On the question of a nuclear freeze, they fall somewhere between the Italian-Hispanic and Jewish-Irish extremes.

On social issues, Poles and Italians appear to be more conservative than the other ethnic groups. Both groups are supportive of a constitutional amendment banning abortions except in cases of rape and incest, and both adopt a strong law and order stance on the death penalty and on the treatment of criminals by the courts. The Poles are the only group which is more likely to support a candidate who favors cuts in student loans to middle and upper income students. By contrast, Jewish and Hispanic voters proved to be more liberal on social issues than the three European Catholic groups. The Hispanics were similar to the other Catholic groups on the question of abortion, but they were more liberal than all of the other groups, including Jews, on affirmative action. Irish Catholic respondents generally fell between the more liberal ethnic groups and the more conservative ones.

There was little difference among the groups on economic issues, with all groups believing that the government has a responsibility to insure the continued existence of social programs which help the needy. All of the groups see unemployment as the greatest single economic problem, but large numbers of all groups also identify inflation and interest rates as the major problem. While Italians were much less willing than the other respondents to cut defense first in order to balance the budget, a plurality of all but Jewish respondents favored cutting welfare or food stamps ahead of defense. All of the groups also support a proposal which would require recipients of government funds to accept employment if they are physically able.

### **Ideology and Partisanship**

In terms of ideological self-identification, Italian and Polish respondents identified themselves as conservatives by better than a two-to-one margin. A majority of Hispanics, 52%, also placed themselves in the conservative category. Both Irish and Jewish respondents classified themselves as more moderate-to-liberal than the other ethnic groups, with only 44.5% of Irish saying they are "somewhat conservative" or "very conservative" and 45% of Jews answering that they are "somewhat liberal" or "very liberal."

### **Jews**

One of the most liberal ethnic groups over the last five decades, Jews appeared to be moving to the right in 1980. Reagan received about 36% of the Jewish vote nation-wide, and he drew 40% or more in two states with large

Table 7.2  
Ideological Outlook  
by ethnic group

|                      | Very<br>Conservative | Somewhat<br>Conservative | Moderate | Somewhat<br>Liberal | Very Liberal | Don't Know | n =  |
|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------|---------------------|--------------|------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 10.0%                | 34.5%                    | 18.5%    | 26.0%               | 7.5%         | 3.5%       | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 10.5                 | 46.5                     | 14.0     | 18.0                | 7.0          | 4.0        | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 9.5                  | 48.0                     | 11.0     | 18.5                | 6.5          | 6.5        | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 9.0                  | 26.0                     | 16.0     | 28.0                | 17.0         | 4.0        | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 14.5                 | 37.5                     | 9.5      | 24.5                | 7.0          | 7.0        | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 10.7                 | 38.5                     | 13.8     | 23.0                | 9.0          | 5.0        | 1000 |

Chi square 57.521 DF = 20 PROB = 0.0001

Table 7.3  
Jewish Presidential and Congressional Vote  
for selected states and nationally

| 1980 Presidential<br>Vote | California | Connecticut | Illinois | Maryland | New Jersey | New York | Pennsylvania | National | 1980 Congressional<br>Vote |
|---------------------------|------------|-------------|----------|----------|------------|----------|--------------|----------|----------------------------|
| Reagan                    | 28%        | 28%         | 22%      | 31%      | 40%        | 36%      | 45%          | 36%      | Republican                 |
| Carter                    | 53         | 49          | 55       | 45       | 49         | 53       | 39           | 47       | Democrat                   |
| Anderson                  | 19         | 23          | 23       | 24       | 11         | 11       | 16           | 17       | Other, Don't Know          |
|                           |            |             |          |          |            |          |              |          | 24%<br>69<br>7             |

Jewish populations—Pennsylvania and New Jersey.<sup>1</sup> However, the Jewish vote in congressional contests nationally was significantly lower, and our results indicate that a solid 50% of Jewish respondents identify themselves as moderate or liberal Democrats. Our findings generally confirm the view put forth by Edgar Litt that Jews have "a generous view of federal power as a tool in the amelioration of social ills" and that there may well be such a thing as "Jewish altruistic liberalism."<sup>2</sup> But, this does not mean that conservatives should write off the Jewish vote or that liberals can take that vote for granted.

Jewish attitudes toward political issues are only part of the reason for Jewish support for liberals in general and liberal Democrats in particular. Cultural differences are probably also a factor, and as Milton Himmelfarb has noted, "Liberalism hardly needed to attract...because conservatism repelled."<sup>3</sup> Undoubtedly many Jews still connect conservatism with anti-semitism, and the strong southern and western tinge of the current brand of conservatism probably gives rise to distrust among northeastern Jews. In addition, the close relationship between the so-called religious right or Christian right and the politically conservative New Right certainly makes many Jews uneasy. Jewish opposition to tuition tax credits for private and parochial schools is a case in point.

Nonetheless, there are issues which conservatives can employ to appeal to Jews. Crime and preferential treatment (e.g. quotas) are two obvious subjects. But on a number of the social issues, especially those with a moral basis, Jews will be drawn back toward the liberal coalition. The greatest challenge to conservatives may be to prove to Jews that conservatism is not simply a Protestant political force and that it does not want to Christianize America. After all, tuition tax credits would mean help for Catholic parochial schools and Jewish schools. Moreover, tuition tax credits for private schools could mean more diversity in education, and diversity is a fundamental assumption of *traditional liberalism*.

Jews are likely to remain important members of the liberal movement and of the Democratic Party. Conservatives, and particularly conservative Republicans, who can draw anywhere close to 35% of the Jewish vote should consider themselves extremely fortunate. But in many states, losing the Jewish vote by a relatively small two-to-one, three-to-one, or even four-to-one margin may be a strong enough showing to win district-wide or state-wide.

### Hispanics

Ronald Reagan drew approximately 30% of the Hispanic vote nation-wide, doing somewhat better in California (33%) and somewhat worse in New York

<sup>1</sup>NBC News/Associated Press election day surveys, November 4, 1980.

<sup>2</sup>Edgar Litt, *Beyond Pluralism: Ethnic Politics in America* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1970), pp. 114-115.

<sup>3</sup>Milton Himmelfarb, "The Case of Jewish Liberalism," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Emerging Coalitions in American Politics* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978), p. 300.

(19%) and Texas (20%).<sup>4</sup> But, while a clear majority of Hispanics are Mexican, and according to one observer, Mexican Americans "tend to be pro-family, pro-growth, pro-military, pro-country, pro-crime, anti-drugs, loyal to the Catholic Church, hungry for advancement and increasingly middle class,"<sup>5</sup> there is no indication that Hispanics are increasingly Republican. As David Broder noted, "All those interviewed predicted that the Democratic Party will continue in the 1980's to be the main channel of Hispanic political energies."<sup>6</sup> In our own ethnic survey, 75.5% of Hispanic respondents said that they usually vote Democratic, while only 8.5% said they tend to vote Republican.

But the Democratic hold over Hispanics is far from firm, and the political clout of Hispanics is relatively low given their numbers, primarily because their turnout rate is so low. Mexican-American turnout, for example, is lower than white turnout,<sup>7</sup> and their "lack of personal involvement and absence of a strong sense of identification with the Democratic Party have not encouraged political consciousness among Chicanos."<sup>8</sup> All of this makes Hispanic voters potentially powerful and of value to both parties.

The Hispanics in our survey proved to be extremely conservative on foreign policy questions. However, John Petrocik argues that foreign policy issues have not divided the electorate the way economic or social issues have, and he maintains that attitudes toward foreign policy have relatively little effect on partisan loyalties.

The criteria which distinguish individuals as 'liberal' and 'conservative' on foreign policy are largely, although not entirely, orthogonal to the cleavages which divide the electorate into Democrats and Republicans. The correlational link between changes in party preference and changes in a group's modal opinion toward foreign policy issues is very weak. Thus, although foreign policy issues may be responsible for some change in party preference, its effect is different from the other issues that affect the party bias of the groups.<sup>9</sup>

But even if there is reason to believe that foreign policy is not normally a decisive factor in accounting for altered partisan loyalties, there is reason to believe that Hispanics are susceptible to appeals from conservatives, whether they be conservative Democratic or conservative Republican candidates. When it comes to social policy, while Hispanics are not as conservative as the European Catholic groups, a sizable percentage of Hispanics do hold conservative views. The Republicans need not win a majority of the Hispanic vote in order to keep them-

<sup>4</sup>NBC News/Associated Press election day survey, November 4, 1980. Some say that the Texas figure is closer to 30%. See *The Washington Post*, July 11, 1981, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup>*The Washington Post*, July 11, 1981, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup>David S. Broder, *Changing of the Guard* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), p. 297.

<sup>7</sup>George Antunes and Charles M. Gaitz, "Ethnicity and Participation: A Study of Mexican-Americans, Blacks and Whites," *American Journal of Sociology* 80 (March, 1975): 1208.

<sup>8</sup>John A. Garcia, "An Analysis of Chicano and Anglo Electoral Patterns in School Board Elections," *Ethnicity* 6 (June, 1979): 169.

<sup>9</sup>Petrocik, *Party Coalitions*, pp. 122-123.



selves competitive. However, the GOP must insure that the Democrats do not win the Hispanic vote by a margin of three-to-one. Given the ideological bent of the group, a conservative candidate who recognizes the link between culture and political attitudes should be able to do reasonably well among Hispanics.

### Italians/Poles/Irish

Italians, Poles and Irish voters have historically supported Democratic candidates, though each group has shown a willingness to support conservative Republicans. National Opinion Research Center (NORC) data show that between 1972 and 1976, 44% of Irish and Italians and 54% of Eastern Europeans identified themselves as Democrats, while only 21% of Irish, 17% of Italians and 13% of Eastern Europeans were Republicans.<sup>10</sup> According to Andrew Greeley, Irish Catholics, Italian Catholics and Polish Catholics voted heavily Democratic in both congressional and presidential contests over the last three decades. While Greeley argues that "a substantial amount of public evidence...refutes the myth of Catholic defection from the Democratic coalition,"<sup>11</sup> Everett Carl Ladd maintains that "over the last two decades, however, there has been a pronounced secular erosion of Protestant and Catholic voting differences."<sup>12</sup>

Table 7.4  
Catholic Democratic Voting  
selected years, 1952-1976

|                                                                  | Irish<br>Catholic | Italian<br>Catholic | Polish<br>Catholic | All<br>Americans |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Average Percentage Voting Democratic<br>for Congress, 1952-1970  | 70%               | 62%                 | 76%                | 55%              |
| Average Percentage Voting Democratic,<br>1976                    | 73                | 62                  | 73                 | 54               |
| Average Percentage Voting Democratic<br>for President, 1952-1968 | 65                | 60                  | 76                 | 48               |
| Average Percentage Voted for Hubert<br>Humphrey in 1968          | 65                | 59                  | 80                 | 44               |

Source: Andrew M. Greeley, "Catholics and Coalition: Where Should They Go?," in Lipset, ed., *Emerging Coalitions*, p. 282.

The results of our survey reflect the Democratic preferences of Italian, Polish and Irish respondents, but the data also show that the three groups are rather conservative in many of their attitudes. Issues involving law and order and foreign policy evoke particularly conservative responses from Poles and Italians in our sample. All three groups appear also to be receptive to conservative appeals

<sup>10</sup>Everett Carl Ladd, "The Shifting Party Coalitions—1932-1976," in Lipset, ed., *Emerging Coalitions*, pp. 87-88.

<sup>11</sup>Andrew M. Greeley, "Catholics and Coalition: Where Should They Go?" in Lipset, ed., *Emerging Coalitions*, p. 283.

<sup>12</sup>Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate," p. 12.

on social issues. But even these groups seem to have come to accept a wide-range of government responsibilities, and candidates who do not recognize this are bound to frighten those ethnics and run a high risk of being called extremists.

Given their past electoral support for Democrats, many of whom were liberal, as well as their generally conservative bent, Italians and Poles appear to offer conservatives and Republicans their best opportunities for picking up support. The Irish, who in our sample were already slightly more likely to support Republicans and who said they are somewhat less conservative than the Italians and Poles, also react favorably to a number of conservative issues. But the Irish appear to be less of a potential windfall to conservatives.

## Women

Polling throughout early and mid-1982 produced data which suggest that there is a growing gap between men and women on a number of issues. Our ethnic survey also found differences between the sexes. On a number of foreign policy issues, women appear to be measurably less "hawkish" than men. For example, women tended to be more hesitant to support American involvement in Latin America, Israel and Poland than were men, and women were more likely to support a nuclear freeze, though in the latter case the significance level (greater than 0.05) suggests that sex is not a statistically significant variable.<sup>13</sup>

Table 7.5

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement—"The U.S. must get involved in helping stop the spread of communism in South America and Central America."  
IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                 | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n=   |
|-----------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|------|
| Male            | 36.4%              | 16.1% | 10.2%  | 11.4%    | 26.0%                 | 511  |
| Female          | 26.6               | 13.5  | 16.8   | 13.5     | 29.7                  | 489  |
| All Respondents | 31.6%              | 14.8% | 13.4%  | 12.4%    | 27.8%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 18.929 DF=4 PROB=0.0008

<sup>13</sup>In one ethnic group, Hispanics, men are overwhelmingly more "hawkish" about a nuclear freeze. Hispanic women back the proposal 57.7% to 29.9%, while Hispanic men are opposed by a 50.5%-40.8% margin.

For a further examination of the differences between men and women, see Kathleen A. Frankovic, "Sex and Politics—New Alignments, Old Issues," *PS* 15 (Summer, 1982): 439-448. Frankovic notes that in at least two areas, foreign policy and the environment, men are measurably more conservative than women. For example, when asked whether the United States "should be more forceful in its dealings with other countries even if it increases the risk of war?", 55% of men say it should and 38% say it should not, while women are split 48% to 48%. The same differences appear for questions concerning the likelihood of war, El Salvador and Soviet-American relations.

Table 7.6

*Some people feel that we spend too much money and effort supporting Israel, and that we should be more even-handed towards the Palestinians and Arabs in the Middle East. Others feel that we should continue to support Israel, even if it means straining relations with the Palestinians and Arabs.*

Which of these views comes closest to your own opinion?  
IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                 | U.S. Help/<br>Strongly | U.S. Should<br>Help | Unsure | U.S.<br>Stay Out | Stay Out/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|-----------------|------------------------|---------------------|--------|------------------|-----------------------|------|
| Male            | 36.2%                  | 15.1%               | 13.7%  | 10.4%            | 24.7%                 | 511  |
| Female          | 26.4                   | 13.7                | 28.0   | 10.0             | 21.9                  | 489  |
| All Respondents | 31.4%                  | 14.4%               | 20.7%  | 10.2%            | 23.3%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 33.606 DF=4 PROB=0.0001

Table 7.7

*Some people think that the U.S. should continue diplomatic pressures to help Polish citizens retain some freedom from the Soviet Union, but that the U.S. should not get actively involved in Poland.*

*Others think that the U.S. should go further, set up embargoes, and engage in other non-military activities in Poland; even if they might heighten tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.*

Which of these comes closest to your own opinion?  
IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                 | Uninvolved/<br>Strong | Uninvolved | Unsure | Military<br>Assistance | Military<br>Assistance/<br>Strong | n =  |
|-----------------|-----------------------|------------|--------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|------|
| Male            | 40.3%                 | 12.9%      | 5.5%   | 11.7%                  | 29.6%                             | 511  |
| Female          | 43.6                  | 16.8       | 11.3   | 8.6                    | 19.8                              | 489  |
| All Respondents | 41.9%                 | 14.8%      | 8.3%   | 10.2%                  | 24.8%                             | 1000 |

Chi square 25.092 DF=4 PROB=0.0001

Table 7.8

**A freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, even if that means the U.S. has slightly fewer weapons. (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)**

|                 | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|-----------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Male            | 58.5% | 7.6%   | 33.9%  | 511  |
| Female          | 62.2  | 10.2   | 27.6   | 489  |
| All Respondents | 60.3% | 8.9%   | 30.8%  | 1000 |

Chi square 5.608 DF=2 PROB=0.0606

Differences between the sexes also appeared on questions involving the courts and punishment for criminals. Women were more likely than men to believe that the courts should have more power, and they were less likely to support the death penalty for convicted murderers.



Table 7.9

In general, do you feel that courts in this country have too much power, about the right amount of power, or not enough power?

|                 | Too Much | Right Amount | Not Enough | Don't Know/<br>No Answer | n =  |
|-----------------|----------|--------------|------------|--------------------------|------|
| Male            | 26.8%    | 40.5%        | 24.5%      | 8.2%                     | 511  |
| Female          | 24.5     | 32.9         | 30.3       | 12.3                     | 489  |
| All Respondents | 25.7%    | 36.8%        | 27.3%      | 10.2%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 11.510 DF=3 PROB=0.0093

Table 7.10

And, do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?  
(PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

|                 | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|-----------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Male            | 74.6% | 6.9%   | 18.6%  | 511  |
| Female          | 67.9  | 11.0   | 21.1   | 489  |
| All Respondents | 71.3% | 8.9%   | 19.8%  | 1000 |

Chi square 7.266 DF=2 PROB=0.0264

On the "social issues," which include the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion, differences between male and female respondents appear minimal. There seems to be a slight difference in attitudes toward federal funding for abortions, with men split 47.5% in favor and 46.7% opposed and women opposed to federal funding by a 52.6%-40% margin (chi square 4.493, DF=2, Prob=0.1058).

Finally, on economic issues, there are no great differences between the sexes. Both groups identify unemployment as the greatest problem facing the country and both see Social Security as an untouchable program. Men appear less willing than women to cut defense spending, while women are less willing to cut federal aid to the handicapped. There are other minor differences which may or may not be significant.

Thus candidates must be aware of the differences in opinion between the sexes, particularly in foreign policy, if they are to respond to the fears of a large number of women as well as to the concerns of men.

### Organized Labor and the Blue Collar Vote

Compared to the differences between ethnic groups and age groups, variance in the responses from union and non-union households was minimal. And while there were differences between white collar and blue collar respondents, those differences were also not very great. Across the entire sample of 1000 ethnic individuals, respondents from union households were slightly more supportive of tuition tax credits and slightly more pro-Israel than were respondents from non-



Table 7.11

What do you personally feel is the greatest economic problem we, as a country, face today? (RECORD MENTION, DO NOT READ)

|                 | High Interest Rate | Inflation | Unemployment | Foreign Competition | Productivity | Unbalanced Federal Budget | Other | Don't Know No Answer | n =  |
|-----------------|--------------------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|---------------------------|-------|----------------------|------|
| Male            | 14.9%              | 15.9%     | 27.0%        | 4.9%                | 4.5%         | 8.4%                      | 16.1% | 8.4%                 | 511  |
| Female          | 11.9               | 19.6      | 32.3         | 1.2                 | 3.1          | 5.9                       | 12.7  | 13.3                 | 489  |
| All Respondents | 13.4%              | 17.7%     | 29.6%        | 3.1%                | 3.8%         | 7.2%                      | 14.4% | 10.8%                | 1000 |

Chi square 27.881 DF=7 PROB=0.0002

Table 7.12

Suppose for a moment that in order to balance the federal budget we had to cut back on some federal programs. Which of the following should be cut first—that is, which of the following programs would be *least* important to the country as a whole if something had to be cut back? (READ LIST, ROTATE) Which should be cut *next*? And which of these is *most* important—that is, should be the *last* program to be cut?

|                 | (a) Defense spending | (b) Federal aid to education | (c) Federal health protection | (d) Social Security | (e) Food stamps | (f) Welfare | (g) Federal aid to the handicapped | (h) Federal low income programs | 1    | 2    | 3    | 4    | 5    | 6    | 7    | 8    |
|-----------------|----------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Male            | 16.6%                | 15.5%                        | 6.5%                          | 33.1%               | 3.5%            | 4.1%        | 6.9%                               | 4.7%                            | 9.2% | 10.4 | 5.3  | 5.0% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 9.8% |
| Female          | 11.0                 | 12.9                         | 5.7                           | 35.4                | 2.0             | 4.3         | 12.9                               | 5.3                             | 10.4 | 5.3  | 5.0% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 9.8% |
| All Respondents | 13.9%                | 14.2%                        | 6.1%                          | 34.2%               | 2.8%            | 4.2%        | 9.8%                               | 5.0%                            | 9.8% | 5.0% | 5.0% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 9.8% | 9.8% |

Chi square 19.227 DF=8 PROB=0.0137

**Table 7.13**  
**Attitudes Toward Tuition Tax Credits**  
by union and non-union households

|                     | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|---------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Union Household     | 65.1% | 3.6%   | 31.3%  | 278  |
| Non-Union Household | 57.1  | 7.2    | 35.7   | 722  |
| All Respondents     | 59.3% | 6.2%   | 34.5%  | 1000 |

Chi square 7.544 DF=2 PROB=0.0230

**Table 7.14**  
**Support for Israel**  
by union and non-union households

|                     | Support/<br>Strongly | Support | Unsure | More<br>Even-Handed | More<br>Even-Handed/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|---------------------|----------------------|---------|--------|---------------------|----------------------------------|------|
| Union Household     | 33.8%                | 16.9%   | 20.1%  | 11.9%               | 17.3%                            | 278  |
| Non-Union Household | 30.5                 | 13.4    | 20.9   | 9.6                 | 25.6                             | 722  |
| All Respondents     | 31.5%                | 14.3%   | 20.7%  | 10.2%               | 23.3%                            | 1000 |

Chi square 9.521 DF=4 PROB=0.0493

union households. But on a number of controversial issues, including busing, the E.R.A., the defense budget and a constitutional amendment banning abortion, there is virtually no difference between union and non-union respondents.

Differences between blue and white collar respondents were non-existent on questions concerning Israel, the Equal Rights Amendment and cutting the defense budget, but differences did exist on a number of issues. For example, opposition among blue collar ethnics to a constitutional amendment banning abortion is much "softer" than among white collar ethnics. In addition, blue collar ethnics are slightly more supportive of tuition tax credits. On foreign policy, they are generally more conservative than white collar respondents, and this is particularly true for the three European Catholic groups. On the other hand, blue collar respondents were slightly more supportive of the E.R.A. and affirmative action, though the differences were not great in either case.

While labor unions generally endorse the more liberal major party candidate in a House or Senate race, ethnics who are members of labor unions appear to hold conservative positions on a number of issues. Blue collar workers appear to be slightly more conservative than their white collar counterparts. This could cause significant problems for organized labor, since a continuing and growing rift between union leaders and the rank-and-file obviously will put a strain on the relationship between the leaders and the led. More importantly for this study, blue collar ethnic voters and union-household ethnics appear to hold atti-

**Table 7.15**  
**Attitudes Toward Constitutional Amendment Banning Abortion**  
 by occupation

|                     | Favor | Unsure | Soft Oppose | Hard Oppose | n =  |
|---------------------|-------|--------|-------------|-------------|------|
| Self-Employed/White |       |        |             |             |      |
| Collar              | 33.3% | 8.9%   | 24.2%       | 33.7%       | 463  |
| Blue Collar         | 32.1  | 16.3   | 33.2        | 18.4        | 196  |
| Not Employed        | 34.7  | 22.2   | 25.8        | 17.3        | 225  |
| Other               | 36.2  | 9.5    | 25.9        | 28.5        | 116  |
| All Respondents     | 33.7% | 13.4%  | 26.5%       | 26.4%       | 1000 |

Chi square 48.820 DF=9 PROB=0.0001

**Table 7.16**  
**Attitudes Toward Tuition Tax Credits**  
 by occupation

|                     | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n =  |
|---------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Self-Employed/White |       |        |        |      |
| Collar              | 59.2% | 4.5%   | 36.3%  | 463  |
| Blue Collar         | 65.8  | 3.6    | 30.6   | 196  |
| Not Employed        | 58.2  | 12.0   | 29.8   | 225  |
| Other               | 50.9  | 6.0    | 43.1   | 116  |
| All Respondents     | 59.3% | 6.2%   | 34.5%  | 1000 |

Chi square 24.537 DF=6 PROB=0.0004

**Table 7.17**  
 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement—"The U.S. must get involved in helping stop the spread of communism in South America and Central America."  
 IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                     | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|---------------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|------|
| Self-Employed/White |                    |       |        |          |                       |      |
| Collar              | 26.7%              | 17.1% | 13.8%  | 13.8%    | 26.6%                 | 463  |
| Blue Collar         | 36.7               | 16.3  | 7.7    | 12.2     | 27.0                  | 196  |
| Not Employed        | 28.0               | 11.1  | 20.0   | 8.9      | 32.0                  | 225  |
| Other               | 41.4               | 10.3  | 8.6    | 13.8     | 25.9                  | 116  |
| All Respondents     | 31.6%              | 14.8% | 13.4%  | 12.4%    | 27.8%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 32.055 DF=12 PROB=0.0014

**Table 7.18**  
**Attitudes Toward A Nuclear Freeze**  
**by occupation**

|                            | Favor | Unsure | Oppose | n=   |
|----------------------------|-------|--------|--------|------|
| Self-Employed/White Collar | 64.2% | 8.2%   | 27.7%  | 463  |
| Blue Collar                | 57.1  | 7.7    | 35.2   | 196  |
| Not Employed               | 56.0  | 12.0   | 32.0   | 225  |
| Other                      | 58.6  | 7.8    | 33.6   | 116  |
| All Respondents            | 60.3% | 8.9%   | 30.8%  | 1000 |

Chi square 8.530 DF=6 PROB=0.2018

**Table 7.19**

**And do you agree or disagree with this statement—"The number one threat to peace in the world today is the Soviet Union."**  
**IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?**

|                            | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n=   |
|----------------------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|------|
| Self-Employed/White Collar | 40.8%              | 16.9% | 6.1%   | 17.3%    | 19.0%                 | 463  |
| Blue Collar                | 50.0               | 13.8  | 5.6    | 12.8     | 17.9                  | 196  |
| Not Employed               | 59.6               | 11.6  | 10.7   | 5.8      | 12.4                  | 225  |
| Other                      | 47.4               | 10.3  | 6.0    | 15.5     | 20.7                  | 116  |
| All Respondents            | 47.6%              | 14.3% | 7.0%   | 13.6%    | 17.5%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 41.393 DF=12 PROB=0.0001

**Table 7.20**

**And do you agree or disagree with this statement—"The number one threat to peace in the world today is the Soviet Union."**  
**IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?**  
**(Italian/Irish/Polish sample only)**

|                            | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n=  |
|----------------------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|-----|
| Self-Employed/White Collar | 39.7%              | 15.5% | 4.3%   | 19.1%    | 21.3%                 | 277 |
| Blue Collar                | 53.3               | 13.1  | 4.1    | 13.1     | 16.4                  | 122 |
| Not Employed               | 63.5               | 12.2  | 10.8   | 4.7      | 8.8                   | 148 |
| Other                      | 52.8               | 7.6   | 5.7    | 13.2     | 20.8                  | 53  |
| All Respondents            | 49.5%              | 13.5% | 6.0%   | 13.8%    | 17.2%                 | 600 |

Chi square 45.691 DF=12 PROB=0.0001



**Table 7.21**  
**Attitudes Toward E.R.A.**  
**by occupation**

|                            | <b>Favor</b> | <b>Unsure</b> | <b>Oppose</b> |
|----------------------------|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| Self Employed/White Collar | 69.1%        | 9.1%          | 21.8%         |
| Blue Collar                | 74.5         | 10.7          | 14.8          |
| All Respondents            | 66.8%        | 10.2%         | 23.0%         |

**Table 7.22**  
**Attitudes on Preferential Treatment**  
**by occupation**

|                            | <b>Better<br/>Treatment/<br/>Strongly</b> | <b>Better<br/>Treatment</b> | <b>Unsure</b> | <b>Ability</b> | <b>Ability/<br/>Strongly</b> | <b>n =</b> |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|----------------|------------------------------|------------|
| Self Employed/White Collar | 10.2%                                     | 4.3%                        | 8.4%          | 11.9%          | 65.2%                        | 463        |
| Blue Collar                | 17.9                                      | 4.6                         | 4.6           | 11.7           | 61.2                         | 196        |
| Others                     | 13.5                                      | 4.7                         | 7.9           | 10.6           | 63.3                         | 341        |
| All Respondents            | 12.8%                                     | 4.5%                        | 7.5%          | 11.4%          | 63.8%                        | 1000       |

tudes on a number of issues which should lead them to vote for the more conservative candidate.

### **The Conservative Label**

When the sample was asked, "What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think about someone who is a conservative?", slightly more than one-quarter of the sample had no answer. Thus, the largest single group of respondents—those who had no answer—appear to have no predispositions for or against conservatives. Conservatives view "conservatives" primarily as cautious spenders (12.4%) who are careful and thoughtful (12.8%). Liberals, on the other hand, respond that conservatives are "closed minded" (13.1%) and fearful of change (7.5%). Another 9.7% said that conservatives are wealthy or selfish. Not surprisingly, a higher percentage of self-described moderates (35.1%) had no response when asked about conservatives. When usual voting behavior is factored in, it becomes clear that moderate and liberal Republicans are much closer to moderate and liberal Democrats than to conservative Republicans.

Conservatives have two image problems which they must overcome. First, almost one-third of ticket-splitters, a group which has traditionally played a swing role in elections, does not have a definite image of conservatives. As noted earlier, the same holds true for moderates. Conservatives would benefit politically if they would address themselves to this fact, as well as to the negative images

**Table 7.23**  
**Description of "A Conservative"**  
by ideology of respondent

| Ideology (attitude only) | Less Spending/Balanced Budget |                          | Fear/Won't Change | Closed Mind/Set Ways | Careful/Thoughtful | Traditional Values | Republican | Reagan | Stingy/Selfish | Specific People |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------|--------|----------------|-----------------|
|                          | Cautious Spender              | Spending/Balanced Budget |                   |                      |                    |                    |            |        |                |                 |
| Very Conservative        | 11.2%                         | 2.8%                     | 2.8%              | 2.8%                 | 13.1%              | 7.5%               | 0.0%       | 0.9%   | 2.8%           | 0.0%            |
| Somewhat Conservative    | 12.7                          | 3.6                      | 4.9               | 3.9                  | 12.7               | 4.7                | 2.9        | 3.1    | 1.0            | 1.6             |
| Moderate                 | 4.8                           | 1.6                      | 4.8               | 6.9                  | 4.8                | 2.7                | 5.3        | 3.2    | 2.7            | 5.3             |
| Somewhat Liberal         | 2.6                           | 1.3                      | 7.8               | 14.8                 | 4.4                | 1.7                | 6.1        | 3.9    | 3.5            | 2.2             |
| Very Liberal             | 4.4                           | 0.0                      | 6.7               | 8.9                  | 3.3                | 0.0                | 2.2        | 8.9    | 7.8            | 3.3             |
| All Respondents          | 8.0%                          | 2.3%                     | 5.5%              | 7.3%                 | 8.5%               | 3.5%               | 3.7%       | 3.6%   | 2.7%           | 2.4%            |

  

| Ideology              | Business/Free Enterprise |                 | Older People | Wealthy | Middle of Road | Cut Social Programs | Fair/Concerned | Right-Winger | Anti-Liberal | Extreme Negative Definitions |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------|----------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|------------------------------|
|                       | Intelligent/Education    | Free Enterprise |              |         |                |                     |                |              |              |                              |
| Very Conservative     | 4.7%                     | 2.8%            | 0.0%         | 0.0%    | 2.8%           | 0.0%                | 8.4%           | 0.0%         | 1.9%         | 0.0%                         |
| Somewhat Conservative | 2.1                      | 2.3             | 0.5          | 0.0     | 2.6            | 1.3                 | 2.1            | 0.3          | 0.5          | 0.3                          |
| Moderate              | 0.5                      | 2.7             | 1.6          | 2.1     | 0.0            | 2.1                 | 0.5            | 1.1          | 1.6          | 0.5                          |
| Somewhat Liberal      | 0.0                      | 3.9             | 1.3          | 3.0     | 0.4            | 1.7                 | 0.4            | 1.7          | 0.4          | 3.0                          |
| Very Liberal          | 0.0                      | 2.2             | 0.0          | 10.0    | 0.0            | 1.1                 | 0.0            | 0.0          | 0.0          | 1.1                          |
| All Respondents       | 1.4%                     | 2.8%            | 0.8%         | 2.0%    | 1.4%           | 1.4%                | 1.9%           | 0.7%         | 0.8%         | 1.0%                         |

  

| Ideology              | Strong/Takes Stand |             | Positive Responses | Negative Responses | Negative Definitions | Nothing | Other | Don't Know/No Answer |
|-----------------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------|-------|----------------------|
|                       | Specific Issues    | Takes Stand |                    |                    |                      |         |       |                      |
| Very Conservative     | 0.9%               | 2.8%        | 4.7%               | 1.9%               | 0.0%                 | 0.9%    | 1.9%  | 22.4%                |
| Somewhat Conservative | 0.5                | 0.8         | 2.1                | 1.8                | 1.0                  | 0.0     | 4.2   | 26.5                 |
| Moderate              | 1.1                | 0.0         | 0.5                | 2.1                | 1.1                  | 0.0     | 5.3   | 35.1                 |
| Somewhat Liberal      | 2.6                | 0.4         | 0.4                | 4.8                | 0.9                  | 0.0     | 4.4   | 22.2                 |
| Very Liberal          | 6.7                | 0.0         | 0.0                | 4.4                | 0.0                  | 0.0     | 11.1  | 17.8                 |
| All Respondents       | 1.7%               | 0.7%        | 1.5%               | 2.8%               | 0.8%                 | 0.1%    | 4.8%  | 25.9%                |

| Ideology (including party preference) | Less Spending/Balanced Budget |                          |                   |                      | Fear/Won't Change  | Closed Mind/Set Ways | Careful/Thoughtful | Traditional Values | Stings/Selfish |                 |                              |  | Specific People |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|--|-----------------|
|                                       | Cautious Spender              | Spending/Balanced Budget | Fear/Won't Change | Closed Mind/Set Ways | Careful/Thoughtful | Traditional Values   | Republican         | Reagan             | Stings/Selfish | Specific People |                              |  |                 |
| Conservative Republican               | 7.7%                          | 4.6%                     | 4.6%              | 1.5%                 | 13.1%              | 9.2%                 | 3.1%               | 5.4%               | 1.5%           | 0.8%            |                              |  |                 |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican           | 4.6                           | 1.5                      | 9.2               | 16.9                 | 7.7                | 1.5                  | 3.1                | 3.1                | 4.6            | 0.0             |                              |  |                 |
| Ticket-Splitter                       | 9.4                           | 1.4                      | 2.8               | 7.0                  | 11.7               | 2.8                  | 2.8                | 2.3                | 1.4            | 2.8             |                              |  |                 |
| Conservative Democrat                 | 14.5                          | 3.9                      | 5.5               | 5.1                  | 11.3               | 5.1                  | 2.0                | 1.2                | 1.6            | 2.0             |                              |  |                 |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat             | 3.0                           | 0.9                      | 6.9               | 9.6                  | 2.7                | 0.9                  | 6.0                | 5.7                | 4.5            | 3.6             |                              |  |                 |
| All Respondents                       | 8.0%                          | 2.3%                     | 5.5%              | 7.3%                 | 8.5%               | 3.5%                 | 3.7%               | 3.6%               | 2.7%           | 2.4%            |                              |  |                 |
| Business/Free Enterprise              |                               |                          |                   |                      |                    |                      |                    |                    |                |                 | Extreme Negative Definitions |  |                 |
| Conservative Republican               | 5.4%                          | 3.1%                     | 0.0%              | 0.0%                 | 2.3%               | 3.9%                 | 3.9%               | 0.0%               | 2.3%           | 0.8%            |                              |  |                 |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican           | 1.5                           | 0.0                      | 1.5               | 1.5                  | 0.0                | 1.5                  | 0.0                | 0.0                | 0.0            | 0.0             |                              |  |                 |
| Ticket-Splitter                       | 0.9                           | 0.9                      | 0.9               | 0.9                  | 2.3                | 1.9                  | 1.9                | 0.9                | 0.0            | 0.0             |                              |  |                 |
| Conservative Democrat                 | 1.6                           | 2.3                      | 0.8               | 0.0                  | 2.3                | 0.0                  | 3.1                | 0.4                | 0.4            | 0.0             |                              |  |                 |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat             | 0.0                           | 4.8                      | 0.9               | 5.1                  | 0.0                | 1.2                  | 0.6                | 1.1                | 1.1            | 2.7             |                              |  |                 |
| All Respondents                       | 1.4%                          | 2.8%                     | 0.8%              | 2.0%                 | 1.4%               | 1.4%                 | 1.9%               | 0.7%               | 0.8%           | 1.0%            |                              |  |                 |
| Specific Issues                       |                               |                          |                   |                      |                    |                      |                    |                    |                |                 | Don't Know/No Answer         |  |                 |
| Conservative Republican               | 0.8%                          | 3.1%                     | 2.3%              | 0.8%                 | 0.8%               | 0.8%                 | 0.0%               | 4.6%               | 14.6%          |                 |                              |  |                 |
| Moderate/Liberal Republican           | 1.5                           | 0.0                      | 0.0               | 0.0                  | 1.5                | 0.0                  | 0.0                | 4.6                | 33.9           |                 |                              |  |                 |
| Ticket-Splitter                       | 0.9                           | 0.5                      | 2.8               | 1.6                  | 2.8                | 0.5                  | 0.5                | 5.6                | 31.3           |                 |                              |  |                 |
| Conservative Democrat                 | 0.4                           | 0.8                      | 0.8               | 0.6                  | 2.0                | 1.2                  | 0.0                | 3.1                | 28.1           |                 |                              |  |                 |
| Moderate/Liberal Democrat             | 3.6                           | 0.0                      | 0.6               | 1.5%                 | 4.5                | 0.9                  | 0.0                | 5.7                | 23.6           |                 |                              |  |                 |
| All Respondents                       | 1.7%                          | 0.7%                     | 1.5%              | 1.5%                 | 2.8%               | 0.8%                 | 0.1%               | 4.8%               | 25.9%          |                 |                              |  |                 |



of conservatives held by moderates and ticket-splitters. Second, conservative Republicans face the prospect of losing moderate and liberal Republican support as they appeal to conservative Democrats. This trade-off may be acceptable to many conservatives, but in some elections, the defection of any Republicans could be fatal. This cannot be ignored.

### Conclusion

Not surprisingly, the results of this survey offer some hope to both conservatives and liberals. Ethnic respondents adopted conservative positions on some issues and liberal positions on others. For example, a majority agreed that the Soviet Union is the greatest threat to world peace, while supporting a nuclear freeze, even if it would place the United States at a slight numerical disadvantage. Similarly, a majority responded in favor of tuition tax credits for private and parochial schools—a conservative position—and in favor of the Equal Rights Amendment—a generally liberal position.

All of this points up the importance of framing issues in such a way as to maximize electoral support. For example, although affirmative action has become a relatively low-priority issue, it could once again become visible, since it arouses strong opposition among ethnics when discussed in terms of "preferential treatment" or "quotas." Conservatives must also note that proposals to cut Social Security and many "safety net" programs will evoke cries of concern from the electorate. Instead of risking charges that budget cuts are "unfair," conservatives could acknowledge the role of government in providing assistance to the needy, while at the same time emphasizing that the criterion for assistance is true need and that anyone receiving that assistance must make compensation for it by accepting employment. Liberals, on the other hand, will continue to make gains by attacking conservatives and Republicans for promoting policies which they say are unfair to the elderly and needy. And liberals may well put conservatives on the defensive on the Equal Rights Amendment if they rely on "fairness" and downplay the more radical feminist arguments, as well as the more radical feminists themselves.

William Schneider notes the difficulty in building a winning coalition. In discussing realignment, ideological consistency and sociological inconsistencies, he argues

As much survey research has shown, lower-status voters tend to be liberal on economic issues and conservative on social issues, while higher-status voters tend to be just the reverse. Thus, the typical voter is probably ideologically *inconsistent* and therefore feels cross-pressured by the realignment trends in the party system. Many working class voters seek economic protection from the Democratic party but do not trust its social liberalism. Middle class suburbanites favor Reagan's fiscal conservatism but are disturbed by the Moral Majoritarian, anti-environmental, interventionist signals on foreign policy that sometimes emanate from the current administration.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup>William Schneider, "Realignment: The Eternal Question," *PS* 15 (Summer, 1982): 456.



Our own results reflect that very problem. For example, those respondents who came from families with high incomes tended to oppose additional federal spending on social programs. Irish, Italian and Polish respondents with at least a college education were much more likely than their less educated counterparts to oppose additional spending. However, on social issues it is the less educated, lower income respondents who are more conservative. Those with a high school education or less are more likely to oppose the E.R.A. and to favor tuition tax credits. Lowest income respondents were significantly more likely to support a constitutional amendment banning abortion. The same relationship holds true in foreign policy, as the more educated and wealthier respondents were more hesitant to agree that the Soviet Union is the greatest threat to world peace today.

The challenge for both conservatives and liberals is to breach the ideological and cultural differences between more highly educated, white collar ethnics and less educated, blue collar ethnics. A winning coalition probably needs elements of both groups.

Each potential voter has a set of attitudes and priorities which determine how he will vote. Some issues are highly salient, while others are not, and a voter could conceivably hold conservative positions on most issues and still vote for the more liberal candidate. Because of this, it is very difficult to say that a candidate can gain a specific number of votes by adopting a particular position. For example, take the hypothetical case of a candidate, John Smith, who sees that there is public support for the death penalty. By announcing his support for that policy, candidate Smith will, no doubt, pick up some supporters (assuming, of course, that his opponent does not support the measure). But at the same time, Smith may lose some former supporters, and many of those who support the death penalty probably had already decided to vote for Smith because of his positions on other issues or because of some non-issue related reason. This does not mean that a particular issue cannot decide an election, but rather that one issue is only a small part of a campaign. This study has presented data which can be used to understand ethnic attitudes toward particular issues, but also to understand the more general underlying values of the five groups. It is those values, as well as the way issues are presented in the future, which will determine which candidates, parties and ideologies will find support from ethnic voters.

# Appendix I: A Multivariate Analysis

by Frank Newport

It is possible to examine the types of relationships explored in this monograph using some multivariate analysis techniques which are somewhat different from the cross-tabular techniques used in the previous chapters. In particular, if we can assume that the respondent's answers to various attitudes measured in this study are at the interval level of measurement—that is, measured such that the intervals between each response choice are equal—then we can utilize variations of a multivariate linear model technique to examine the relationship between a given independent variable and an attitude (dependent variable) while controlling for the influence of other independent variables which may be related to both variables.

It is of particular interest in the present study to examine the influence of *ethnicity* on the various measured attitudes. We have seen that ethnic group membership does bear a basic, bivariate relationship to various attitudes, but we can also be interested in the underlying natures or explanation for this relationship. Is it ethnicity *per se* which is responsible for the attitudinal differences, or is it a correlate of ethnicity such as education or income which is the real cause? The linear model, regression techniques will allow us to give some answers to these questions.

We should make it clear that these techniques are most useful for *understanding*, and are not *necessarily* augmentations to the *practical* implications of data and relationships between variables. For example, it is probably of greatest practical importance simply to know that there are differences in attitudes towards abortion among the five ethnic groups, for it is this information that would allow a campaign organizer, for example, to make plans concerning the emphasis to be placed on the abortion issue for a particular ethnic group. For this practical use, the campaign manager would be less interested in the underlying reason for the development of the ethnic group—attitude relationship, and more interested in simply knowing that it exists. To use a simple analogy, it is of greatest interest to know that the application of pressure to a car's brake pedal produces stopping behavior. To understand why this relationship works is of less practical pith and moment to the average driver confronted with the need for a sudden stop.

We will focus in this appendix on the relationship between a set of independent variables and the basic attitudinal dependent variables used in this study.

We will set up a series of regression equations, using dummy variables to represent nominal level independent variables, and examine the evidence these equations can give us concerning the impact of each of the variables on given attitudes. We will be particularly interested in looking at the *significance* of the entry of a particular independent variable into an equation explaining variance

in a dependent variable, above and beyond the effect of all other independent variables which will have already been entered into the equation. In other words, we will assume we have knowledge of respondents' positioning on all independent variables except one, and we will look at how much help that knowledge is in predicting respondents' positioning on the dependent variables. Then we will include knowledge of the respondents' value on the one remaining independent variable, and test to see if that additional knowledge allows us to predict with any greater accuracy a respondent's position on the dependent variable. If so, we know that this remaining independent variable has a unique, independent effect on the dependent variable, above and beyond that of all the other variables included in the equation. We will let each independent variable in turn be the last variable entered into the equation, and check each in turn to see what its "above and beyond" impact is. Results will be reported in terms of significance levels (.001, .05, etc.).

In general, the lower the significance level, the less probable that the entry of the remaining variable into the equation's improvement on our predictive ability was due to chance, and the more likely it was due to a real impact. Thus, a significance level of .0001 means that only in one instance out of 10,000 would the predictive increment obtained have occurred by chance.

Table 8.1 which follows records these significance levels of the set of independent variables and the set of 20 dependent variables. To be a bit redundant, we should point out again that the reported numbers in each column represent the significance of adding that particular independent variable (a row variable) into the predictive equation *after* all the other variables have been entered. For example, look at the column representing the equation for Question 3, the respondent's position on the Equal Rights Amendment. All 14 of the listed independent variables (Past Party Behavior, Generation, etc.) were entered into a regression equation *after* all the other 13 variables had been entered. Only three produced significant increments in predictive ability above and beyond that of the other 13. Thus, we can see that even when we know a respondent's past party behavior, his generation, his education, and so forth, the additional knowledge of his ideology allows us to make a significantly more accurate prediction of his stand on the E.R.A. than if we don't know his ideology. Similarly, knowledge of union membership and political party also have independent (but somewhat less significant) impacts on E.R.A. positions. Only significance levels of .05 and lower are recorded.

Several things are immediately apparent from an examination of these tables. First, and most importantly, we can see that the ethnic status of the respondent is an *independent*, significant explanatory factor in explaining the respondent's position on only nine attitudes. Ethnic status is important in explaining the following:

- Q.10—Better treatment for minorities versus treatment by ability.
- Q.28—Voting for a candidate based on his position on abortion.
- Q. 5—Basic position on abortion.



**Table 8.1**  
**Multivariate Analysis**  
significance levels

|                       | <b>Q.3<br/>Equal Rights<br/>Amendment</b> | <b>Q.5<br/>Amendment<br/>Banning<br/>Abortion</b> | <b>Q.6<br/>Death Penalty<br/>for Convicted<br/>Murderer</b> | <b>Q.8<br/>Tuition<br/>Tax Credit<br/>Private/Paro-<br/>chial School</b> | <b>Q.9<br/>Busing for<br/>Better Racial<br/>Balance</b> |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Past Party Behavior   | —                                         | .002                                              | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Generation            | —                                         | —                                                 | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Education             | —                                         | —                                                 | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Union/Non-Union       | .05                                       | —                                                 | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Income                | —                                         | —                                                 | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Occupational Category | —                                         | —                                                 | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Sex                   | —                                         | —                                                 | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Turnout Propensity    | —                                         | —                                                 | —                                                           | .05                                                                      | —                                                       |
| Ideology              | .0001                                     | .003                                              | .02                                                         | —                                                                        | .0006                                                   |
| Age                   | —                                         | .01                                               | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Party                 | .02                                       | .0001                                             | .02                                                         | —                                                                        | .03                                                     |
| Strength of Ethnicity | —                                         | —                                                 | .04                                                         | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Ethnic Concern Scale  | —                                         | —                                                 | —                                                           | —                                                                        | —                                                       |
| Ethnic Status         | —                                         | .0001                                             | .008                                                        | .0001                                                                    | .0001                                                   |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | .191                                      | .095                                              | .066                                                        | .134                                                                     | .128                                                    |
| N                     | 982                                       | 982                                               | 982                                                         | 982                                                                      | 982                                                     |

|                       | <b>Q.10<br/>Better<br/>Treatment or<br/>Ability</b> | <b>Q.11<br/>Environ-<br/>mental Dis-<br/>ruption U.S.<br/>Do Not<br/>Disturb</b> | <b>Q.13<br/>Power in<br/>Courts</b> | <b>Q.14<br/>Treatment in<br/>Courts</b> | <b>Q.15<br/>Government<br/>Spending<br/>Social<br/>Programs</b> |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| Past Party Behavior   | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | —                                       | —                                                               |
| Generation            | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | .03                                     | —                                                               |
| Education             | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | —                                       | —                                                               |
| Union/Non-Union       | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | —                                       | —                                                               |
| Income                | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | —                                       | —                                                               |
| Occupational Category | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | —                                       | —                                                               |
| Sex                   | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | .04                                     | —                                                               |
| Turnout Propensity    | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | .02                                     | —                                                               |
| Ideology              | .0001                                               | .05                                                                              | —                                   | —                                       | .0001                                                           |
| Age                   | —                                                   | —                                                                                | .04                                 | —                                       | —                                                               |
| Party                 | .0008                                               | .02                                                                              | —                                   | .0016                                   | .0001                                                           |
| Strength of Ethnicity | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | —                                       | —                                                               |
| Ethnic Concern Scale  | —                                                   | —                                                                                | —                                   | —                                       | —                                                               |
| Ethnic Status         | .0001                                               | —                                                                                | —                                   | —                                       | —                                                               |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | .126                                                | .074                                                                             | .042                                | .080                                    | .140                                                            |
| N                     | 982                                                 | 982                                                                              | 886                                 | 939                                     | 982                                                             |



Table 8.1 (continued)

|                       | Q.16<br>Government<br>Assistance to<br>Accept Jobs | Q.17<br>U.S. Help<br>Stop<br>Communism<br>in C/S<br>America | Q.19<br>Support U.S.<br>Non-Support<br>Israel | Q.20<br>Support<br>Policy<br>Israel | Q.21<br>U.S. Active<br>in Poland |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Past Party Behavior   | —                                                  | —                                                           | —                                             | .0013                               | —                                |
| Generation            | —                                                  | .05                                                         | —                                             | .02                                 | —                                |
| Education             | .05                                                | —                                                           | —                                             | —                                   | —                                |
| Union/Non-Union       | —                                                  | —                                                           | —                                             | —                                   | —                                |
| Income                | —                                                  | —                                                           | .04                                           | —                                   | .03                              |
| Occupational Category | —                                                  | —                                                           | —                                             | —                                   | —                                |
| Sex                   | —                                                  | .0029                                                       | .05                                           | .002                                | .0006                            |
| Turnout Propensity    | —                                                  | .04                                                         | —                                             | .04                                 | —                                |
| Ideology              | —                                                  | .02                                                         | —                                             | .04                                 | —                                |
| Age                   | —                                                  | .04                                                         | —                                             | —                                   | —                                |
| Party                 | —                                                  | .05                                                         | —                                             | .0001                               | —                                |
| Strength of Ethnicity | .02                                                | —                                                           | .006                                          | —                                   | —                                |
| Ethnic Concern Scale  | .03                                                | .007                                                        | —                                             | —                                   | —                                |
| Ethnic Status         | —                                                  | —                                                           | —                                             | .0003                               | .005                             |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | .074                                               | .087                                                        | .048                                          | .183                                | .077                             |
| N                     | 982                                                | 982                                                         | 982                                           | 982                                 | 982                              |

|                       | Q.22<br>No. 1 Threat<br>to world<br>peace is<br>U.S.S.R. | Q.28<br>Support<br>Amendment<br>Banning<br>Abortion | Q.29<br>Voted For<br>ERA | Q.30<br>Vote To<br>Cut Defense<br>Budget | Q.31<br>Favored<br>Cutting<br>Student<br>Loans |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| Past Party Behavior   | .007                                                     | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Generation            | —                                                        | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Education             | —                                                        | .03                                                 | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Union/Non-Union       | —                                                        | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Income                | —                                                        | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Occupational Category | —                                                        | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Sex                   | —                                                        | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Turnout Propensity    | —                                                        | —                                                   | .05                      | —                                        | —                                              |
| Ideology              | .01                                                      | .0003                                               | .006                     | .01                                      | .0041                                          |
| Age                   | —                                                        | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | .02                                            |
| Party                 | —                                                        | .03                                                 | .03                      | .0001                                    | —                                              |
| Strength of Ethnicity | —                                                        | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Ethnic Concern Scale  | —                                                        | —                                                   | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| Ethnic Status         | —                                                        | .0001                                               | —                        | —                                        | —                                              |
| R <sup>2</sup>        | .102                                                     | .164                                                | .086                     | .091                                     | .059                                           |
| N                     | 982                                                      | 982                                                 | 982                      | 982                                      | 982                                            |

## Explanatory note for table:

Each column represents the regression equation for that set of independent variables regressed on that dependent variable. The numbers represent the significance level of the increment in explained variation ( $R^2$ ) produced by the entry of that independent variable into the equation after all other variables have been entered. Only significance levels of .05 or lower are recorded.

- Q. 6—Death penalty for convicted murderer?
- Q. 8—Tuition tax credit for private or parochial school?
- Q. 9—Busing for better racial balance?
- Q.17—Should the U.S. get involved in stopping Communism in Central and South America?
- Q.20—Support President Reagan's policy toward Israel?
- Q.22—U.S. get involved in Poland?

In short, these are the key issues on which ethnic group membership makes a significant difference above and beyond all other characteristics the models take into account. Of course, to really understand the nature of the significant relationship, we need to look at other ways of presenting data which actually show the patterns of differences by ethnic group. The most straightforward such mechanism is the basic bivariate table used in the previous chapters of this monograph. Thus, as can be seen from Table 5.7, the reason for the significance of the relationship between ethnicity and Q.10 is clear: Hispanics are much more in favor of the special treatment for minorities option, while the other four groups are much more in favor of the "ability" option.

Most of the relationships follow what we would predict. Attitudes towards abortion and tax credits for parochial schools are closely connected to Catholic teachings and practices. "Reverse discrimination" or "equal opportunity" (Q.10) has quite a different impact on and meaning towards Hispanics and Jewish respondents. Busing has different implications for members of these different groups. And, quite obviously, U.S. foreign policy toward Central and South America, toward Israel, and toward Poland, would have differential impact on Hispanics, Jews, and Polish ethnics respectively. Only the attitude towards the death penalty (Q.6) does not have an immediately apparent relationship to ethnicity, but as can be seen in Table 5.24, a primary explanation for the significance of the relationship lies with the fact that Polish respondents are more in favor of the death penalty, and that Irish and Hispanic respondents are more opposed to the death penalty than the average respondent interviewed.

Looked at in a different fashion, these data indicate that the E.R.A., environmental disruption, student loans, basic support for Israel, attitudes toward the threat posed by the Soviet Union, government spending on social programs, government assistance being given only when individuals accept jobs, the defense budget, and the judicial system in this country are not issues on which an individual's ethnic status *per se* have a significant and independent effect.

In general, these same patterns of relationships appear in the cross-tabular analysis used as the framework for the chapters of this monograph, although the cross-tabular analysis was confined (as it usually must be due to sample size limitations) to three variable considerations. The results of our multivariate analysis simply produce a different way of looking at these same relationships. The multivariate, linear model approach is somewhat more elegant, and has greater power in general to analyze large numbers of variables without being restricted by low sample sizes. The basis tabular analysis (the "old-fashioned"

methodology) is a bit more cumbersome, yet it retains the very significant advantage of allowing the analyst to actually see real numbers, or, that is, numbers which represent actual, real respondents. Each analyst, of course, has his or her preferred way of discerning what the data really mean.

# Appendix II

## ETHNIC STUDY

Version A

INTERVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_  
TARRANCE & ASSOCIATES  
PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

Hello, I'm \_\_\_\_\_ of Tarrance & Associates, a national research firm. We're talking to people in your area today about issues facing us all.

- A. Are you 18 years of age or older?  
IF "NO", ASK: Is there anyone home that is 18? (REPEAT SCREEN)
- |                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Yes (CONTINUE) .....                | 1 |
| No/Unsure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... | 2 |

- B. Some people have the time to register to vote while others do not. Do you recall whether you are registered to vote *today* in your state?
- |                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Yes (CONTINUE) .....                  | 1 |
| No/not sure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... | 2 |

We are particularly interested today in talking with members of specific groups in America in order to gain a better understanding of their own particular views and concerns—

- C. And from what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?
- |                                                   |   |
|---------------------------------------------------|---|
| _____ Ireland (GO TO E) .....                     | 1 |
| _____ Other (READ STATEMENT) .....                | 2 |
| _____ Ireland <i>and</i> other (GO TO Q.D.) ..... | 3 |

**STATEMENT:** "SINCE WE ONLY NEED TO TALK WITH CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS DURING TODAY'S INTERVIEWING, WE WON'T NEED TO BOTHER YOU ANY FURTHER. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION."

- D. Which one of these countries do you feel closer to?
- |                                          |   |
|------------------------------------------|---|
| _____ Ireland (GO TO Q.E.) .....         | 1 |
| _____ Other (READ STATEMENT ABOVE) ..... | 2 |

- E. And what is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or some other religion?
- |                                    |                           |   |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| (READ TERMINATION STATEMENT ABOVE) | Catholic (TO Q.1.) .....  | 1 |
|                                    | Protestant .....          | 2 |
|                                    | Jewish .....              | 3 |
|                                    | Some other religion ..... | 4 |
|                                    | No religion .....         | 5 |



# ETHNIC STUDY

Version B

INTERVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_  
TARRANCE & ASSOCIATES  
PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

Hello, I'm \_\_\_\_\_ of Tarrance & Associates, a national research firm. We're talking to people in your area today about issues facing us all.

- A. Are you 18 years of age or older?  
IF "NO", ASK: Is there anyone home that is 18? (REPEAT SCREEN) Yes (CONTINUE) ..... 1  
No/Unsure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... 2

- B. Some people have the time to register to vote while others do not. Do you recall whether you are registered to vote *today* in your state? Yes (CONTINUE) ..... 1  
No/not sure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... 2

We are particularly interested today in talking with members of specific groups in America in order to gain a better understanding of their own particular views and concerns—

- C. And from what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?  
\_\_\_\_\_ Poland (GO TO E) ..... 1  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other (READ STATEMENT) ..... 2  
\_\_\_\_\_ Poland and other (GO TO Q.D.) ..... 3

STATEMENT: "SINCE WE ONLY NEED TO TALK WITH CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS DURING TODAY'S INTERVIEWING, WE WON'T NEED TO BOTHER YOU ANY FURTHER. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION."

- D. Which one of these countries do you feel closer to?  
\_\_\_\_\_ Poland (GO TO Q.E.) ..... 1  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other (READ STATEMENT ABOVE) ..... 2

- E. And what is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or some other religion?  
(READ TERMINATION STATEMENT ABOVE) Catholic (TO Q.1.) ..... 1  
Protestant ..... 2  
Jewish ..... 3  
Some other religion ..... 4  
No religion ..... 5

# ETHNIC STUDY

Version C

INTERVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_  
TARRANCE & ASSOCIATES  
PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

Hello, I'm \_\_\_\_\_ of Tarrance & Associates, a national research firm. We're talking to people in your area today about issues facing us all.

- A. Are you 18 years of age or older?  
IF "NO", ASK: Is there anyone home that is 18? (REPEAT SCREEN) Yes (CONTINUE) ..... 1  
No/Unsure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... 2

B. Some people have the time to register to vote while others do not. Do you recall whether you are registered to vote *today* in your state?

Yes (CONTINUE) ..... 1  
No/not sure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... 2

We are particularly interested today in talking with members of specific groups in America in order to gain a better understanding of their own particular views and concerns—

C. And from what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?

Italy (GO TO E) ..... 1  
Other (READ STATEMENT) ..... 2  
Italy *and* other (GO TO Q.D.) ..... 3

**STATEMENT:** "SINCE WE ONLY NEED TO TALK WITH CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS DURING TODAY'S INTERVIEWING, WE WON'T NEED TO BOTHER YOU ANY FURTHER. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION."

D. Which one of these countries do you feel closer to?

Italy (GO TO Q.E.) ..... 1  
Other (READ STATEMENT ABOVE) ..... 2

E. And what is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or some other religion?

(READ TERMINATION STATEMENT ABOVE)

Catholic (TO Q.1.) ..... 1  
Protestant ..... 2  
Jewish ..... 3  
Some other religion ..... 4  
No religion ..... 5

## ETHNIC STUDY

Version D

INTERVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_  
TARRANCE & ASSOCIATES  
PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

Hello, I'm \_\_\_\_\_ of Tarrance & Associates, a national research firm. We're talking to people in your area today about issues facing us all.

A. Are you 18 years of age or older?  
IF "NO", ASK: Is there anyone home that is 18? (REPEAT SCREEN)

Yes (CONTINUE) ..... 1  
No/Unsure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... 2

B. Some people have the time to register to vote while others do not. Do you recall whether you are registered to vote *today* in your state?

Yes (CONTINUE) ..... 1  
No/not sure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... 2

We are particularly interested today in talking with members of specific groups in America in order to gain a better understanding of their own particular views and concerns—

C. And what is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or some other religion?

(READ TERMINATION STATEMENT ABOVE)

Jewish (TO Q.1.) ..... 1  
Catholic ..... 2  
Protestant ..... 3  
Some other religion ..... 4  
No religion (TO Q.D.) ..... 5

STATEMENT: "SINCE WE ONLY NEED TO TALK WITH CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS DURING TODAY'S INTERVIEWING, WE WON'T NEED TO BOTHER YOU ANY FURTHER. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION."

D. And what do you consider your race or ethnic background?

Jewish (GO TO Q.1.) ..... 1  
Other (READ STATEMENT ABOVE) ..... 2

## ETHNIC STUDY

Version E

INTERVIEWER \_\_\_\_\_  
TARRANCE & ASSOCIATES  
PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

Hello, I'm \_\_\_\_\_ of Tarrance & Associates, a national research firm. We're talking to people in your area today about issues facing us all.

A. Are you 18 years of age or older?

IF "NO", ASK: Is there anyone home that is 18? (REPEAT SCREEN)

Yes (CONTINUE) ..... 1  
No/Unsure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... 2

B. Some people have the time to register to vote while others do not. Do you recall whether you are registered to vote *today* in your state?

Yes (CONTINUE) ..... 1  
No/not sure (THANK & TERMINATE) ..... 2

We are particularly interested today in talking with members of specific groups in America in order to gain a better understanding of their own particular views and concerns—

C. And from what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?

Spanish speaking countries (Mexico, Spain, Puerto Rico, Cuba, other Carribean nations, Central American nations, South American nations (GO TO E) ..... 1  
Other (READ STATEMENT) ..... 2  
Spanish speaking countries and other (GO TO Q.D.) ..... 3

**STATEMENT:** "SINCE WE ONLY NEED TO TALK WITH CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS DURING TODAY'S INTERVIEWING, WE WON'T NEED TO BOTHER YOU ANY FURTHER. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION."

D. Which one of these countries do you feel closer to?

Spanish speaking countries (GO TO E) ..... 1  
Other (READ STATEMENT ABOVE) ..... 2

E. And what is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or some other religion?

(READ TERMINATION STATEMENT ABOVE)

Catholic (TO Q.1.) ..... 1  
Protestant ..... 2  
Jewish ..... 3  
Some other religion ..... 4  
No religion ..... 5

1. In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing our country today—that is, the one you yourself are most concerned about? (PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT THAT?)

---

---

---

---

---

2. Now on the local level, what do you consider to be the most important problem facing your community today—that is, the one you yourself are most concerned about? (PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT THAT?)

---

---

---

---

---

Now I'd like your opinion on several issues which people have been talking about. For each one, please tell me whether you favor or oppose the issue. First—

3. The Equal Rights Amendment or E.R.A.  
—the constitutional amendment about women. (PROMPT: DO YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE THIS AMENDMENT?)

Favor ..... 1  
Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... 2  
Oppose ..... 3

4. A constitutional amendment banning abortion.  
(PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

Favor ..... 1  
Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... 2  
Oppose ..... 3



IF "OPPOSE" IN QUESTION 4, ASK:

5. And, would you be more likely to favor such an amendment if it allowed abortions only in cases of rape or incest?

|                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Yes .....                  | 1 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... | 2 |
| No .....                   | 3 |

6. And, do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

|                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Favor .....                | 1 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... | 2 |
| Oppose .....               | 3 |

7. A freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, even if that means the U.S. has slightly fewer weapons. (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

|                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Favor .....                | 1 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... | 2 |
| Oppose .....               | 3 |

8. Tuition tax credit—where parents are given tax credits if they choose to send their children to private or parochial schools. (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

|                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Favor .....                | 1 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... | 2 |
| Oppose .....               | 3 |

9. Finally—busing children to achieve a better racial balance in the schools. (PROMPT: DO YOU FAVOR OR OPPOSE BUSING?)

|                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Favor .....                | 1 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... | 2 |
| Oppose .....               | 3 |

10. Some people say that to make up for past discrimination, women and members of minority groups should be given better treatment for getting jobs and places in college. Others say that ability, as determined by test scores, should be the main consideration. Which of these two views comes closest to your own opinion?  
IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                                 |   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Better treatment/strongly ..... | 1 |
| Better treatment .....          | 2 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) .....      | 3 |
| Ability .....                   | 4 |
| Ability/strongly .....          | 5 |

Now I'd like to read you some statements about energy made by two people. Please tell me which one comes closest to your own opinion.

11. Mr. Jones says that it is okay to cause some disruption in the environment if that's what it takes to find and produce enough energy to make sure that the country has a good economy with plenty of jobs.

Mr. Smith says that we must not disturb or harm the environment, even if it means that we have fewer jobs or a weaker economy.

Which point of view comes closest to your own?

|                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Some disruption okay/strongly ..... | 1 |
| Some disruption okay .....          | 2 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) .....          | 3 |
| Must not disturb .....              | 4 |
| Must not disturb/strongly .....     | 5 |

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

12. Do you think that federal money should be used to help a woman pay for an abortion in some circumstances, or do you think that federal money should *never* be used to help pay for an abortion?

Federal money used ..... 1  
 Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... 2  
 No federal money used ..... 3 \_\_\_\_\_

13. In general, do you feel the courts in this country have too much power, about the right amount of power, or not enough power?

Too much ..... 1  
 About the right amount ..... 2  
 Not enough ..... 3 \_\_\_\_\_

14. And, do you feel that the courts in this country are *too harsh* in their treatment of people convicted of crimes, *not harsh enough* in their treatment, or is their treatment of people convicted of crimes *about right*?

Too harsh ..... 1  
 Not harsh enough ..... 2  
 About right ..... 3 \_\_\_\_\_

15. In general, are you in favor of *more* federal government spending on social programs, such as Aid to Dependent Children, welfare, and Medicare, or *less* government spending on these programs?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

More/strongly ..... 1  
 More ..... 2  
 Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 Less ..... 4  
 Less/strongly ..... 5 \_\_\_\_\_

16. Think for a moment about a new law which would require anyone who received *any* form of government assistance to accept a job if one were available. The law would not apply to people who were sick, disabled, or elderly. Would you favor or oppose such a law?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

Favor/strongly ..... 1  
 Favor ..... 2  
 Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 Oppose ..... 4  
 Oppose/strongly ..... 5 \_\_\_\_\_

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement—

17. "The U.S. must get involved in helping stop the spread of communism in South America and Central America."

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

Agree/strongly (TO Q.18) ..... 1  
 Agree (TO Q.18) ..... 2  
 Unsure (DO NOT READ) (TO 19) .... 3  
 Disagree (TO Q.19) ..... 4  
 Disagree/strongly (TO Q.19) ..... 5 \_\_\_\_\_

IF "AGREE/STRONGLY" OR "AGREE" IN Q.17, ASK:

18. And which of the following do you think would be the most effective way for the United States to do this: (READ LIST)

- |                                          |   |
|------------------------------------------|---|
| (a) Send in American advisors            | 1 |
| (b) Send in American combat troops       | 2 |
| (c) Economic aid                         | 3 |
| (d) Supply military weapons and supplies | 4 |

19. *Some people feel that we spend too much money and effort supporting Israel, and that we should be more even-handed towards the Palestinians and Arabs in the Middle East. Others feel that we should continue to support Israel, even if it means straining relations with the Palestinians and Arabs.*

Which of these views comes closest to your own opinion?

- |                           |   |
|---------------------------|---|
| U.S. should help/strongly | 1 |
| U.S. should help          | 2 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ)      | 3 |
| U.S. stay out             | 4 |
| U.S. stay out/strongly    | 5 |

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

20. Would you say that the Reagan Administration's policies towards Israel have made you *more likely* or *less likely* to support President Reagan?

- |                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| More likely/strongly | 1 |
| More likely          | 2 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) | 3 |
| Less likely          | 4 |
| Less likely/strongly | 5 |

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

21. *Some people think that the U.S. should continue diplomatic pressures to help Polish citizens retain some freedom from the Soviet Union, but that the U.S. should not get actively involved in Poland.*

*Others think that the U.S. should go further, set up embargoes, and engage in other non-military activities in Poland, even if they might heighten tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.*

Which of these comes closest to your own opinion?

- |                                  |   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Not get involved/strongly        | 1 |
| Not get involved                 | 2 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ)             | 3 |
| Non-Military assistance          | 4 |
| Non-Military assistance/strongly | 5 |

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

And do you agree or disagree with this statement—

22. "The number one threat to peace in the world today is the Soviet Union."

- |                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| Agree/strongly       | 1 |
| Agree                | 2 |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) | 3 |
| Disagree             | 4 |
| Disagree/strongly    | 5 |

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

Suppose for a moment that in order to balance the federal budget we had to cut back on some federal programs. Which of the following should be cut first—that is, which of the following programs would be *least* important to the country as a whole if something had to be cut back? (READ LIST, ROTATE) Which should be cut *next*? And which of these is *most* important—that is, should be the *last* program to be cut?

|                                    | Q.23<br>Cut<br>First | Q.24<br>Cut<br>Next | Q.25<br>Cut<br>Last |          |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------|
| (a) Defense spending               | 1                    | 1                   | 1                   |          |
| (b) Federal aid to education       | 2                    | 2                   | 2                   | Q23 ____ |
| (c) Federal health protection      | 3                    | 3                   | 3                   |          |
| (d) Social Security                | 4                    | 4                   | 4                   |          |
| (e) Food stamps                    | 5                    | 5                   | 5                   | Q24 ____ |
| (f) Welfare                        | 6                    | 6                   | 6                   |          |
| (g) Federal aid to the handicapped | 7                    | 7                   | 7                   |          |
| (h) Federal low income programs    | 8                    | 8                   | 8                   | Q25 ____ |

26. What do you personally feel is the greatest *economic* problem we, as a country, face today? (RECORD MENTION, DO NOT READ)

|                                 |        |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| High interest rates .....       | 1      |
| Inflation .....                 | 2      |
| Unemployment .....              | 3      |
| Foreign competition .....       | 4      |
| Productivity .....              | 5      |
| Unbalanced federal budget ..... | 6      |
| Other (SPECIFY) .....           | 7 ____ |

27. If it came down to—(ROTATE)—(1) balancing the federal budget, or (2) increasing our country's defense spending, which would you favor?

|                                    |        |
|------------------------------------|--------|
| Balancing the federal budget ..... | 1      |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) .....         | 2      |
| Increasing defense spending .....  | 3 ____ |

The following are some things you might find out about the candidates for Congress this fall. For each one, please tell me if you would be *more likely* or *less likely* to vote for that candidate, or if it would make no difference in your vote.

28. Someone who supports a constitutional amendment banning abortion.

(PROMPT: WOULD YOU BE MORE LIKELY OR LESS LIKELY TO VOTE FOR A CANDIDATE WHO SUPPORTS BANNING ABORTION OR WOULD IT MAKE NO DIFFERENCE?)

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                                   |        |
|-----------------------------------|--------|
| More likely/strongly .....        | 1      |
| More likely .....                 | 2      |
| Unsure (DO NOT READ) .....        | 3      |
| No difference (DO NOT READ) ..... | 4      |
| Less likely .....                 | 5      |
| Less likely/strongly .....        | 6 ____ |



29. Someone who voted for the Equal Rights Amendment or the E.R.A.

(PROMPT: WOULD YOU BE MORE LIKELY OR LESS LIKELY TO VOTE FOR A CANDIDATE WHO VOTED FOR THE E.R.A.?)

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

More likely/strongly ..... 1  
 More likely ..... 2  
 Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 No difference (DO NOT READ) ..... 4  
 Less likely ..... 5  
 Less likely/strongly ..... 6

30. Someone who voted to cut our defense budget.

(PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

More likely/strongly ..... 1  
 More likely ..... 2  
 Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 No difference (DO NOT READ) ..... 4  
 Less likely ..... 5  
 Less likely/strongly ..... 6

31. Someone who is in favor of cutting federal guaranteed loans to middle and upper class college students. (PROMPT IF NECESSARY)

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

More likely/strongly ..... 1  
 More likely ..... 2  
 Unsure (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 No difference (DO NOT READ) ..... 4  
 Less likely ..... 5  
 Less likely/strongly ..... 6

Which of the following should be *most responsible* for dealing with the problems of the handicapped in this country? The elderly? And the problems of people without enough money who live below the poverty line? (READ LIST FOR EACH QUESTION)

|                                           | Q.32<br>Handicapped | Q.33<br>Elderly | Q.34<br>Below Poverty |          |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------|
| 1) Federal government                     | 1                   | 1               | 1                     | Q32 ____ |
| 2) State government                       | 2                   | 2               | 2                     |          |
| 3) Local governments                      | 3                   | 3               | 3                     | Q33 ____ |
| 4) Business and industry                  | 4                   | 4               | 4                     |          |
| 5) Religious and charitable organizations | 5                   | 5               | 5                     | Q34 ____ |
| 6) Family and relatives                   | 6                   | 6               | 6                     |          |

35. If you could change one thing in this country today, what would it be? (PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THAT?)

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Now just a few more questions for statistical purposes only—

36. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself to be—(ROTATE)—(1) a Republican, (2) a Democrat, (3) an Independent—or what?

IF "REPUBLICAN" OR "DEMOCRAT," ASK: And would you say that you are a strong or not-so-strong Republican/Democrat?

IF "INDEPENDENT" OR "NO PREFERENCE," ASK: And would you say that you *lean more* to the Republicans or the Democrats?

|                                   |   |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Strong Republican .....           | 1 |
| Not-so-strong Republican .....    | 2 |
| Independent/lean Republican ..... | 3 |
| Independent/no preference .....   | 4 |
| Independent/lean Democrat .....   | 5 |
| Not-so-strong Democrat .....      | 6 |
| Strong Democrat .....             | 7 |

37. Have you ever considered yourself as anything other than a/an (INSERT ANSWER FROM 37)?

IF "YES", ASK: And what was that?

|                                                  |   |
|--------------------------------------------------|---|
| No, never thought of self as anything else ..... | 1 |
| Yes, used to be Republican .....                 | 2 |
| Yes, used to be Democrat .....                   | 3 |
| Yes, used to be Independent .....                | 4 |

(IF "NO", GO TO QUESTION 39)

Version A

IF "YES" IN QUESTION 37, ASK:

38. And what made you stop thinking of yourself as a/an (INSERT ANSWER FROM QUESTION 37)?

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39. Do you consider yourself to be a conservative or a liberal?

IF "CONSERVATIVE"/"LIBERAL", ASK: And would that be very conservative/liberal or just somewhat conservative/liberal?

|                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| Very conservative .....      | 1 |
| Somewhat conservative .....  | 2 |
| Moderate (DO NOT READ) ..... | 3 |
| Somewhat liberal .....       | 4 |
| Very liberal .....           | 5 |
| Don't know/can't say .....   | 6 |

40. What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think about someone who is a *conservative*? (PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THAT?)

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- 41A. I'd like for you to think for a moment about a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for American, 7 stands for Irish. Trying to be as honest as you can, where would you place yourself on this scale—that is, *which number from 1 to 7 best represents how you commonly think of yourself?* (IF NECESSARY: 1 STANDS FOR AMERICAN, AND 7 STANDS FOR IRISH.)

|          |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |       |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
| American | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Irish |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|

42A. As an Irish-American, do you have certain problems and concerns which are different from those of other Americans?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

Yes/strongly ..... 1  
 Yes ..... 2  
 Undecided (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 No ..... 4  
 No/strongly ..... 5

Version B

IF "YES" IN QUESTION 37, ASK:

38. And what made you stop thinking of yourself as a/an (INSERT ANSWER FROM QUESTION 37)?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

39. Do you consider yourself to be a conservative or a liberal?

IF "CONSERVATIVE"/"LIBERAL", ASK: And would that be very conservative/liberal or just somewhat conservative/liberal?

Very conservative ..... 1  
 Somewhat conservative ..... 2  
 Moderate (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 Somewhat liberal ..... 4  
 Very liberal ..... 5  
 Don't know/can't say ..... 6

40. What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think about someone who is a conservative? (PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THAT?)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

41B. I'd like for you to think for a moment about a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for American, 7 stands for Polish. Trying to be as honest as you can, where would you place yourself on this scale—that is, *which number from 1 to 7 best represents how you commonly think of yourself?* (IF NECESSARY: 1 STANDS FOR AMERICAN, AND 7 STANDS FOR POLISH.)

American      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Polish

42B. As an Polish-American, do you have certain problems and concerns which are different from those of other Americans?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

Yes/strongly ..... 1  
 Yes ..... 2  
 Undecided (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 No ..... 4  
 No/strongly ..... 5

IF "YES" IN QUESTION 37, ASK:

38. And what made you stop thinking of yourself as a/an (INSERT ANSWER FROM QUESTION 37)?

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39. Do you consider yourself to be a conservative or a liberal?

IF "CONSERVATIVE"/"LIBERAL",  
ASK: And would that be very conservative/liberal or just somewhat conservative/liberal?

|                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| Very conservative .....      | 1 |
| Somewhat conservative .....  | 2 |
| Moderate (DO NOT READ) ..... | 3 |
| Somewhat liberal .....       | 4 |
| Very liberal .....           | 5 |
| Don't know/can't say .....   | 6 |

40. What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think about someone who is a *conservative*? (PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THAT?)

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41C. I'd like for you to think for a moment about a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for American, 7 stands for Italian. Trying to be as honest as you can, where would you place yourself on this scale—that is, *which number from 1 to 7 best represents how you commonly think of yourself?* (IF NECESSARY: 1 STANDS FOR AMERICAN, AND 7 STANDS FOR ITALIAN.)

|          |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |         |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------|
| American | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Italian |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------|

42C. As an Italian-American, do you have certain problems and concerns which are different from those of other Americans?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

|                               |   |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Yes/strongly .....            | 1 |
| Yes .....                     | 2 |
| Undecided (DO NOT READ) ..... | 3 |
| No .....                      | 4 |
| No/strongly .....             | 5 |

IF "YES" IN QUESTION 37, ASK:

38. And what made you stop thinking of yourself as a/an (INSERT ANSWER FROM QUESTION 37)?

---



---



---



39. Do you consider yourself to be a conservative or a liberal?

IF "CONSERVATIVE"/"LIBERAL",  
ASK: And would that be very conservative/liberal or just somewhat conservative/liberal?

Very conservative ..... 1  
Somewhat conservative ..... 2  
Moderate (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
Somewhat liberal ..... 4  
Very liberal ..... 5  
Don't know/can't say ..... 6

40. What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think about someone who is a conservative? (PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THAT?)

41D. I'd like for you to think for a moment about a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for American, 7 stands for Jewish. Trying to be as honest as you can, where would you place yourself on this scale—that is, *which number from 1 to 7 best represents how you commonly think of yourself?* (IF NECESSARY: 1 STANDS FOR AMERICAN, AND 7 STANDS FOR JEWISH.)

American      1      2      3      4      5      6      7      Jewish

42D. As an American who is also Jewish, do you have certain problems and concerns which are different from those of other Americans?

IF CHOICE MADE, ASK: And do you feel strongly about that?

Yes/strongly ..... 1  
Yes ..... 2  
Undecided (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
No ..... 4  
No/strongly ..... 5

Version E

IF "YES" IN QUESTION 37, ASK:

38. And what made you stop thinking of yourself as a/an (INSERT ANSWER FROM QUESTION 37)?

39. Do you consider yourself to be a conservative or a liberal?

IF "CONSERVATIVE"/"LIBERAL",  
ASK: And would that be very conservative/liberal or just somewhat conservative/liberal?

Very conservative ..... 1  
Somewhat conservative ..... 2  
Moderate (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
Somewhat liberal ..... 4  
Very liberal ..... 5  
Don't know/can't say ..... 6

- 
- 
- 

American 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Hispanic \_\_\_\_\_

- |                               |   |
|-------------------------------|---|
| Yes/strongly .....            | 1 |
| Yes .....                     | 2 |
| Undecided (DO NOT READ) ..... | 3 |
| No .....                      | 4 |
| No/strongly .....             | 5 |

|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| United States (TO Q.44A) ..... | 1 |
| Ireland (TO Q.46) .....        | 2 |
| Other (SPECIFY)                |   |
| _____ (TO Q.44A) .....         | 3 |

Yes (TO Q.46) ..... 1  
No (TO Q.45) ..... 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Yes ..... 1  
No ..... 2 \_\_\_\_\_

- |                                 |   |
|---------------------------------|---|
| Less than high school . . . . . | 1 |
| High school graduate . . . . .  | 2 |
| Some college . . . . .          | 3 |
| College graduate . . . . .      | 4 |

- |                           |   |
|---------------------------|---|
| Union household .....     | 1 |
| Teachers union .....      | 2 |
| Non-union household ..... | 3 |
| Both (DO NOT READ).....   | 4 |

|                               |                   |   |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 48. What is your age, please? | 18-24 .....       | 1 |
|                               | 25-34 .....       | 2 |
|                               | 35-44 .....       | 3 |
|                               | 45-54 .....       | 4 |
|                               | 55-64 .....       | 5 |
|                               | 65 and over ..... | 6 |

**Version B**

|                                     |                                |   |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| 43B. In what country were you born? | United States (TO Q.44B) ..... | 1 |
|                                     | Poland (TO Q.46) .....         | 2 |
|                                     | Other (SPECIFY)                |   |
|                                     | _____ (TO Q.44B) .....         | 3 |

IF "UNITED STATES" OR "OTHER"  
IN Q.43, ASK:

|                                                  |                     |   |
|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---|
| 44B. Were either of your parents born in Poland? | Yes (TO Q.46) ..... | 1 |
|                                                  | No (TO Q.45) .....  | 2 |

IF "NO" IN QUESTION 44, ASK:

|                                                        |           |   |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---|
| 45B. And were any of your grandparents born in Poland? | Yes ..... | 1 |
|                                                        | No .....  | 2 |

|                                                                 |                             |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| 46. What is the last grade of school you completed? (READ LIST) | Less than high school ..... | 1 |
|                                                                 | High school graduate .....  | 2 |
|                                                                 | Some college .....          | 3 |
|                                                                 | College graduate .....      | 4 |

|                                                                                             |                           |   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|---|
| 47. Are you or is any member of your household a member of a labor union or teachers union? | Union household .....     | 1 |
|                                                                                             | Teachers union .....      | 2 |
|                                                                                             | Non-union household ..... | 3 |
|                                                                                             | Both (DO NOT READ) .....  | 4 |

|                               |                   |   |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 48. What is your age, please? | 18-24 .....       | 1 |
|                               | 25-34 .....       | 2 |
|                               | 35-44 .....       | 3 |
|                               | 45-54 .....       | 4 |
|                               | 55-64 .....       | 5 |
|                               | 65 and over ..... | 6 |

|                                     |                                |   |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| 43C. In what country were you born? | United States (TO Q.44C) ..... | 1 |
|                                     | Italy (TO Q.46) .....          | 2 |
|                                     | Other (SPECIFY)                |   |
|                                     | _____ (TO Q.44C) .....         | 3 |

IF "UNITED STATES" OR "OTHER"  
IN Q.43, ASK:

|                                                 |                     |   |
|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---|
| 44C. Were either of your parents born in Italy? | Yes (TO Q.46) ..... | 1 |
|                                                 | No (TO Q.45) .....  | 2 |

IF "NO" IN QUESTION 44, ASK:

45C. And were any of your grandparents born in Italy?

Yes ..... 1  
No ..... 2 \_\_\_\_\_

46. What is the last grade of school you completed? (READ LIST)

Less than high school ..... 1  
High school graduate ..... 2  
Some college ..... 3  
College graduate ..... 4 \_\_\_\_\_

47. Are you or is any member of your household a member of a labor union or teachers union?

Union household ..... 1  
Teachers union ..... 2  
Non-union household ..... 3  
Both (DO NOT READ) ..... 4 \_\_\_\_\_

48. What is your age, please?

18-24 ..... 1  
25-34 ..... 2  
35-44 ..... 3  
45-54 ..... 4  
55-64 ..... 5  
65 and over ..... 6 \_\_\_\_\_

Version D

43D. In what country were you born?

United States (TO Q.44D) ..... 1  
Other (SPECIFY)  
\_\_\_\_\_ (TO Q.46) ..... 2 \_\_\_\_\_

IF "UNITED STATES" OR "OTHER" IN Q.43, ASK:

44D. Were either of your parents born outside the United States?

Yes/outside U.S. (TO Q.46) ..... 1  
No/in U.S. (TO Q.45) ..... 2 \_\_\_\_\_

IF "NO" IN QUESTION 44, ASK:

45D. And were any of your grandparents born outside the United States?

Yes ..... 1  
No ..... 2 \_\_\_\_\_

46. What is the last grade of school you completed? (READ LIST)

Less than high school ..... 1  
High school graduate ..... 2  
Some college ..... 3  
College graduate ..... 4 \_\_\_\_\_

47. Are you or is any member of your household a member of a labor union or teachers union?

Union household ..... 1  
Teachers union ..... 2  
Non-union household ..... 3  
Both (DO NOT READ) ..... 4 \_\_\_\_\_

48. What is your age, please?

18-24 ..... 1  
25-34 ..... 2  
35-44 ..... 3  
45-54 ..... 4  
55-64 ..... 5  
65 and over ..... 6 \_\_\_\_\_



43E. In what country were you born?

United States (TO Q.44E) ..... 1  
 Mexico (TO Q.46) ..... 2  
 Puerto Rico (TO Q.46) ..... 3  
 Cuba (TO Q.46) ..... 4  
 Other (SPECIFY) .....

\_\_\_\_\_ (TO Q.46) ..... 5 \_\_\_\_\_

IF "UNITED STATES" IN Q.43, ASK:

44E. Were either of your parents born in a country other than the United States?

IF YES ASK: And which country was that?

Yes/Mexico (TO Q.46) ..... 1  
 Yes/Puerto Rico (TO Q.46) ..... 2  
 Yes/Cuba (TO Q.46) ..... 3  
 Yes/Other (SPECIFY \_\_\_\_\_)  
 (TO Q.46) ..... 4  
 No (TO Q.45) ..... 5 \_\_\_\_\_

IF "NO" IN QUESTION 44, ASK:

45E. And were any of your grandparents born in a country other than the United States?

Yes ..... 1  
 No ..... 2 \_\_\_\_\_

46. What is the last grade of school you completed? (READ LIST)

Less than high school ..... 1  
 High school graduate ..... 2  
 Some college ..... 3  
 College graduate ..... 4 \_\_\_\_\_

47. Are you or is any member of your household a member of a labor union or teachers union?

Union household ..... 1  
 Teachers union ..... 2  
 Non-union household ..... 3  
 Both (DO NOT READ) ..... 4 \_\_\_\_\_

48. What is your age, please?

18-24 ..... 1  
 25-34 ..... 2  
 35-44 ..... 3  
 45-54 ..... 4  
 55-64 ..... 5  
 65 and over ..... 6 \_\_\_\_\_

49. Which of these statements best describes how you usually vote for offices such as U.S. Senator, U.S. Congressman, and Governor? (READ LIST)

Mostly Republican ..... 1  
 A few more Republicans than Democrats ..... 2  
 Independent/the man (DO NOT READ) ..... 3  
 A few more Democrats than Republicans ..... 4  
 Mostly Democrat ..... 5 \_\_\_\_\_

50. Is your total family income over or under \$20,000?

IF UNDER: And is it over or under \$12,000?  
IF OVER: And is it over or under \$30,000?  
IF OVER: And is it over or under \$40,000?

Under \$12,000 ..... 1  
\$12,000-\$20,000 ..... 2  
\$20,000-\$30,000 ..... 3  
\$30,000-\$40,000 ..... 4  
\$40,000 and over ..... 5  
Refused ..... 6 \_\_\_\_\_

51. Of the following types of work, which one describes what the head of the household does? (READ LIST)

Self-employed ..... 1  
White-collar ..... 2  
Blue-collar ..... 3  
Government worker ..... 4  
Farmer/rancher ..... 5  
Not in the labor force (student, housewife, retired) ..... 6  
Unemployed ..... 7  
Other (SPECIFY) ..... 8 \_\_\_\_\_

52. Sex (BY OBSERVATION)

Male ..... 1  
Female ..... 2 \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix III

Distribution of Ethnic Sample, by State

| State          | Irish | Polish | Italian | Jewish | Hispanic |
|----------------|-------|--------|---------|--------|----------|
| Alabama        | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Alaska         | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Arizona        | 1     | 0      | 1       | 0      | 9        |
| Arkansas       | 0     | 0      | 1       | 0      | 0        |
| California     | 7     | 3      | 8       | 16     | 36       |
| Colorado       | 0     | 0      | 1       | 1      | 12       |
| Connecticut    | 7     | 4      | 2       | 3      | 2        |
| Delaware       | 1     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| D.C.           | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Florida        | 6     | 0      | 4       | 19     | 7        |
| Georgia        | 1     | 0      | 0       | 2      | 0        |
| Hawaii         | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Idaho          | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Illinois       | 12    | 42     | 10      | 12     | 4        |
| Indiana        | 3     | 0      | 1       | 1      | 1        |
| Iowa           | 3     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Kansas         | 0     | 0      | 2       | 2      | 0        |
| Kentucky       | 2     | 0      | 1       | 1      | 0        |
| Louisiana      | 2     | 1      | 2       | 2      | 1        |
| Maine          | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Maryland       | 2     | 0      | 0       | 7      | 0        |
| Massachusetts  | 34    | 6      | 16      | 14     | 2        |
| Michigan       | 4     | 27     | 5       | 4      | 1        |
| Minnesota      | 5     | 0      | 1       | 0      | 0        |
| Mississippi    | 0     | 0      | 0       | 1      | 0        |
| Missouri       | 4     | 0      | 1       | 5      | 0        |
| Montana        | 1     | 0      | 0       | 1      | 0        |
| Nebraska       | 1     | 0      | 1       | 0      | 0        |
| Nevada         | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| New Hampshire  | 1     | 0      | 0       | 1      | 0        |
| New Jersey     | 15    | 12     | 20      | 8      | 0        |
| New Mexico     | 1     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 12       |
| New York       | 36    | 61     | 68      | 62     | 10       |
| North Carolina | 1     | 0      | 1       | 1      | 0        |
| North Dakota   | 2     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Ohio           | 13    | 9      | 7       | 1      | 0        |
| Oklahoma       | 0     | 0      | 1       | 2      | 0        |
| Oregon         | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 2        |
| Pennsylvania   | 14    | 24     | 29      | 14     | 0        |
| Rhode Island   | 4     | 0      | 10      | 0      | 1        |
| South Carolina | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| South Dakota   | 0     | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0        |
| Tennessee      | 0     | 0      | 0       | 4      | 0        |
| Texas          | 7     | 1      | 2       | 6      | 97       |
| Utah           | 0     | 0      | 0       | 1      | 1        |

**Distribution of Ethnic Sample, by State (continued)**

| <b>State</b>  | <b>Irish</b> | <b>Polish</b> | <b>Italian</b> | <b>Jewish</b> | <b>Hispanic</b> |
|---------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| Vermont       | 2            | 0             | 0              | 1             | 0               |
| Virginia      | 0            | 2             | 0              | 5             | 1               |
| Washington    | 0            | 0             | 0              | 2             | 0               |
| West Virginia | 0            | 0             | 0              | 0             | 0               |
| Wisconsin     | 8            | 8             | 2              | 1             | 0               |
| Wyoming       | 0            | 0             | 0              | 0             | 0               |
| Not Reported  | 0            | 0             | 3              | 0             | 1               |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  | <b>200</b>   | <b>200</b>    | <b>200</b>     | <b>200</b>    | <b>200</b>      |



## **Appendix IV: Supplementary Tables**

Table 9.1  
Respondents' Age

|                      | 18-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55-64 | 65 and older | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 15.5% | 23.5% | 21.5% | 9.5%  | 15.0% | 15.0%        | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 10.5  | 22.5  | 17.0  | 13.0  | 19.5  | 17.5         | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 9.0   | 19.0  | 16.0  | 19.0  | 23.0  | 14.0         | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 9.0   | 24.0  | 15.0  | 13.0  | 15.5  | 23.5         | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 18.0  | 36.0  | 20.0  | 14.0  | 10.5  | 1.5          | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 12.4% | 25.0% | 17.9% | 13.7% | 16.7% | 14.3%        | 1000 |

Chi square 81.526 DF=20 PROB=0.0001

Table 9.2  
Respondents' Family Incomes

|                      | Under \$12,000 | \$12,000-\$20,000 | \$20,000-\$30,000 | \$30,000-\$40,000 | \$40,000/Over | Refused | n =  |
|----------------------|----------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 10.0%          | 21.0%             | 24.0%             | 20.0%             | 19.0%         | 6.0%    | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 15.5           | 28.5              | 22.0              | 14.5              | 12.5          | 7.0     | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 15.5           | 19.5              | 28.0              | 19.0              | 13.5          | 4.5     | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 11.5           | 19.0              | 17.5              | 18.5              | 24.5          | 9.0     | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 11.0           | 33.5              | 20.0              | 15.5              | 13.5          | 6.5     | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 12.7%          | 24.3%             | 22.3%             | 17.5%             | 16.6%         | 6.6%    | 1000 |

Chi square 41.912 DF=20 PROB=0.0028

Table 9.3  
Respondent's Occupations

|                      | Self-Employed | White-Collar | Blue-Collar | Government Worker | Farmer/<br>Rancher | Not in<br>Labor<br>Force | Unemployed | Other | Don't Know/<br>No Answer | n =  |
|----------------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|------------|-------|--------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 15.5%         | 39.0%        | 15.5%       | 7.5%              | 0.0%               | 19.0%                    | 1.5%       | 1.5%  | 0.5%                     | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 9.0           | 33.0         | 22.0        | 4.5               | 0.5                | 25.0                     | 2.5        | 1.5   | 2.0                      | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 11.5          | 30.0         | 24.0        | 6.5               | 1.0                | 23.5                     | 2.5        | 0.5   | 0.5                      | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 20.0          | 35.0         | 2.5         | 10.5              | 0.5                | 25.0                     | 3.0        | 2.5   | 1.0                      | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 16.0          | 22.0         | 34.5        | 14.0              | 1.0                | 6.5                      | 4.0        | 2.0   | 0.0                      | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 14.4%         | 31.8%        | 19.7%       | 8.6%              | 0.6%               | 19.8%                    | 2.7%       | 1.6%  | 0.8%                     | 1000 |

Chi square 127.706 DF=32 PROB=0.0001

**Table 9.4**  
**Respondents' Education Levels**

|                      | Some<br>High School | High School<br>Graduate | Some College | College<br>Graduate | n =  |
|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|--------------|---------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 7.5%                | 31.0%                   | 27.0%        | 34.5%               | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 18.5                | 35.5                    | 22.0         | 24.0                | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 18.5                | 36.5                    | 15.5         | 29.5                | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 4.5                 | 23.5                    | 20.0         | 52.0                | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 15.0                | 35.5                    | 27.5         | 21.0                | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 13.0%               | 32.4%                   | 22.4%        | 32.2%               | 1000 |

Chi square 79.787 DF=12 PROB=0.0001

**Table 9.5**  
**Respondents and Union Memberships**

|                      | Union<br>Household | Teachers<br>Union | Non-Union<br>Household | Both<br>Unions | Don't Know/<br>Refused | n =  |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------|----------------|------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 18.5%              | 10.5%             | 70.0%                  | 1.0%           | 0.0%                   | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 24.0               | 5.0               | 68.5                   | 2.0            | 0.5                    | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 23.0               | 7.5               | 68.5                   | 1.0            | 0.0                    | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 8.5                | 11.0              | 80.0                   | 0.5            | 0.0                    | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 15.5               | 10.5              | 73.5                   | 0.5            | 0.0                    | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 17.9%              | 8.9%              | 72.1%                  | 1.0%           | 0.1%                   | 1000 |

Chi square 33.247 DF=16 PROB=0.0069

**Table 9.6**  
**Respondents' Turnout Propensities**

|                      | Low   | Medium | High  | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|--------|-------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 21.5% | 53.5%  | 25.0% | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 24.5  | 60.0   | 15.5  | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 21.0  | 59.5   | 19.5  | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 12.0  | 52.0   | 36.0  | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 37.0  | 47.0   | 16.0  | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 23.2% | 54.4%  | 22.4% | 1000 |

Chi square 58.184 DF=8 PROB=0.0001



I'd like for you to think for a moment about a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for American, 7 stands for [insert ethnic group]. Trying to be honest as you can, where would you place yourself on this scale—that is, which number from 1 to 7 best represents how you commonly think of yourself? (IF NECESSARY: 1 STANDS FOR AMERICAN, AND 7 STANDS FOR HISPANIC.)

|                       | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |  |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|--|
| American              |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |
| [insert ethnic group] |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  |

|                      | 1     | 2     | 3     | 4     | 5    | 6    | 7    | Don't Know/<br>No Answer | n =  |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|--------------------------|------|
| Irish Respondents    | 61.0% | 11.5% | 8.0%  | 7.5%  | 3.5% | 2.0% | 5.5% | 1.0%                     | 200  |
| Polish Respondents   | 56.0  | 10.5  | 10.5  | 11.0  | 6.0  | 3.5  | 1.5  | 1.0                      | 200  |
| Italian Respondents  | 64.0  | 7.0   | 8.0   | 12.0  | 4.0  | 1.0  | 4.0  | 0.0                      | 200  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 35.5  | 13.0  | 11.0  | 16.5  | 11.5 | 2.0  | 5.0  | 5.5                      | 200  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 32.0  | 10.0  | 14.5  | 10.0  | 10.5 | 3.5  | 17.5 | 2.0                      | 200  |
| All Respondents      | 49.7% | 10.4% | 10.4% | 11.4% | 7.1% | 2.4% | 6.7% | 1.9%                     | 1000 |

**Table 9.8**  
**Attitude Toward Government Spending on Social Programs**  
by age

|                 | More/Strongly | More  | Unsure | Less  | Less/Strongly | n=   |
|-----------------|---------------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|------|
| 18-34           | 33.9%         | 20.3% | 8.5%   | 13.6% | 23.7%         | 375  |
| 35-54           | 25.7          | 12.4  | 15.6   | 11.4  | 34.9          | 315  |
| 55+             | 29.7          | 17.1  | 15.5   | 6.5   | 31.3          | 310  |
| All Respondents | 30.0%         | 16.8% | 12.9%  | 10.7% | 29.6%         | 1000 |

Chi square 35.043 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

**Table 9.9**  
**Attitude Toward Government Spending on Social Programs**  
by education

|                     | More/Strongly | More  | Unsure | Less  | Less/Strongly | n=   |
|---------------------|---------------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|------|
| High School or Less | 31.7%         | 16.3% | 14.5%  | 7.7%  | 29.7%         | 454  |
| Some College        | 29.0          | 17.4  | 14.3   | 13.0  | 26.3          | 224  |
| College Graduate    | 28.3          | 17.1  | 9.6    | 13.4  | 31.7          | 322  |
| All Respondents     | 30.0%         | 16.8% | 12.9%  | 10.7% | 29.6%         | 1000 |

Chi square 13.174 DF=8 PROB=0.1060

**Table 9.10**  
**Attitude Toward Government Spending on Social Programs**  
by income

|                   | More/Strongly | More  | Unsure | Less  | Less/Strongly | n=   |
|-------------------|---------------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|------|
| Under \$20,000    | 36.8%         | 18.1% | 12.7%  | 6.2%  | 26.2%         | 370  |
| \$20,000-\$40,000 | 25.6          | 17.3  | 12.8   | 12.1  | 32.2          | 398  |
| \$40,000 and Over | 25.3          | 12.7  | 12.1   | 15.7  | 34.3          | 166  |
| Refused           | 30.3          | 16.7  | 16.7   | 15.2  | 21.2          | 66   |
| All Respondents   | 30.0%         | 16.8% | 12.9%  | 10.7% | 29.6%         | 1000 |

Chi square 30.193 DF=12 PROB=0.0026

**Table 9.11**  
**Attitude Toward Government Spending on Social Programs**  
 by occupation

|                                | More/Strongly | More  | Unsure | Less  | Less/Strongly | n =  |
|--------------------------------|---------------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|------|
| Self-Employed/<br>White Collar | 28.3%         | 16.2% | 10.6%  | 12.5% | 32.4%         | 463  |
| Blue Collar                    | 31.1          | 18.9  | 12.8   | 10.7  | 26.5          | 196  |
| Not Employed                   | 33.3          | 19.1  | 15.6   | 7.6   | 24.4          | 225  |
| Other                          | 28.5          | 11.2  | 17.2   | 9.5   | 33.6          | 116  |
| All Respondents                | 30.0%         | 16.8% | 12.9%  | 10.7% | 29.6%         | 1000 |

Chi square 17.977 DF=12 PROB=0.1164

**Table 9.12**  
**"The number one threat to peace in the world is the Soviet Union"**  
 by attitude to U.S. activity *re* Poland

|                     | Agree/<br>Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|---------------------|--------------------|-------|--------|----------|-----------------------|------|
| Uninvolved/Strongly | 52.0%              | 11.9% | 5.5%   | 12.4%    | 18.1%                 | 419  |
| Uninvolved          | 37.2               | 18.9  | 9.5    | 20.3     | 14.2                  | 148  |
| Unsure              | 39.8               | 19.3  | 15.7   | 13.3     | 12.1                  | 83   |
| Assistance          | 34.3               | 25.5  | 5.9    | 21.6     | 12.8                  | 102  |
| Assistance/Strongly | 54.4               | 9.3   | 5.7    | 8.5      | 22.2                  | 248  |
| All Respondents     | 47.6%              | 14.3% | 7.0%   | 13.6%    | 17.5%                 | 1000 |

Chi square 65.081 DF=16 PROB=0.0001

Table 9.13

If you could change one thing in this country today, what would it be?  
(PROBE: CAN YOU TELL ME A LITTLE MORE ABOUT THAT?)

|                      | The President | Reduce Unemployment | The Economy | Tax System | Crime Situation | High Interest Rates | Cut Federal Spending | Inflation | Peace/No War | Eliminate Welfare |
|----------------------|---------------|---------------------|-------------|------------|-----------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------|-------------------|
| Irish Respondents    | 5.5%          | 11.0%               | 5.0%        | 4.0%       | 3.5%            | 2.5%                | 4.0%                 | 3.0%      | 1.5%         | 3.5%              |
| Polish Respondents   | 8.0           | 14.5                | 5.5         | 2.5        | 3.5             | 4.0                 | 1.5                  | 3.0       | 3.0          | 7.5               |
| Italian Respondents  | 8.0           | 7.5                 | 5.0         | 3.5        | 5.5             | 3.5                 | 2.0                  | 1.5       | 4.0          | 3.5               |
| Jewish Respondents   | 13.5          | 6.0                 | 5.5         | 4.0        | 5.0             | 2.0                 | 1.5                  | 5.5       | 2.5          | 2.5               |
| Hispanic Respondents | 10.5          | 8.5                 | 5.0         | 3.0        | 1.5             | 4.5                 | 1.5                  | 4.5       | 2.5          | 3.0               |
| All Respondents      | 9.1%          | 9.5%                | 5.2%        | 3.4%       | 3.8%            | 3.3%                | 2.1%                 | 3.5%      | 2.7%         | 4.0%              |

  

|                      | Less Foreign Involvement | Court System | Politicians | Eliminate Nuclear Power/Waste | No Poverty | Federal Government | More Aid/Elderly | Less Prejudice | More Aware/Concerned | Moral/Religious Attitudes |
|----------------------|--------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------------------|------------|--------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Irish Respondents    | 4.0%                     | 4.5%         | 3.0%        | 2.5%                          | 2.0%       | 3.5%               | 0.5%             | 2.5%           | 2.5%                 | 1.5%                      |
| Polish Respondents   | 3.5                      | 4.0          | 2.5         | 0.0                           | 2.0        | 2.0                | 2.5              | 2.5            | 2.5                  | 2.0                       |
| Italian Respondents  | 0.5                      | 5.5          | 4.5         | 0.5                           | 1.5        | 2.0                | 2.5              | 3.5            | 5.5                  | 1.5                       |
| Jewish Respondents   | 2.5                      | 5.0          | 2.5         | 2.0                           | 1.5        | 1.5                | 1.0              | 4.0            | 2.5                  | 1.0                       |
| Hispanic Respondents | 2.5                      | 1.5          | 1.5         | 1.5                           | 1.0        | 2.5                | 3.0              | 1.5            | 2.0                  | 3.0                       |
| All Respondents      | 2.6%                     | 4.1%         | 2.8%        | 1.3%                          | 1.6%       | 2.3%               | 1.9%             | 2.8%           | 3.0%                 | 1.8%                      |



|                      | Education/<br>Young<br>People | Immigration | Increase<br>Defense/<br>Draft | Work<br>Ethic | Cut<br>Defense<br>Spending | Elect<br>Democrats | Political/<br>Government<br>System | Environment/<br>Pollution | People's<br>Attitudes |
|----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Irish Respondents    | 2.5%                          | 1.5%        | 1.0%                          | 0.5%          | 1.0%                       | 1.0%               | 0.0%                               | 0.0%                      | 1.0%                  |
| Polish Respondents   | 2.5                           | 0.5         | 0.0                           | 0.5           | 1.5                        | 0.0                | 0.0                                | 0.5                       | 0.0                   |
| Italian Respondents  | 1.0                           | 0.0         | 0.5                           | 0.5           | 0.5                        | 0.0                | 1.0                                | 0.5                       | 0.5                   |
| Jewish Respondents   | 0.5                           | 1.5         | 0.5                           | 1.0           | 0.0                        | 0.5                | 1.0                                | 0.5                       | 0.5                   |
| Hispanic Respondents | 2.0                           | 0.0         | 1.5                           | 1.0           | 0.0                        | 0.5                | 1.0                                | 1.0                       | 0.0                   |
| All Respondents      | 1.7%                          | 0.7%        | 0.7%                          | 0.7%          | 0.6%                       | 0.4%               | 0.6%                               | 0.5%                      | 0.4%                  |
|                      | Everything/<br>Many Problems  |             |                               | No Change     |                            | Other              | Don't Know/<br>No Answer           |                           | n =                   |
| Irish Respondents    |                               | 0.5%        |                               | 4.0%          |                            | 3.5%               | 13.5%                              |                           | 200                   |
| Polish Respondents   |                               | 0.0         |                               | 3.5           |                            | 3.0                | 11.5                               |                           | 200                   |
| Italian Respondents  |                               | 1.0         |                               | 3.0           |                            | 6.0                | 14.0                               |                           | 200                   |
| Jewish Respondents   |                               | 0.5         |                               | 1.0           |                            | 8.0                | 13.0                               |                           | 200                   |
| Hispanic Respondents |                               | 0.0         |                               | 3.5           |                            | 6.0                | 19.0                               |                           | 200                   |
| All Respondents      |                               | 0.4%        |                               | 3.0%          |                            | 5.3%               | 14.2%                              |                           | 1000                  |

Chi square 141.560 DF=132 PROB=0.2691

**Table 9.14**  
**Attitude Toward the Use of Federal Money for Abortion**  
 by support/opposition to a constitutional amendment banning abortion

|                 | Federal<br>Money Used | Unsure | No Federal<br>Money | n =  |
|-----------------|-----------------------|--------|---------------------|------|
| Favor           | 32.3%                 | 4.5%   | 63.2%               | 337  |
| Unsure          | 38.8                  | 15.7   | 45.5                | 134  |
| Soft Oppose     | 45.7                  | 5.7    | 48.7                | 265  |
| Hard Oppose     | 61.0                  | 3.8    | 35.2                | 264  |
| All Respondents | 44.3%                 | 6.1%   | 49.6%               | 1000 |

Chi square 76.578 DF=6 PROB=0.0001

**Table 9.15**  
**Likelihood of voting for a candidate who supports a cut in the defense budget**  
 by attitude on U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze

|                 | More Likely/Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | No Difference | Less Likely | Less Likely/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|-----------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|
| Favor           | 32.8%                | 19.6%       | 7.8%   | 13.9%         | 9.0%        | 16.9%                    | 603  |
| Unsure          | 13.5                 | 18.0        | 15.7   | 12.4          | 15.7        | 24.7                     | 89   |
| Oppose          | 14.3                 | 12.7        | 6.5    | 14.9          | 13.3        | 38.3                     | 308  |
| All Respondents | 25.4%                | 17.3%       | 8.1%   | 14.1%         | 10.9%       | 24.2%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 90.750 DF=10 PROB=0.0001

**Table 9.16**  
**Attitude Toward Preferential Treatment**  
by attitude toward busing

|                 | Better<br>Treatment/<br>Strongly | Better<br>Treatment | Unsure | Ability | Ability/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|-----------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--------|---------|----------------------|------|
| Favor           | 20.6%                            | 7.3%                | 10.7%  | 11.6%   | 49.8%                | 233  |
| Unsure          | 19.7                             | 9.1                 | 13.6   | 21.2    | 36.4                 | 66   |
| Oppose          | 9.6                              | 3.1                 | 5.9    | 10.4    | 71.0                 | 701  |
| All Respondents | 12.8%                            | 4.5%                | 7.5%   | 11.4%   | 63.8%                | 1000 |

Chi square 65.318 DF=8 PROB=0.0001

**Table 9.17**  
**Likelihood of voting for a candidate who supports a constitutional amendment banning abortion**  
by attitude toward a constitutional amendment banning abortion

|                 | More Likely/Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | No Difference | Less Likely | Less Likely/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|-----------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|
| Favor           | 47.2%                | 16.3%       | 3.9%   | 17.2%         | 4.5%        | 11.0%                    | 337  |
| Unsure          | 13.4                 | 8.2         | 13.4   | 42.5          | 8.2         | 14.2                     | 134  |
| Soft Oppose     | 18.9                 | 7.6         | 5.3    | 21.5          | 16.2        | 30.6                     | 265  |
| Hard Oppose     | 4.9                  | 3.0         | 2.7    | 15.5          | 12.5        | 61.4                     | 264  |
| All Respondents | 24.0%                | 9.4%        | 5.2%   | 21.3%         | 10.2%       | 29.9%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 372.564 DF=15 PROB=0.0001

**Table 9.18**  
Likelihood of voting for a candidate who supports E.R.A.  
by attitude toward E.R.A.

|                 | More Likely/Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | No Difference | Less Likely | Less Likely/<br>Strongly | n =  |
|-----------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|---------------|-------------|--------------------------|------|
| Favor           | 51.0%                | 22.6%       | 2.1%   | 19.3%         | 2.2%        | 2.8%                     | 669  |
| Unsure          | 7.8                  | 17.7        | 15.7   | 45.1          | 4.9         | 8.8                      | 102  |
| Oppose          | 5.2                  | 5.7         | 6.6    | 31.0          | 17.9        | 33.6                     | 229  |
| All Respondents | 36.1%                | 18.2%       | 4.5%   | 24.6%         | 6.1%        | 10.5%                    | 1000 |

Chi square 441.928 DF=10 PROB=0.0001

**Table 9.19**  
Most Effective Way to Stop Communism in South and Central America  
by those ethnic respondents who believe U.S. should help stop communism

|                      | American<br>Advisors | American<br>Combat<br>Troops | Economic<br>Aid | Weapons/<br>Supplies | Don't Know/<br>No Answer | n = |
|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|--------------------------|-----|
| Irish Respondents    | 45.4%                | 3.1%                         | 35.1%           | 11.3%                | 5.2%                     | 97  |
| Polish Respondents   | 40.9                 | 2.3                          | 35.2            | 15.9                 | 5.7                      | 88  |
| Italian Respondents  | 44.3                 | 4.1                          | 34.0            | 9.3                  | 8.3                      | 97  |
| Jewish Respondents   | 41.2                 | 2.9                          | 35.3            | 14.7                 | 5.9                      | 68  |
| Hispanic Respondents | 53.1                 | 4.4                          | 23.0            | 14.2                 | 5.3                      | 113 |
| All Respondents      | 45.6%                | 3.5%                         | 32.0%           | 13.0%                | 6.0%                     | 463 |

Chi square 9.921 DF=16 PROB=0.8707



Table 9.20  
Support for Reagan because of his Policy Toward Israel  
by current and past party status

|                                | More Likely/Strongly | More Likely | Unsure | Less Likely | Less Likely/Strongly | n = |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|--------|-------------|----------------------|-----|
| Republicans                    | 29.0%                | 21.5%       | 30.1%  | 7.5%        | 11.8%                | 93  |
| Republicans/Former Democrats   | 26.1                 | 26.1        | 34.8   | 8.7         | 4.4                  | 23  |
| Republican/Former Independents | 11.1                 | 22.2        | 44.4   | 11.1        | 11.1                 | 18  |
| Independents                   | 13.1                 | 10.0        | 34.6   | 15.0        | 27.3                 | 260 |
| Independent/Former Democrats   | 20.0                 | 14.3        | 28.6   | 15.7        | 21.4                 | 70  |
| Independent/Former Republicans | 20.0                 | 6.7         | 33.3   | 13.3        | 26.7                 | 15  |
| Democrats                      | 8.5                  | 10.4        | 32.0   | 13.7        | 35.3                 | 422 |
| Democrat/Former Republicans    | 32.0                 | 16.0        | 36.0   | 0.0         | 16.0                 | 25  |
| Democrat/Former Independents   | 8.3                  | 10.4        | 37.5   | 18.8        | 25.0                 | 48  |
| All Respondents Refusals       | 13.4%                | 12.0%       | 32.1%  | 13.0%       | 26.9%                | 974 |

Chi square 87.277 DF=32 PROB=0.0001

Table 9.21  
 "The number one threat to peace in the world is the Soviet Union  
 by current and past party status

|                                | Agree/Strongly | Agree | Unsure | Disagree | Disagree/Strongly | n = |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-------|--------|----------|-------------------|-----|
| Republicans                    | 55.9%          | 14.0% | 6.5%   | 10.8%    | 12.9%             | 93  |
| Republicans/Former Democrats   | 47.8           | 17.4  | 4.4    | 4.4      | 26.1              | 23  |
| Republican/Former Independents | 50.0           | 27.8  | 5.6    | 11.1     | 5.6               | 18  |
| Independents                   | 42.7           | 11.5  | 7.3    | 17.7     | 20.8              | 260 |
| Independent/Former Democrats   | 37.1           | 12.9  | 10.0   | 17.1     | 22.9              | 70  |
| Independent/Former Republicans | 73.3           | 6.7   | 6.7    | 0.0      | 13.3              | 15  |
| Democrats                      | 49.5           | 16.6  | 7.1    | 12.1     | 14.7              | 422 |
| Democrat/Former Republicans    | 76.0           | 8.0   | 4.0    | 4.0      | 8.0               | 25  |
| Democrat/Former Independents   | 43.8           | 10.4  | 2.1    | 18.8     | 25.0              | 48  |
| All Respondents                | 46.9%          | 13.9% | 6.7%   | 13.2%    | 16.7%             | 974 |
| Refusals                       |                |       |        |          |                   |     |

Chi square 44.188 DF=32 PROB=0.0742

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**Ethnic Voters and National Issues** examines the attitudes of five ethnic groups—Hispanics, Irish, Italians, Poles, and Jews—toward certain economic, social and foreign policy issues and suggests ways in which issues might be framed and prioritized in order to draw the groups into an ideological coalition.

Since the upheavals of the 1960's, members of a number of ethnic groups appear to be becoming more conservative and, in some areas, somewhat less Democratic. However, it is not yet clear whether ethnic Americans are ready to turn their backs completely on the Democratic party, and it is equally uncertain whether the policies being advocated by the Republican Party and its standard-bearer will lead those ethnic voters to continue to support conservatives and Republicans throughout the 1980's.

Conservatives clearly face a problem in convincing the ethnic public that increased defense spending is necessary. While it is true that respondents who agreed that the Soviet Union is the greatest threat to world peace were more likely to favor increased defense spending, even a majority of those respondents opted for a balanced budget over increased defense spending.

The sample's overwhelming support for the proposition that all able-bodied incidents of government assistance be required to accept a job if one is available indicates that a political party which makes the proposal an important part of its agenda will find great support in the ethnic community.



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